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This research covers a targeted review of relevant theories and technical domains related 
to the incorporation of organizational factors into technological systems risk. In the 
absence of a comprehensive set of principles and modeling guidelines rooted in theory 
and empirical studies, all models look equally good, or equally poor, with very little basis 
to discriminate and build confidence. Therefore, this research focused on the possibility 
of improving the theoretical foundations and principles for the field of Organizational 
Safety Risk Analysis. Also, a process for adapting a hybrid modeling technique, in order 
to operationalize the theoretical organizational safety frameworks, is proposed. Candidate 
ingredients are techniques from Risk Assessment, Human Reliability, Social and 
Behavioral Science, Business Process Modeling, and Dynamic Modeling. Then, as a 
realization of aforementioned modeling principles, an organizational safety risk 
 
framework, named Socio-Technical Risk Analysis (SoTeRiA)1 is developed. The proposed 
framework considers the theoretical relation between organizational safety culture, 
organizational safety structure/practices, and organizational safety climate, with specific 
distinction between safety culture and safety climate. A systematic view of safety culture 
and safety climate fills an important gap in modeling complex system safety risk, and 
thus the proposed organizational safety risk theory describing the theoretical relation 
between two concepts to bridge this gap. In contrast to the current safety causal models 
which do not adequately consider the multilevel nature of the issue, the proposed 
multilevel causal model explicitly recognizes the relationships among constructs at 
multiple levels of analysis. Other contributions of this research are in implementing the 
proposed organizational safety framework in the aviation domain, particularly the airline 
maintenance system. The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which has 
sponsored this research over the past three years, has recognized the issue of 
organizational factors as one of the most critical questions in the quest to achieve 80% 
reduction in aviation accidents. An example of the proposed hybrid modeling 
environment including an integration of System Dynamics (SD), Bayesian Belief 
Network (BBN), Event Sequence Diagram (ESD), and Fault Tree (FT), is also applied in 
order to demonstrate the value of hybrid frameworks. This hybrid technique integrates 
deterministic and probabilistic modeling perspectives, and provides a flexible risk 
management tool.  
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 In most modern industries, safety is a stated goal at the same level of priority 
as efficient and economical production. Yet we continue to witness large-scale system 
failures and loss of lives due to major accidents. Many such failures and accidents do 
not have a simple explanation, particularly those that have significant contributions 
from human and organizational behaviors. One example of these major accidents is 
the Chernobyl accident in 1996, for which the International Atomic Energy Agency 
cites “poor safety culture” as a primary cause. (Cox & Flin, 1998) As another 
example, after the crash of Continental Express Flight 2574 near Eagle Lakes, Texas, 
on September 11, 1991, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) stated that 
Continental Express management’s failure “to establish a corporate culture which 
encouraged and enforced adherence to approved maintenance and quality assurance 
procedures” (NTSB/AAR-92/04, 1992:54) was a contributing factor.  
 Increasing interest over the past two decades in causal modeling of 
organizational safety behavior is in part motivated by the desire to understand the 
deeper more fundamental causes of accidents and incidents. Naturally the main 
objective is to be able to identify preventive measures and assess their effectiveness. 
Complex socio-technical systems are comprised of two different key ingredients: 
physical system and human system. Gordon (1998) among an increasing number of 
researchers remind us that, “the performance of a complex socio-technical system is 




and environmental factors…”  However there are significant gaps in this 
multidisciplinary research area. Social Sciences fail to provide an understanding of 
the processes that lead to failures in technological systems, while engineers fail to 
incorporate social aspects in the analysis of conditions that lead to system failures. 
Human Reliability Analysis which is the study of the nature, causes, and probability 
of human actions in the design and operation of systems and processes, is 
concentrated on individual error and is not typically extended to formally consider the 
effects of organizational factors , in a formal and comprehensive way as well. As 
Reason (1990) states “While cognitive psychology can tell us something about an 
individual’s potential for error, it has very little to say about how these individual 
tendencies interact within complex groupings of people working in high–risk 
systems”. And it is these “collective failures” that represents the major residual 
hazard. Organizations (behind the technical system), where these “collective failures” 
may occur, play a significant role in the reliability of technological systems.  
 At the same time, new realities highlight the need for more comprehensive 
models of risk assessments and management. These include rapid changes in 
technology, changes in the nature of accidents, new types of hazards, complexity of 
rare, but high consequence accidents, and changing regulatory approaches to safety. 
(Leveson, 2004) 
 The key questions in this line of research can be summarized as follows: (1) 
what are the organizational factors that affect risk? (2) how do these factors influence 
risk? and (3) how much do they contribute to risk? This thesis aims at paving the way 




broader perspective, all the efforts and studies in this research area can be placed 
under the banner of “Organizational Safety Risk Analysis”. The most dominant 
driving forces for this field of research have been several high profile accident 
investigations, industry deregulation, and emergence and rapid growth of 
Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA), as a tool for decision making. The latter is the 
primary framework of this thesis.  
 Methods to perform risk assessment in the early 1960s originated in U.S. 
aerospace and missile programs. Later, the nuclear industry used PRA as a structured 
and formal method for identifying and assessing risk in its technological system. In 
most applications PRAs have been a tool to estimate risk as a function of equipment 
and operator performance. The process is used to identify potential accident 
scenarios, estimate the likelihoods and consequences of accidents, and improve 
system safety designs and operations. This analytical technique was gradually 
improved and applied over the past two decades, not only in the nuclear industry, but 
in other fields including the offshore oil, petrochemical and defense industries. 
However, some decision makers and safety analysts have expressed concern that the 
current generation of PRA may not have accounted for the contributions of 
organizational factors to the total risk.  This is rooted, at least in part, in the fact that 
vast majority of PRAs do not include an explicit representation of the possible impact 
of organization and management on safety performance of equipment and personnel. 
In contrast, investigations of major accidents have cited management and 
organizational factors as major contributors to operational safety problems (e.g., 




research and modeling efforts in recent years, resulting in several methodologies and 
framework. This research is an effort to contribute to this new domain.  
 
1.2 Research Approach 
  
 Seeking answers to the research questions, first, the quantitative frameworks 
that have been proposed for inclusion of organizational factors in PRA were studied. 
These research studies have mainly focused their efforts on quantification methods. 
Many such as MACHINE (Embrey, 1992), Omega Factor Model (Mosleh & Golfeiz, 
1999), SAM (Pate-Cornell, 1996), ASRM (Luxhoj, 2004), and “Causal Modeling of 
Air Safety” (Roelen et al., 2003) use variations of the Bayesian Belief Network 
(BBN). Some other ones such as WPAM (Davoudian, 1994) utilized flow diagrams to 
relate work processes and organizational factors. 
 Significant increase in sophistication of quantitative methods of safety and 
risk assessment over the past two decades led many to believe that the same style of 
causal modeling is an effective way of assessing the effects of the organizational 
factor on safety risks. There is however a number of major challenges in developing a 
predictive causal model of organizational safety performance. The study of the field 
has revealed the fact that although the key research questions for this line of research 
are obvious, foundations for model building are lacking. The existing frameworks 
have some similar, but also dissimilar steps. However, in the absence of a 
comprehensive theory, or at least a set of principles and modeling guidelines rooted in 




little basis to discriminate, and build confidence. Therefore, as a first fundamental 
step, this research focused on the possibility of improving the theoretical 
understanding of relation between character of organizations and their (system) safety 
output. 
 The first field that was reviewed for its potential use in safety models was 
simulation approach for organizations (see for example Carley, 2000, Carley & Lin, 
1997). In such an approach, the focus is on modeling the organization as an 
information processor composed of a collection of intelligent individuals. Carley for 
instance assesses organizational adaptation using simulation software called 
ORGAHEAD. This software simulates the response to organizational changes, and 
the analysis of the results generates theoretical predictions on organizational 
adaptation. Research has shown that this approach of detail simulation has potential 
applicability in small organizations, but in large organizations loses its efficiency.  
 A totally different perspective can be seen in Biondi (1998), utilizing a 
conceptual model, named Complex Adaptive Non-Linear (CANL). The CANL model 
created by Bella (1997) is a qualitative representation of the migration process of a 
system towards its boundary. In Bella’s view, large organizations are complex 
systems, which adaptively change and self-organize. The non-linear response of 
organizations cannot be reduced to the intentions of the individuals that make it up. 
Their emergent outcomes can be found by the focus on the “whole” rather than 
“parts”. Bella believes that the global patterns of behavior that tend to reduce the 
safety of systems are common to all systems. They are: (1) “shift of the burden of 




and (4) “systemic distortion of information”. These four global patterns of behavior 
are defined as “organizational factor type” by Biondi (1998).  He states that the 
organization system can have an affect on the reliability through numerous 
interrelated ways (token). But, identification and classification of these tokens in 
detail are not possible. Biondi, instead, concentrated on organizational factors “type” 
instead of “token”.  
 The idea of looking for “pattern of behavior” in organization is appealing, but 
the CANL approach is too qualitative to be linked to the quantitative risk models. 
Even the link proposed by Biondi’s has not been discussed in detail. Searching for a 
more practical approach that could accommodate the concept of “pattern of behavior” 
in organization led to the System Dynamics literature. System dynamics (Forrester, 
1957) is an extension of control theory/cybernetics to management. It is also applied 
to complex dynamic systems, involving psychological, social, technological or even 
environmental aspects (Sterman, 2000). System dynamics modeling can take into 
account nonlinear dynamics, feedback, time delays, and interdisciplinary aspects. 
System dynamics focuses on the pattern of system behavior (instead of events) based 
on time dependencies and dynamic behavior. They attempt to model the underlying 
structure of the system that creates a specific pattern of behavior.  
 Some references have used system dynamics modeling to describe the safety 
outcome of organization.  For example, Cooke (2004) develops a system dynamics 
model of the Westray mine disaster. In his causal loop model of the accident, the 
interactions between safety and non-safety factors (e.g. productivity) are presented. 




Leveson (2004). In her point of view, safety can be shown as a control problem and 
managed by a control structure developed for a socio-technical system. In other 
words, Leveson tries to model the whole system from the control point of view.  
 Since event chain scenarios are capable of modeling technical risks (to be 
explained more in Chapter 4), it seems that framing the whole model as a control 
structure is not needed, and it makes the integrated model too complicated. A 
promising approach could be to model social aspects from control perspectives and 
link them to pre-existing PRA models, which have been able to develop technical 
system risk scenarios successfully. I found system dynamics as a powerful tool to 
model the pattern of organizational behavior, but without a comprehensive 
knowledge about the organizational behavior, system dynamics applications can be 
very misleading. 
 Studying a separate branch of management science, the quality management 
literature, I found that the idea of integrating safety and quality has been mentioned 
by some references such as Roughton, Lischeid, Peterson, Curis, Weinstein, and 
Manzella (Cooke, 2004). For example, Cooke (2004, p.91) proposed the idea of 
similarity between a risk system and a business system: “Just as we would apply 
quality management principles to control the quality of products and services from 
the business system, so we must apply similar principles to control the “quality” of 
incidents from the risk system.” In his opinion, we could consider the incidents as 
quality problems. Organizations should apply an “incident learning system” to 
improve and analyze the deficiencies in risk systems in the same way they implement 




business. A related terminology, named Safety management, has its root in quality 
management field. Safety management is defined as “the management process to 
achieve a state of freedom from unacceptable risks of harms” (Kennedy, R., Kirwan, 
B., 1998). Safety management is implemented via the organization’s safety 
management system (SMS). It is referred to as a documented version of a safety 
management system and is carried out through established procedures, policies and 
regulations. It acts as a formal system of control over work activities and working 
methods, but it is not necessarily the way it exists in reality. 
 Many recent disasters happened not because of the way that safety was 
managed through the formal controls and procedures, but because of the safety 
culture in which safety management approaches were implemented (Kennedy, R., 
Kirwan, B., 1998). Safety culture is a sub-facet of organizational culture and is 
defined as common safety value in organization (e.g., Cooper, 2000, Cox & Cox, 
1991).   
 Studying subjects such as organizational culture and climate, human resources 
systems, and more specifically safety culture and safety climate, and also 
organizational effectiveness model, I learned the concept of configurational approach 
in the organizational field. It was then, that I came across the interesting concept of 
“pattern” in the organizational field once more. Schulte et al. (2006, p.648) believe 
that configurations “allow for examining multiple characteristics simultaneously 
while accounting for the interrelationships and interactions among them”. 
Configurational approaches have been applied to different areas of organizational 




organization based on “patterns” or “profiles” of different factors, instead of 
analyzing them independently.  
 After two and half years of multidisciplinary efforts, I started building the 
proposed organizational safety analysis framework, named Socio-Technical Risk 
Analysis (SoTeRiA2) , with the intention of improving existing accident theory (e.g. 
Reason’s model, 1990). This theory brings engineering, social, and behavioral science 
perspectives together under a modeling scheme, founded on relevant theories and 
observations. To my knowledge, no prior research has addressed these issues in a 
unified manner and on theoretical ground. Since the US Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) has sponsored my research, the proposed theory has been 
implemented in part in the aviation system. A hybrid modeling environment that is an 
integration of System Dynamics, Bayesian Belief Net (BBN), Event Sequence 
Diagram (ESD), and Fault Tree (FT) is proposed to operationalize the new theory. I 
believe this work extends the domain of complex systems modeling beyond the 
traditional scope, to also include, in a formal way, the human and organizational 
environments of the system in development and operation.  
 The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows (Figure 1.1). Chapter 2 
provides a background by introducing the various fields and related literature that can 
flow into the field of organizational safety risk. We also discuss the open challenges 
that this research has sought to address. 
 Chapter 3, which is the first contribution of the current research, defines a set 
of principles that could guide the development of causal models for assessing the 
                                                 






impact of organizational factors on safety of technical systems. This includes the 
identification or development of a set of building blocks for causal models both in 
qualitative as well as quantitative terms. The impetus for this is the belief that 
methods and concepts that have evolved in a number of diverse disciplines can be 
adopted within an interdisciplinary framework, allowing a more comprehensive and 
more realistic coverage of the path of organizational influence on safety performance. 
The aim in Chapter 3 is to provide a brief summary of an overriding philosophy for 
building an organizational safety risk theory.  
 Chapter 4 provides a methodology for adapting appropriate modeling 
techniques, building proper interfaces, and creating a “hybrid” technique consistent 
with the principles described in Chapter 3. The described methodology is the second 
contribution of the current thesis.  
 Chapter 5 utilizes the findings described in Chapter 3 and 4 to propose a 
theoretical framework, named SoTeRiA, for quantitative organizational safety risk 
assessment. This is the third major contribution of the thesis. Chapter 6 demonstrates 
an example of applying the generic framework to Aviation Maintenance (the safety 
impact of maintenance activities as practiced in the commercial airlines). The final 
part, Chapter 7, concludes the thesis by summarizing the findings and outlining future 
extensions to the research. We also highlight which of the challenges addressed in 
Chapter 2, are answered in the current thesis. 
 The contents of Chapters 3, 4, and 5 point to the orientation of this research as 
theoretical rather than empirical. The primary objective is to develop a theoretically 




principles are a series of testable propositions with supporting rationales, combination 
of past research, and/or integration of different theories across diverse disciplines. In 
some specific cases, expert judgment or plausible explanations are used to fill 
theoretical gaps.  
 The approach taken follows the general distinction that Whetten (1989) makes 
between theory development and empirical research and validation: 
 
“During the theory-development processes, logic replaces data 
as the basis for evaluation. Theorists must convince others that 
their propositions make sense if they hope to have an impact on 
the practice of research. If the theoretical model is a useful guide 
for research, by definition, all the relationships in the model 
have not been tested. If all links have been empirically verified, 
the model is ready for the classroom and is of little value in the 
laboratory…The mission of a theory-development journal is to 
challenge and extent existing knowledge, not simply to rewrite it. 
Therefore, authors should push back the boundaries of our 
knowledge by providing compelling and logical justifications for 
altered views. This requires explaining the Whys underlying the 
reconstituted Whats and Hows.  ….....The primary difference 
between propositions and hypothesis is that propositions involve 
concepts, whereas hypothesis requires measures”. 
 
 
  The principles and modeling framework developed in this research carry the 
characteristics articulated by Whetten (1989) for theory development. “What” and 
“how” are reflected in the framework. “What” refers to the elements of a framework 
and “how” is in the relations among the elements. “Why” explains the underlying 
rationale for the framework based on theoretical principles. 
 The secondary purpose of this thesis is to adapt appropriate quantitative tools 
to operationalize the theoretical framework. This is achieved by creating a hybrid 




theoretically-based research can be followed by future studies that test the developed 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.1 Introduction  
 This chapter serves as a background (the starting point in Figure1.1) for the 
remainder of the report. Section 2.2 describes the multidisciplinary nature of this field 
of research. Section 2.3 illustrates general trends in safety risk analysis. Section (2.4) 
introduces existing conceptual theories and quantitative frameworks in the field of 
organizational safety risk analysis. In Section (2.5), we discuss the open challenges 
that this research seeks to address. The related fields and corresponding literature are 
reviewed and summarized in Section (2.6).  
2.2 The Multidisciplinary Nature of the Problem 
 The issue of safety risk management can be discussed from different points of 
view and in diverse disciplines. Rasmussen’s (1997) view of the socio-technical 











































































Figure  2.1 Different disciplines involved in risk management (Rasmussen, 1997) 
 At the top, society influences safety through regulations and the legal system. 
Legislation prioritizes the safety goals, a domain of interest to social and political 
scientists. The next levels concern the human and physical environments of the 
organizational in question, and that is the domain of management scientists, 
psychologists, as well as researchers in human–machine interactions, and engineers. 
 
2.3 General Trends in Safety Risk Analysis  
 Over the past 25 years a significant improvement in the field of safety risk 
analysis can be observed. The nature of this improvement is in the shift from the first 
to the second and then to the third generation of models (Figure  2.2). This 
development has been in parallel to the shift in human sciences from normative, 



























Figure  2.2 General Trends in Safety Risk Analysis 
 
• First Generation (1950-1960): In this generation, high risk nuclear systems are 
designed on the basis of defense-in-depth protection (as in nuclear power 
systems), and multiple barriers (such as redundancies in modern aircraft). This 
philosophy led to very conservative designs and regulations in engineering 
systems with frequent quality control and inspection. Work instructions for 
operators and maintenance personnel were developed from the functional 
design. Formal standard operating procedures, developed by technical reliability 




• Second Generation (1970-1990):  This is the time that decision makers started 
using formal risk analysis (e.g. classical Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)) 
covering primarily the technical system. Later, it was found that contributions to 
major accidents included “human error”, in addition to technical failure.  The 
first generation of human reliability methods, e.g. THERP (Technique for 
Human Error Rate Prediction), were developed to predict the probability that a 
given task procedure is accomplished successfully. Rasmussen (1997, p.207) 
calls this period a generation of “models in term of deviations from normative 
performance”. Even the organizational accident model of this generation, such 
as Reason’s model (1990), is based on “management errors” and deviations 
from “norm”.  
• Third Generation:  In this generation, models moved toward presenting a more 
realistic performance of hardware, operators, and organizations. Classical PRA 
starts moving towards dynamic PRA. Operator models are becoming 
increasingly cognitive-based. These include CREAM (Cognitive Reliability and 
Error Analysis Method; Hollnagel, 1998) and IDAC (Information, Decision, 
and Action in Crew context), developed by Mosleh and Chang (2004). IDAC 
for example has a causal model of human behavior which is built based on 
cognitive theories rather than observable characteristics. Rasmussen called this 
phase a generation of “models in term of actual behavior” (1997, p. 208). In this 
generation, the modeling of “organizational accidents” is also moving toward 
representing the actual behavior. These include the methods to capture the 




there are a number of major challenges in developing third-generation models in 
all three areas of organizational model, human reliability, and dynamic PRA. 
The research documented in this report is an attempt to improve the theoretical 
foundations of this generation of organizational safety risk analysis.           
2.4 Existing Conceptual Theories & Quantitative Frameworks 
in the Field of Organizational Safety Risk Analysis 
 
 Existing studies in the field of organizational safety risk analysis are classified 
into three categories: (1) identification and classification of factors affecting 
organizational safety purposes, (2) conceptual theories, and (3) causal frameworks. 
2.4.1 Classification of Organizational Factors for Safety Studies 
 Certain works on the organizational factors have been devoted mainly to the 
classification of such factors. The emphasis of some authors has been more on the 
completeness of the classifications than on their application in PRA. One example is 
the classification of Jacobs & Haber (1994): 
• Culture  
(1) Organizational Culture 
(2) Ownership 
(3) Safety Culture 
(4) Time Urgency 
• Communication  








                  (9) Goal Prioritization 
              (10) Organizational Learning  
             (11) Resource Allocation 
                  (12) Problem Identification 
• Administrative knowledge 
                 (13) Coordination of work 
            (14) Formalization 
            (15) Organizational Knowledge 
            (16) Roles-Responsibilities 
• Human Resource administrative 
                (17) Performance Evaluation 
                (18) Personnel selection 
                (19) Technical Knowledge 
                (20) Training 
 
 Other classifications have been used for safety evaluation of organizations. 
For example, Eisner (2003) provides a list of “safety matters” to map general 
management functions against safety- related issues in an organization. His purpose is 
to offer a method for an enterprise to evaluate its safety programs. Eisner’s factors are 




• Program level Safety Elements 
Technology Elements 
1. Process technology 
2. Process Hazards Analysis 
3. Operating Procedures and Safe Work Practices 
4. Management of Change (Technology) 
Personnel Elements 
5. Training and Performance 
6. Contractor safety and Performance 
7. Management of Change (Personnel ) 
8. Incident Investigation and Communication 
9. Emergency Planning and Response 
10. Auditing 
Facilities Elements 
11. Quality Assurance 
12. Mechanical Integrity 
13. Pre-Start- up Safety Review 
14. Management of “Subtle” change 
 








Leadership and Commitment 
4. Process Safety Management (PSM), Policies and Guidelines 
5. Resource Commitment 
6. Employee Involvement 
7. Performance Accountability 
8. Performance Verification 
Operating Excellence  
9. Open Communication 
10. Teamwork 
11. Common Shared Values 
12. Do the Job the Right Way 
13. Behavior Modification 
2.4.2 Conceptual Theories 
 Based on Figure  2.2), organizational models appear in the second and third 
generation safety analyses. Thus, we classified the conceptual theories into second 
and third generation. 
   
2.4.2.1 Second-generation Theories  
 Some accident causation theories mostly deal with occupational safety (e.g., 
Hale and Hale, 1972, Benner, 1975, Smillie and Ayoub, 1976). Many of these 
theories focus on “unsafe behavior” or “error” by individuals. Two major 




1995), and (2) energy flow modeling (Johnson, 1980). The first defines accident as 
“not a single event, but rather a transformation process by which a homeostatic 
activity is interpreted with accompanying unintentional harm. The critical point is that 
an accident is a process involving interacting elements and certain necessary or 
sufficient conditions”. By contrast, according to the energy flow concept, an accident 
happens because of inadequate barriers. In other words, in this model the focus is 
barriers rather than processes, and accident is an “unwanted transfer of energy 
producing harm”. Fahlbruch et al. (2000) rates these two models as best fundamental 
theories of accident.  
 In 1988, Peterson extended the accident causation theory from individual and 
local conditions to underlying management system. He proposed top managers are 
responsible for all accidents since they are in charge of designing, building, and/or 
operating the system.  
 Reason (1990) developed the concept of “organizational accidents” or 
“organizational error”.  As shown in Figure (2.2), we have classified his method 
among the second generation methods. Reason’s “Swiss Cheese” model describes the 
contributing factors in an organizational accident (Figure 2.3), based on which, 
accidents happen because of defects in the elements involved in the organizational 
processes. These defects (failures) are pictured as “holes” within different layers of 
the system that change a production process to a failed process. The accident 
sequence starts with the failed or missing defenses in organization (that is, decisions 
concerned with planning, designing, managing, and communicating). These defects 




supervisors (e.g., assignment of complex tasks to inexperienced technicians), and to 
their related departments, where they appear as conditions (such as high workload, 
time pressure, inadequate skills and experience, poor equipment, etc.) that cause 
errors or violations. At the level of individuals, these “local defects” (conditions) 
combine with psychological error tendencies to create the “unsafe acts”. In other 












Figure  2.3 Reason’s “Swiss Cheese” Model of Organizational Accident (Reason, 1990) 
 
 Later Groeneweg (1992) extended Reason’s model to Tripod Theory with the 
philosophy of managing the “controllable aspects of human error” in the work 
environment. He defined eleven possible causes of errors, called “Basic Risk Factors 
(BRFs)”, i.e. “design”, “hardware”, “maintenance”, “housekeeping”, “error enforcing 
conditions”, “procedures”, “training”, “communication”, “incompatible goal”, 





2.4.2.1 Third-generation Theories  
 The third-generation organizational accident theories focus mostly on 
systematic and collective nature of organization error, rather than decomposing it to a 
chain of errors. The concept of a “natural migration of activities” toward the 
boundary of acceptable performance has been developed by Rasmussen (1997). He 
emphasizes that for risk management, we need to find the underlying mechanism of 
migration. He believes every workplace is bounded by administrative, functional, and 
safety related constraints. Objectives and constraints shape individual behaviors. 
People adapt to these constraints or change some of them to better suit their goals. 
During these adaptive processes, management supplies an effective “cost gradient” 
and workers try to find an “effort gradient”. The result of these two gradients will be 
the system migration towards the boundaries. The accidents might occur if the system 
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It’s important to understand that when the system is close to the safety 
boundaries, any act of individual that might be considered as “normal” in normal 
situations could be critical and become the root cause of the accident. Even if this 
specific root cause is avoided by additional safety activities, it might be initiated by 
another cause. Therefore, new methods of risk management should focus on the 
mechanisms “generating behavior in actual dynamic work context” to prevent the 
system from approaching its safety boundaries (Rasmussen, 1997). (see Figure 2.4)  
  Normal Accident Theory, developed by Perrow (1984), views accidents as 
inevitable in complex socio-technical systems. The two characteristics of these 
systems are “interactive complexity” and “tight-coupling”. The most important 
measure of “interactive complexity” is the number of variables in the system and their 
relationships as well as the number of feedbacks loops. The measure of coupling is 
the pace that changes in one variable will affect the changes in other variables. Based 
on this theory, due to interactive complexity and close coupling, some of the changes 
in organizations are unpredictable, and potentially lead to disasters. Another camp of 
expert disagree and point out a number of high hazard organizations that have not had 
any accidents for decades. This discussion has led to the study of organizational 
success rather than failure, and the concept of “High Reliability Organizations” 
(HROs). According to Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) and Roberts and Bea (2001), 





 Both normal accident theory and high reliability theory are holistic in nature, 
therefore it is hard to prove or disprove. These two represent the extreme possible 
cases, with reality most likely somewhere in between.  
2.4.3 Quantitative Frameworks  
 There are a number of quantitative methods and frameworks that aim at 
quantifying the impact of organizational factors of safety risk. Most of the existing 
quantitative frameworks such as MACHINE (Embrey, 1992), WPAM (Davoudian, 
1994), , SAM (Pate-Cornell, 1996), Omega Factor Model (Mosleh, 1999), ASRM 
(Luxhoj, 2004), and “Causal Modeling of Air Safety” (Roelen et al., 2003), are 
essentially second generation methods. The majority of these include the three key 
parts: organization model, operator model, and technical system model. Their 
commonalties and shortcomings are described in Section (2.4.3.1).  
 Third-generation frameworks are still in development phase. Among these, we 
can name Cooke (2004), Leveson(2003), and Mousang (2004). These models have 
not been yet expanded adequately to include the third-generation human behavior 
models and third-generation technical systems risk models. Section (2.4.3.2) reviews 
third-generation models. Section (2.4.3.3) highlights some open questions in this field 
of research, some of which are targeted to be answered in this report. 
 
2.4.3.1 Second-generation  






(1) A set of organizational factors:   
 Most models (e.g., MACHINE (Embrey, 1992)), have developed their factors 
based on accident data. MACHINE, which has been used to analyze railway 
accidents in the United Kingdom, views accident causation as a process involving 
three levels: Level 1 includes latent, active, and recovery errors; Level 2 includes 
error-inducing factors such as training, procedures, time pressure, responsibilities, 
etc.; and Level 3 includes policy deficiencies such as project management, safety 
culture, training policy, etc.  
 Some of these frameworks have used a predefined set of factors. For example, 
WPAM (Davoudian et al. 1994a and 1994b) uses a set of 20 organizational factors 
developed for Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Jacobs & Haber, 1994). WPAM has 
three levels.  The top level is an event tree that ends in a critical accident. The other 
two levels are organizational factors; the first one is the overall culture 
(communication, decision making, etc.), and the second level includes certain 
attributes of decision making, communication, etc.   
 The set of factors in some frameworks is based on certain specific theories. 
For example, SAM (Pate-Cornell, 1996) describes the organization as a set of 
decisions and uses four different theories for different kinds of decisions. Three 
models represent the actor’s intention: a rule-based decision model for rule-based 
decisions, both a rational and a bounded rational model for knowledge-based 




selection of relevant organizational factors depends on which of the four explicit 
models can describe a given decision.  
 As another example, Roelen et al. (2002& 2003) present a causal model for 
aviation systems. The structure of their management model is based on safety 
management systems (SMS). The set of organizational factors in this model include 
generic “delivery systems” in SMS. SMS is characterized as a control process with 
three levels: (1) Execution, (2) Plans and Procedures, and (3) Structure and Policy. 
SMS must manage the delivery of “resources” and “criteria” to the right place and at 
the right time for the execution level. “Resources” are people, hardware, money, time, 
and information that are needed for a task to be done. The “criteria” are the 
procedures that direct people in performing the tasks, and standards according to 
which they need to adhere. Roelen et al. define several generic categories of delivery 
systems including “Competence”, “Availability”, “Commitment”, “Man-Machine 
Interface”, “Communication”, “Plans”, “Conflict Resolution”, “Spares and Tools”, 
and “Change Management”. 
 The Omega Factor approach (Mosleh & Golfeiz, 1999) represents an 
organization by a model not just a set of factors. An organization model is a 
descriptive and/or predictive representation of the way the organization affects the 
performance of its workers and work products. The model considers both the 
structural as well as the behavioral aspects of the organization. Structural aspects 
refer to (1) organization positions (e.g., general manager, unit manager, maintenance 
worker, etc.) and (2) organization divisions, groups, work units, etc. In contrast, 




specifications), (2) objectives, performance measures, and products of the 
organization, or its divisions, units, groups, etc., (3) means and processes used for 
production and achieving objectives, and (4) attributes and characteristics of the 
above. This model of an organization recognizes the relationships between these 
elements.  The relationship could be implicit (e.g., relative position of an element in 
the model, e.g., supremacy of manager over the worker in the hierarchy of the 
organization), or explicit (e.g., dependence of a worker in performing his or her job 
on the availability of tools and quality of training). But the approach for the 
construction of the model is heavily focused on formal relationships, effectively 
disregarding the very important informal network.  
 Another approach, ASRM (Luxhoj, et al., 2001), utilizes Human Factors 
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). HFAC was developed by Weigmann 
and Shappell (2000) based on Reason’s model, and in the context of aviation. ASRM 
includes organizational influence (resource management, organizational climate, and 
organizational processes), preconditions for unsafe acts (adverse mental states, 
adverse physiological states, physical /mental limitations, crew resources 
management, and personal readiness), and individual unsafe acts (decision errors, 
skill-based errors, perceptual errors, routine violations, and exceptional violations). 
Luxhoj et al. use expert knowledge to build the detail path of causalities among the 
factors. 
(2) A link to the risk model  
 In SAM (Murphy and Pate-Cornell, 1996), the link between the management 




point on SAM is that decisions and actions by individuals tend to be shaped by 
reinforcing patterns of systematic behavior, rather than rational decisions and written 
objectives and policies established by the top managers. The climate and culture in 
which the decisions are made do influence the decisions.  
 The Omega factor model creates a relation between organization performance 
and hardware failure with the help of a parameter called omega, which is the ratio of 
component rate of failure due to organizational factors to its “inherent" failure rate. 
The inherent portion of the failure rate represents failure mechanisms which are 
beyond the control of the organization in charge of operating the system. The value of 
the ω-factor is caries the quantitative influence of organizational factors on 
component failure probabilities, and through them the system risk.   
 In WPAM (Davoudian et.al, 1994a and 1994b), the link is established through 
work process model. In this model, task analysis of each key work process is 
conducted, and an organizational-factor (OF) event tree for each key work process is 
constructed. The human reliability model and the detailed path of influence of 
organizational factors are not modeled in WPAM. WPAM concentrates on capturing 
the "common-cause" effect of organizational factors on system risk. It considers 
organizational common-cause effects on similar and dissimilar systems. It includes a 
category of causes that synchronize failures of multiple components so that failures 
happen simultaneously or within a short period of time. For example, use of the same 
erroneous procedure for maintenance of a component can simultaneously cause 
failure of all components subjected to that specific maintenance. But, as Mosleh and 




the above form. There is another class of failure mechanisms where a single 
underlying cause increases the failure rate of multiple components.  This results in a 
shorter time between failures, but each component fails conditionally independently 
and that times of failure are still random and independent.  This is a different 
mechanism of dependence as compared with the type considered in conventional 
CCF analyses. 
 Some models such as MACHINE (Embrey, 1992) and ASRM (Luxhoj, 2001) 
use a human model as a link. Using a human reliability model is important, especially 
for the cases where human behavior and decisions are the critical factors in system 
risk. In Roeln’s model (2002, 2003), safety critical tasks  are the link to the technical 
system accident risk model. For example, all maintenance activities are specified as 
safety critical tasks. The processes that are carried out within the aviation system are 
analyzed and broken down into tasks and subtasks using Hierarchical Task Analysis.  
(3) A Set of Modeling Techniques  
 Most of the above methods use variations of Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) 
or Influence Diagram. This modeling technique is explained in Chapter 4. In 
MACHINE, between each level (level 1, 2, and 3) there is a many to many pattern of 
influences that has been implemented using Influence Diagram. In the Omega factor, 
the result of the quantification of influence diagrams is a parameter, P, which is the 
degree (or probability) that the organization product (e.g., worker's performance) is 
adversely affected by the relevant organizational factors. A variety of ways to model 
the relationship between ω and P are established. In SAM, the Influence Diagram 




work processes and organizational factors. A similar technique, named process 
modeling technique, is explained in Section (4.4). 
(4) A set of Measurement Methods  
 None of the existing quantitative safety frameworks adequately discusses the 
methods of measuring their factors. Some have exclusively relied on expert judgment 
(e.g., Embrey (1992)) for measurement. WPAM (Davoudian et al, 1994) suggest 
surveys, behavioral checklist, and interview as well as expert judgment. These 
measurement methods are mainly the ones suggested by Jacobs and Haber (1994) for 
their 20 organizational factors for the nuclear power industry. Others have used a 
combination of expert and historical data (e.g., Omega factor (Mosleh & Golfeiz, 
1999), ASRM (Luxhoj, 2001)). Murphy and Pate-Cornell (1996) partially relied on 
theories as basis for measurements. In their earlier work, expert judgment is used for 
the measurement of the conditional probabilities. But in the developed SAM 
framework, the link between management factors and human action is based on 
organizational theory through the four human behavioral models mentioned before. In 
this case the quantification of the links is based on their related theories.  
 
2.4.3.2 Third-generation Models 
 Third-generation models intend to picture the actual performance of 
organization, rather than the concept of deviation from normative performance. The 
existing third-generation organizational safety frameworks mostly tackle the dynamic 
aspects of organizational influences. For example, Biondi (1998) has used the 




of a system due to organizational dynamics. Bella’ model (1997) is a qualitative 
representation of the migration process of a system towards its safety boundary.  
In Bella’s opinion, large organizations are complex systems, which adaptively 
change and self-organize. Their non-linear response can not be reduced to the 
intentions of the members of the organization. Their emergent outcomes can be 
understood by focusing on the “whole” rather than the “parts”. CANL model can 
explain the non-linear organic responses and their evolution over time. According to 
Bella, CANL model can be applied to an organization through a “search for 
behavioral loops”. Loop diagrams represent the qualitative causal relationships within 
the system. Bella believes that the global patterns of behavior that tend to reduce the 
safety of the technological systems are common to different systems. These are: (1) 
“shift of the burden of the poof”, (2) “productivity vs. safety conflicts”, (3) “work 
overload and time pressure”, and (4) “systemic distortion of information”.  
 Bella’s four global patterns of behavior are defined as “organizational factor 
types” by Biondi (1998). Organizational factors are a set of conditions that provide 
context for human behavior (actions and decisions). They are emergent outcome of 
dynamic interactions of the members of an organization. According to Biondi an 
organization can affect reliability through countless interrelated ways (token). 
Therefore, identification and classification of these tokens in detail are not possible. 
Biondi concentrates on organizational factor “type” instead of “token”. He believes 
that all such organizational factors types have a common “Organizational Root 
Factor”, which is “systemic imbalance”. Systemic imbalance changes the flow of 




CANL model to measure the “reliability state” of organizations. The reliability state 
of an organization is the degree of systemic imbalance, or the measure of its 
organizational factor types. The measure is based on an interpretation of loops that 
reinforce unsafe actions. 
 Some other references have used system dynamics modeling (e.g., Sterman, 
2000) to describe the dynamics of an organization.  For example, Cooke (2004) 
developed a system dynamics model of the Westray mine disaster. In his causal loop 
model of the accident, the interactions between safety and non-safety factors (e.g. 
productivity) are presented. Based on the simulation model of the Westray mine 
disaster, he made the following observations: (1) rapid increase of the incident rate, 
resulting from placing higher priority on production over safety, (2) criticality of 
management commitment to safety for controlling the risky scenarios, (3) accidents 
are the consequence of the system as a “whole” rather than individual components, 
and (4) change in safety culture as measured by management and personnel safety 
commitment has a large time delays. 
 Another example of utilizing system dynamics approach for safety is the 
Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) model, developed by 
Leveson (2004). In her view, safety can be shown as a control problem and managed 
by a control structure developed for a socio-technical system. In other words, 
Leveson tries to model the whole system from the control point of view. A system in 
her conceptualization is not a static design, but a dynamic process that is continually 
adapting (changing to fit into a new occasion) to achieve its objective. Since the 




enforce the necessary constraints in order to provide safe adaptation. Accidents can 
be studied in this model, identifying which safety constraints were ignored or violated 
and why the controls imposed were insufficient. 
  Since event chain scenarios are capable of modeling technical risks (to be 
explained more in the Chapter 4), it seems that framing the whole model as a control 
structure is not needed, and it makes the integrated model too complicated. A 
promising approach could be to model social aspects from control perspectives and 
link them to existing PRA models, which have been able to develop technical system 
risk scenarios successfully.  
 Yu et al. (2004) also used system dynamics modeling in the context of nuclear 
power plants to assess the effects of organizational factors on plant safety. They 
conclude that system dynamics technique can effectively facilitate dealing with 
interactions and dependencies among the organizational factors. Their work is an 
attempt to link system dynamics and PRA. However, the interconnection between 
PRA and system dynamics is not clarified. Besides, they do not provide sufficient 
theoretical support for their proposed organizational model.  
  
2.5 Open Challenges 
 As we mentioned in Section (2.3), the field of safety risk analysis is gradually 
moving from the second-generation toward the third-generation methods.  (see Figure 
2.2) The transitions involved in the development of third-generation organizational 
safety frameworks and their related research area, are depicted in Figure (2.5). As the 




“organization model” (A), “human model” (B), and “technical system model” (C). In 
contrast, third-generation frameworks are still in early stages of development, and 
only few models can be identified as organization models (D). These models have not 
been yet expanded effectively to include the third-generation “human model (E), and 































Figure  2.5 The research area for developing third-generation organizational safety frameworks 
 
 The dotted arrows in Figure (2.5) illustrate the challenges of moving from 
second to third-generation frameworks. The followings are a number of open 







- Do we need to have three parts, i.e. technical, organizational, and individual 
models in the third-generation organizational safety formwork? If so, why? 
- Which modeling environment can accommodate and cover all three parts 
together? 
- How can we evaluate the organizational safety frameworks? 
G2G3 
- What are the underlying differences between the third- and the second- 
generation methods? 
AØD  
- Which fields/literature should be searched for constructing the 
organizational part of third-generation safety frameworks? 
- What should be the elements of D? What elements are missing in the 
second- generation models? Which elements of second-generation models 
can be modified or generalized for use in the third-generation models?  
- What is the underlying theory (or theories) for establishing the causal 
relation between the factors of the organization model? 
- How can we adequately account for interactions and dependencies among 
the factors? 
- What would be the best technique to “operationalize” the organizational 
safety frameworks? 
- How should we measure the factors or elements of the safety model?  What 




- How should we consider the interaction of safety and other organizational 
performance measures (such as financial performance)?  
- How should we account for the dynamic aspects of organizational safety 
behavior? (Comment: one of the challenges of second-generation models are 
their deficiency in modeling the dynamic behavior of an organization 
including the impact of change during a transition, the delay between causes 
and effects, the time order of events e.g., decision/actions, and feedback 
loops). 




- How should we connect the organization model to the human performance 
model? 




- How should the third-generation human performance models be built? 
- Which aspects of second-generation human models can be generalized for 
the third-generation?  





- How we can deal with dynamics at the individual-level?  
- What would be the individual level-factors?  
BCØEF 
- How should we connect the human model to the technical part? 
- Can we generalize the link in the second generation to the third? 
CØF 
- Where would be the place of technical system model in an organizational 
safety framework? (comment: this is the only question that is covered in the 
current report in relation to CØF) 
- How we can go from second-generation PRA (technical system) to the third 
generation? 
- What would be the best modeling technique for the third-generation 
technical system? 
 
 The remainder of this report investigates answers to a subset of these 
questions. Some categories (nearly all of CF and parts of BE) are out of the scope of 
the current research. In the final chapter of this report we make an assessment of the 
extent to which these questions are answered.  
2.6 The Related Fields 
 The disciplines that can feed into the immature field of Organizational Safety 
Risk analysis are explored. They mainly consist of safety management, safety culture, 
organizational theory, human resource system, human reliability, and PRA. Clearly, 




differences on common subjects stem from their different perspectives. The following 
is a brief summary of the relevant fields. Much of the relevant literature used in 
support of the argument and ideas of report, however, are cited throughout the report 
to support the specific positions taken or to contrast the techniques introduced. 
2.6.1 Technical System Risk 
 The primary and most popular set of methods for technical system risk 
assessment is known as Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). The roots of PRA 
methods can be traced to the reliability and safety assessments in the U.S. aerospace 
and missile programs in the 1960s.  Later, in the 70’s and 80’s the nuclear industry 
extended PRA methods for identifying and assessing risks of commercial nuclear 
power plants. The analytical techniques were gradually improved and applied over 
the next two decades, not only in the nuclear industry, but also in other fields such as 
the offshore oil, petrochemical, and defense industries.  
 The NASA PRA Guide (Stamatelatos , 2002) describes eleven procedural 
elements for PRA, including objectives and methodology definition, familiarization 
and information assembly, identification of initiating events, sequence or scenario 
development logic modeling, failure data collection and analysis, quantification and 
integration, uncertainty analysis, sensitivity analysis, risk ranking, and interpretation 
of the results. In Section (4.2), we briefly describe some of the key techniques of 




2.6.2 Human Safety Performance Model 
 Human errors are present in all phases of system life (planning/design, 
construction, operation, maintenance, and management) and account for 30%-90% of 
all causes of industrial accidents. Human Reliability Analysis (HRA), which is the 
study of the nature, causes, and probability of human actions in the design and 
operation of systems and processes, emerged out of need to provide an assessment of 
human error probability in PRAs. Mosleh & Chang (2004a) describe Human 
Reliability as a methodology, a theoretical concept, and a measurement method. As a 
methodology, it is a procedure for conducting a quantitative analysis to predict the 
likelihood of human error; as a theoretical concept, it develops an explanation of 
human errors in technical systems; and as a measure, human reliability is the 
probability of successful performance of a task by an individual.   
 Some other disciplines such as Human Factors, Human Engineering, 
Ergonomics (see Wickens & Gordon, 1997), and Engineering Psychology (see 
Wickens & Hollands, 2000) are relevant to HRA.  In Human Factors and Ergonomics 
the emphasis is on equipment design to maximize productivity by reducing operator 
discomfort and fatigue and to meet the requirements of human operators. The 
emphasis of Engineering Psychology is on understanding the human mind to identify 
human limitations and capabilities as part of system design. In contrast, the emphasis 
of Human Reliability lies on estimating Human Error Probability (HEP).  
 Over the past 20 years, more than 40 methods of HRA have been developed. 
These methods are classified into first-generation  methods, such as THERP 




Likelihood Index Method- Multi-attribute Utility Decomposition ; Embrey et al., 
1984), HCR (Human Cognitive Reliability Model; Spurgin et al, 1990) , NARA 
(Nuclear Action Reliability Assessment; Kirwin et al., 2004) , and second-generation 
such as CREAM (Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method; Hollnagel, 1998), 
ATHENA (A Technique for Human Event Analysis; Barriere et al. , 2000), and 
IDAC (Information, Diagnosis & Decision, Action in Crew Context; Mosleh & 
Chang, 2004 b). The first generation methods mainly cover Errors of Omission 
(EOO). These methods do not provide any causal picture of operator error, and the 
error probability is mainly estimated on the basis of a set of performance shaping 
factors (PSFs). In contrast, the second-generation methods take into account the 
context of operators’ cognitive decisions. These methods attempt to cover Error of 
Commission (EOC) in addition to EOO. 
Figure (2.6) shows an example of the types of factors that are considered in 
second and third generation HRA methods. This figure is from the IDAC approach 
where an operator interacts with the external world (i.e., other operators, the system, 
the external resources) to achieve a set of goals (e.g., recover a failed engine). The 
operator’s problem-solving process is influenced by factors that are internal or 
external to the operator. The internal influencing factors cover the operator’s 
psychological, cognitive, and physical states. The external influencing factors include 
team-related factors, organizational factors. The external factors must be perceived by 
the operator to influence the operator’s error. The internal and external influencing 






Figure  2.6  External and internal PIF in IDAC model (Mosleh & Chang, 2004b) 
  
The main focus of the present report is modeling organizational factors among the 
external PIFs.  
2.6.3 Organization Performance Model 
 The first field that was reviewed for its potential use in safety models was a 
simulation approach to organizations (see for example Carley (2000)). In this 
approach, the focus is on modeling the organization as an information processor 
composed of a collection of intelligent individuals. Carley, for instance, assesses 
organizational adaptation using simulation software called ORGAHEAD. This 
software simulates the response to organizational changes, and the analysis of the 
results generates theoretical predictions on organizational adaptation. Research has 
shown that this approach (detail simulation) has potential applicability in small 




 Review of organizational literature revealed two different lines of research. 
(see Figure 2.7) The focus of one is quality management, and the related term, safety 
management. Another line has a psychological orientation and studies culture and 
climate, and related terms safety culture and safety climate. Some researchers have 
studied connections between the quality management view of organizations and 
organizational performance. For example, Good (1999) attempts to link Total Quality 
Management (TQM) to financial performance and Ichniowski & Shaw (1999) study 
the relation between the quality of human resource system and economic performance 
of organizations. Similarly, some other researchers have tried to link safety 
management to safety performances. For example, Mc Donald et al. (2000) have 
shown a relation between safety management and safety outcomes.  
 Other studies focus on the relations between culture/climate and 
organizational performances. For example, the effect of culture on financial 
performance is studied by Siehl and Martin (1990). Lin, Madu, & Kuei (1999) have 
linked global climate dimensions to quality management outcomes. Also, Zohar 
(2000) has explored the relation between group-level safety climate and objectively 
measured number of injuries. In another study, Vurren (2000) has shown a relation 
between safety culture and incident causation in organization.  
 Another group of studies discusses the relation between organizational 
performance (e.g., quality, financial state) and safety. For example, D. Golbe (1986) 


















Figure  2.7 Relation of various literatures on quality, culture/climate, and safety 
 
 In reviewing the quality management literature, it was found that the idea of 
integrating safety and quality has been mentioned by some references such as 
Roughton, Lischeid, Peterson, Curis, Weinstein, and Manzella (Cooke, 2004). For 
example, Cooke (2004, p.91) proposed the idea of similarity between a risk system 
and a business system: “Just as we would apply quality management principles to 
control the quality of products and services from the business system, so we must 
apply similar principles to control the “quality” of incidents from the risk system.” In 
his opinion, we could consider safety incidents as quality problems. Organizations 
should apply an “incident learning system” to improve and analyze the deficiencies in 
risk systems in the same way they implement a “quality management system” to deal 
with quality problems and progress the business. As defects are the visible 
expressions of poor quality management, the visible representations of poor risk 
management are the incidents that are produced by a system during normal operation. 
System risk arises from the characteristics of operation (e.g. the transformation 




technology in the operation). This is similar to the creation of performance quality 
through the characteristics of products and services.  
 A related terminology, Safety Management, has its root in the quality 
management field and the “plan-do-check-act” cycle of Deming (1990). Safety 
management is defined as “the management process to achieve a state of freedom 
from unacceptable risks of harms” (Kennedy, R., Kirwan, B., 1998). Safety 
management is implemented via the organization’s safety management system 
(SMS). It is referred to as a documented version of a safety management system, 
carried out through established procedures, policies and regulations. It acts as a 
formal system of control over work activities and working methods. We refer the 
reader to Hale et al. (1997) and Hale & Braram (1998) for more detailed review of 
safety management concepts.  
 The British Standard BS 8800 (1996), describes links between safety 
management activities, ISO 9001 quality standard, and ISO 14001 environmental 
management standard. Since mid-1990s, the central management trends have been 
moving towards developing a comprehensive management system that includes both 
the improvement of products and the internal activities. Malcolm Baldrige National 
Quality Awards (MBNQA) and the European Foundation for Quality Management 
(EFQM) Excellence model are examples of this trend. Although quality is focused on 
the customer’s needs, the business philosophy of MBNQA winners in the service 
industries is People-Service- Profits (P-S-P), with the view that providing a quality 
working environment for employees leads to quality service, and that is what 




management framework for risk control would be a very important view, because risk 
management like quality management needs an integrated socio-technical approach to 
include employee involvement, technical systems, and management practices. 
 Many recent disasters happened not because of the way that safety was 
managed through the formal controls and procedures, but because of the safety 
culture in which safety management approaches were implemented (Kennedy, R., 
Kirwan, B., 1998). Safety culture is a sub-facet of organizational culture and is 
defined as the common safety value in organization (e.g., Cooper, 2000, Cox & Cox, 
1991).  Likewise, safety climate is a sub-facet of organizational climate and is 
expressed as the shared perception of employees regarding organizational safety 
practices (e.g., Zohar & Luria, 2005, Griffin & Neal, 2000). In Section (4.9) we will 
explain safety culture and climate in more detail. 
 Another related research line is trade-off analysis for strategic safety 
decisions. It concentrates on optimization of the managerial decisions, from the 
standpoint of safety and productivity. Baron & Pate-Cornel (1999) believe that 
managers face a trade-off between productivity and safety in a changing business 
environment. Pate-Cornel has studied this aspect in context of cost benefit analysis 
regarding maintenance. 
 There are some other fields that served as background to this research, but 
have not been discussed in this writing. They include certain theories/models from 
organizational theory field, such as socio-technical system theory (Emery & Trist, 
1960), Lewinian filed theory (Lewin, 1951), Mintzberg categorical theory (1983), and 




as theories of learning organization (e.g., Senge, 1990). Also, we have not expanded 
this chapter to the review of the human resource system (e.g., Ostroff, 1995), which is 
the collection of organizational practices that support individuals’ performance in 
organizations including the people who have influence on or conduct the safety 
critical tasks. 
 Two aspects that are not explored deeply in this report are the political view of 
organizations and inter-organizational causation mechanisms. Based on Bolman and 
Deal (1984), one of the frames of an organization is the political view that considers 
an organization as a coalition between groups with different values. The decisions in 
organizations are viewed as a way to allocate scarce resources, and theories such as 
game theory are utilized to model them. Another important aspect is the study of 
inter-organizational effects. Although we have considered the effects of some 
regulatory practices, such as the regulatory auditing system, and the indirect effects of 
regulation through some standards and codes, we have not studied regulation and 
policies at the national and industry level.   The other three aspects of Bolman 
framework, Structural, Human resource, and Symbolic, have been tackled in building 







3. ORGANIZATIONAL SAFETY RISK ANALYSIS: 
PRINCIPLES 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter elaborates upon the first contribution of our research: identifying 
theoretical principles to guide the development and evaluation of organizational 
safety risk frameworks. The impetus for this is the notion that methods and concepts 
that have evolved in a number of diverse disciplines can be adopted within an 
interdisciplinary framework that allows a more comprehensive and more realistic 
coverage of the path of organizational influence on safety performance.  
 What is described here provides insights into possible theoretical foundations 
and principles for the field of “Organizational Safety Risk Analysis”. Since exploring 
such foundations spans diverse disciplines such as risk analysis, 
industrial/organizational psychology, organizational theory, and human reliability, it 
is anticipated that the unstated concepts, principles, and assumptions in this field 
would be obvious to the members of one discipline, but not others. The issues 
discussed, however, are central to the development of organizational safety analysis 
theories and provide conceptual guidance for theorists seeking to develop integrated 
safety frameworks for specific industries and organizations, specific safety outputs 
(e.g. large scale accidents, occupational hazards, and information system security), 
and specific phases of interest (e.g., operation and design).  
 In order to explore these principles, theory development studies, especially 
organizational theory development studies (e.g. Dubin, 1978, Whetten, 1989, 




risk analysis. Bacharach (1989, p.496) defines theory as “a statement of the relation 
among concepts within a set of boundary assumptions and constraints”. He states that 
two important functions of a theoretical statement are to “organize” and to 
“communicate”. The development of this chapter, as in similar efforts, aim at 
identifying the key building blocks, criteria, and rules of a theory that would 
accomplish these two functions.  
 We will first describe the background, specific issue or question, or the 
identified need, and then end with the statement of the resulting principle. The 
principles are stated at the highest possible end of abstraction that would give the 
principles their broadest reach and applicability irrespective of the particular selected 
modeling approach. 
3.2 Designation & Definition of the Objective  
3.2.1 Defining the Unknown of Interest 
  Development of a theory should start with identifying and defining the 
“unknown of interest” otherwise known as “dependent variable” for the theory. It 
leads to finding the level of analysis (Section 3.3), constructing factors (Section 3.4), 






 Risk is a construct of two key notions:  “uncertainty” and “undesirability”. 
Thus, the quantitative value of risk reflects the likelihood (magnitude of uncertainty) 
and the consequence (magnitude of undesirability) of an event. The undesirable 
consequences can appear in different dimensions such as accident or financial 
distress. In the present study, we are concerned with safety consequences, and 
therefore the focus is “safety risk”.  
 Two well-known conceptualizations of “accident” are the following:  (1) 
Bernner (1995) defines an accident as “not a single event, but rather a transformation 
process by which a homeostatic activity is interrupted with an accompanying 
unintentional harm”. (2) Johnson (1980) viewes accidents as a conglomeration of 
energy and barriers rather than a process, and defines accident as an unwanted 
transfer of energy producing unwanted losses (e.g. injuries, damages, etc.) He 
believes that accidents happen because of inadequate or missing barriers. These two 
conceptualizations are rated best by some references (e.g. Fahlbruch et al., 2000) 
based on ten dimensions, such as being realistic, comprehensive, consistent and 
functional.  
PRINCIPLE (A) 
Organizational Safety Risk (OSR) is the unknown of interest for Organizational 
Safety Risk Theory, and is a measure of the safety performance of the whole, or 
some sub-units of the organization. Formally 
 
OSR= f ( F1 , F2 , …, FN) 
 
where f stands for an explicit or implicit function , and F1 , F2 , …, FN  are the 




3.2.2 The Interaction of Safety & Other Organizational Performance 
 Safety is often not the reason for the existence of an organization, but it is one 
of the desirable attributes of its performances. For example, the objective of a nuclear 
power plant is to produce electricity, in profitable way, but it should be safe as well.  
 Since safety is not the sole organizational output and concern, managerial 
decisions and organizational practices seek to strive a balance between different 
organizational outcomes. Therefore, an organizational safety causal model should 
consider the interaction of safety performance with other organizational 
performances. As Rusmussen (1997) states, “when safety is controlled by stating 
performance objectives, as is the case with generic regulation, safety become just 
another criterion of a multi-criteria decision making and becomes an integrated part 
of normal operational decision making. In this way, the safety organization is merged 
with the line organization”. 
 
 
3.2.3 Safety Performance & the Concept of Deviation  
 A simple conceptual model of the path of influence of organization on safety 
performance of a technical system (e.g. nuclear power plant, aircraft) is shown in 
PRINCIPLE (B) 
Safety Risk is one of the organizational outputs that influences, and also is 





Figure (3.1) where the points of interface between the technical system and 











Figure  3.1 Operation and maintenance actions as links between 
 
 This simple model captures the majority, if not all, paths of organizational 
influence for the post design and installation phase of a system’s life cycle.  Arrows at 
interface points go in both directions, symbolizing the interactive and often dynamic 
nature of influence.  
 The organizational safety risk is a measure of deviation of organizational 
safety output (e.g. technical system safety performance) from a normative level of 
safety. Now, the question is whether or not we can extend this deviation-based 
concept to the lower levels in the Figure (3.1), including individuals in directly charge 
of the technical system and the supporting related organization. We argue that the 
concept of “error” and “deviation” can be clearly defined for the technical system and 




extended to the internal factors (e.g. emotional and  cognitive ones) and  external 
factors (e.g. team and organizational ones) affecting the performance of individuals.  
 In order to support this statement, we move the discussion to two conceptual 
terms, i. e. “equifinality” and “unifinality” (e.g. Katz and Kahn, 1978, Sharit, 2000). 
Unifinality refers to situation where there is only one way for the system to yield its 
product. In contrast, equifinality depicts the case that the product of the system can be 
brought forth in different ways. According to Katz and Kahn (1978, p 30) such “a 
system can reach the same final state from differing initial conditions and by a variety 
of paths”.  
 As shown in Figure (3.1), technical systems are mostly located at the 
“unifinality” side of the spectrum. In these cases there is a limited number of ways for 
a technical system to function “correctly”. In contrast, organizations are often located 
at the “equifinality” side of the spectrum. That is, there are multiple ways that an 
organization can reach the desirable performance. Considering that technical systems 
mostly lean towards “unifinality”, any deviation from the “correct” way of interacting 
with the system is an “error” on the part of individuals directly working with the 
technical system. The reference points for these individuals’ errors are the system 
needs. This concept was introduced in the IDAC human reliability framework ( 
Mosleh & Chang, 2004) in order to link system and human performance failures. This 
deviation is similar to the concept of “Δ” in Degani and Wiener’s four “Ps’ theory 
(1994): Philosophy, Policy, Procedure, and Practices. They hold that it is the 
underlying management philosophy that leads to policies, and the policies in turn lead 




Practices are the way the activities are actually done by operators. The said authors 
define “Δ=|Practices -Procedures|” as an operator’s deviation from procedures, and 
these deviations lead to the unsafe system outcome. Following this discussion, it is 
then meaningful to specify “error” for the individuals’ action at the sharp end of 
system deviation from safe operation.  
 Nevertheless, these individual errors are the output of the organization, and 
should be only a starting point to search for the root causes. Reason (2003) refers to 
this as a principle of error management: “Errors are consequences rather than causes”.  
 On the other hand, when we focus on the underlying factors (individuals’ 
internal performance shaping factor, and organizational factors) that produce those 
“sharp end” actions (performances), determining “error” for a single factor is not 
meaningful. In other words, it is possible that different configurations of an 
individual’s internal and organizational factors create the same individual output 
performance. Hence, for these factors, “error” can not be clearly defined independent 
of other factors. This is one of the major challenges of this line of research. As Bier 
(1999, pp 707-708) points out, “there is no one “correct” management style, corporate 
culture, or organizational structure”. Several different combinations of the states of 
organizational factors and different structures may produce the same organizational 
output.  
 As a simple example, two organizations A and B can perform safely even 
though they have two different combinations of quality levels of their “training” and 
“selection” system. For instance, organization A may have a “medium” quality 




quality training and a “high” quality selection system. The level of individuals’ 
knowledge which is the result of joint effects of training and selection can be the 
same for both organizations leading to the same level of safety performances. In this 
case, the “low” quality of training in B does not automatically translate into a failure 
in B’ s training.  
 Now, consider organization C with a “low” quality training and a “low” 
quality selection system that may lead to an unsafe behavior. Regardless of the fact 
that the interactions of training and selection systems have created some 
circumstances that lead to accidents, a post-accident analysis may define the failure or 
inadequacy of the training system as the root organizational cause of the accident, 
whereas the same level of training has not led to an accident in organization B. In 
other words, an organization can have different configurations of factors and reach a 
safe (or unsafe) performance. In other words, it is not necessary to find a series of 
failure that need to line up to lead to an organizational failure, as it is implied in 
Reason’s Swiss Cheese model (Figure 2.3). 
 The output performance is the result of combined effects of influencing 
factors. It may create circumstance where none of the factors individually has any 
problem, but their interactions may result in accidents. This concept resembles the 
polarization effect. It is possible to see through each of two transparent plates 
individually, but if we overlay the two plates at a particular angle, light will be 



















Figure  3.2  Polarized glass analogy for combinational effect of factors  
 
 This discussion is related to the concept of “fit” (Ostroff, C, Schulte,M., in 
press) and specifically “system fit” in organizational psychology. System fit is the 
degree of alignment between different elements of a system (such as the human 
resource system and organizational culture). Bier (1999, p.708) also refers to fit and 
states that “the study of management and organizational factors is difficult, in part 
because there is no one “correct” management style, corporate culture, or 
organizational structure. Rather, these various elements must be consistent both with 
the demands of the organization’s environment (a viewpoint known as “contingency 
theory”) and with each other (configurational theory”)”. For example, system fit 
would be the extent of consistency of the messages conveyed from different elements 
of the organization, regarding the extent to which safety is desired and rewarded in 
that organization. According to Bowen & Ostroff (2004), individuals seek 
consistency in their environment, and misalignments of the elements of a system will 




 The argument about combinational effects questions the validity ( or at least 
the generality) of organizational accident model developed by Reason (1990). In his 
Swiss Cheese Model, he proposes that the top managers’ error leads to the 
supervisors’ error, which prepares the grounds for individuals’ active errors, and 
these may lead to accidents. A German research group tried to extend the Reason 
model and one of their conclusions was: “the renouncement of the term “error” or 
“failure”. …the term indicates liability or blame, an “error” can be defined only 
according to consequences and identified therefore only by hindsight. This leads to 
difficulties with regard to “failures”, such as erroneous management decisions taken 
years ago.” (Fahlbriuch et al., 2000) In other words, performance is a collective 
characteristic of an organization that emerges from the interaction of its elements. 
This concept can be compared to the macroscopic thermodynamic effects which can 
only be explained as the collective result of Brownian movements of the molecules 
rather than their individual states. 
 Along with this discussion, Rasmussen (1997) highlights the transition of risk 
analysis frameworks from models of “deviation from normative performance” to the 
modeling of actual behavior. He suggests moving from models such as Management 
Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT Johnson, 1980)), which is based on “less than 
adequate management decisions”, and Swiss Cheese that is based on “management 






3.3 Level of Analysis 
 The idea of perceiving an organization as a multilevel system is prevalent in 
most of the earliest organizational theories such as Lewin’s field theory (1951), socio-
technical systems theory (Emry and Trist, 1960), and Katz and Kahn’s (1966) social 
organizational theory. Yet, this idea has not been adequately in studying of 
organization. Most of these studies break down systems into organization, group, and 
individual levels, with different related disciplines and theories. Over the last two 
decades, organizational science has moved toward filling the micro-macro gap in 
theory and research, developing well-defined multilevel frameworks. Multilevel 
theories integrate macro- and micro-organizational perspectives, taking into 
consideration the relationships between constructs on different levels of the analysis. 
(Kozlowski et al., 2000) Align with this evolution in organizational science, 
PRINCIPLE (C) 
 
C1 : The organizational safety risk can be measured as a “deviation” of 
organizational safety output from a normative level. The concept of “error” and 
“deviation” can be clearly defined for the technical system and the individuals 
directly operating and/or maintaining it, but this concept should not be extended to 
modeling the internal factors (e.g. emotional and cognitive factors) and  external 
factors (e.g. team and organizational factors) affecting the performance of 
individuals.  
 
C2 :  Analyzing the effects of organizational factors on safety calls for theoretical 
understanding of how the organization performs . 
 
C3 :  The causal model and selected technical approach to implement this theoretical 
understanding need to be capable of capturing the “collective” nature of 





considering multilevel perspective is a principle of theory building for organizational 
safety risk theory.  
 


















Figure  3.3 Multi-level relations between organizational factors and organizational safety 
performance 
 
 Since organizational safety risk is an organizational outcome, the relation 
between organizational factors and organizational safety risk can be studied either at 
the organization-level (A) or with a cross-level analysis (B-C or D-E-C). (see 
Figure3.3) 
 An organization-level accident causation theory may satisfy safety risk 
prediction, but it is not appropriate for risk management. Managing risks needs 
understanding explicit relations in order to analyze the effects of changes in the 
contributing factors.  Since the effects of organizational factors on accidents are 
caused through individuals operating or maintaining the system, a causal model that 





 In other words, there is a need for a framework that can integrate the macro 
and micro perspectives. Macro analysis studies relations in the aggregate level and 
ignore the variations in individuals. In contrast, the micro perspectives studies how 
the variations among individuals influence individual performance. No single-level 
perspective can effectively model the organizational behavior. The macro perspective 
neglects the interactions among individuals as well as the process of their influence 
rising to higher-levels. On the other hand, the micro perspectives can not adequately 
consider the effects of contextual factors. (Kozlowski et al., 2000) For example, a 
macro research on safety can study the effects of organizational investments in 
training or on organizational safety performance. In contrast, a micro research can 
show how an increase in individual cognitive ability can increase the individual’s 
safety performance.  
 The point is that safety output of an organization is a collective effect of 
different individuals in different units with a variety of job descriptions, for example 
technicians and inspectors in maintenance units and operators in an operation phase. 
Since the effects of training on each of these individuals can be different, and also 
because the interactions of their performances lead to the organizational safety 
performance, therefore the impacts of training on organizational safety performance 
has different paths of influence with different strengths. Knowing these explicit paths 
is necessary for decision makers that are concerned with optimizing organizational 
factors for a maximum performance.  
 Rusmussen (1970) also mentions this point in his paper explaining the 




vertical interaction among the levels of socio-technical systems with reference to the 
nature of the technological hazard they are assumed to control”. He argued that risk 
management needs cross-disciplinary studies that consider risks involving all levels 
of society.  
 
 
3.4 Factor  
 The first essential element of a theory is called factor, also referred to under 
such terms as “construct” and “variable” (e.g. Whetten, 1989, Bacharach 1989). 
There is some ambiguty about the difference between construct and variable in the 
literature. Some references (e.g. Bacharach 1989) make a distinction between 
construct and variable by specifying them as unobservable and observable factors 
respectively. Here, we use the definition given by (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000, p.27) 
that defines construct as “an abstraction used to explain an apparent phenomenon”, 
and it can be either observable (e.g., unit size) or unobservable (e.g., safety climate). 
The content of a construct may include different factors, which are used to measure 
that construct, and those are defined as variable here. For example, climate is a 
PRINCIPLE (D) 
a) A comprehensive organizational safety theory mandates a combined macro- 
and micro-organizational perspective. Therefore, organizational safety 
theory should be built in a “mulit-level” framework. 
 
b) When “risk management” is the objective, a “cross-level” organizational 





construct that is measured by variables such as “employees’ shared perception about 
the reward system” or “employees’ shared perception about the reporting system”.  
 In building a theoretical understanding of complex phenomena, the content of 
factors (or elements) and their links (relations, interactions), provide a powerful, 
almost universal language. These notations may be use in a very explicit way or only 
implicitly. In either way one could view “factors” and “links” as essential ingredients 
of models and theories and express that the smallest building block is a set of two 




Figure  3.4 The smallest building block of a theory 
 
 The following describes three important issues related to the factors of 
organizational safety theories: level, measurement, and selection of the factors. 
 
3.4.1 The Level of the Factors 
 Constructs can be found either on individual-levels or on unit-levels. Unit 
refers to any entity composed of two or more individuals such as groups, divisions, 
and organizations. In organizational literature, many problems emerge because of a 
misspecification of the level of constructs, and therefore the level identification of the 
PRINCIPLE (E) 





factors should be accomplished in the early stages of the theory building process. 
Kozlowski & Klein (2000) distinguish three types of unit-level constructs: global, 
shared, and configural. Global unit constructs are single-level phenomena that are 
originated and revealed at the unit-level. “Organization size” and “organizational 
practices” (e.g. human resources functions) are examples of global constructs. They 
represent the unit as a whole, but they have an identity (or objective) separate from 
unit members’ social and psychological characteristics. In other words, there is a 
reality about organization size and the quality of its practices (e.g. human resources 
functions) that don’t originate from employees’ psychological processes.  
 In contrast, the shared and configural constructs originate at individual-level 
perceptions, values, cognitions, and behavior, and emerge at the higher levels. Shared 
unit constructs (e.g., group climate) describe the common characteristics of the unit 
members, but configural constructs (e.g. diversity, pattern of individual perceptions) 
show the pattern or variability of unit members’ characteristics. As another example, 
team performance can be assumed as a configural phenomenon when it emerges from 
the combination of team members’ performance with different but interdependent 
tasks. (Kozlowski et al., 1999) The shared and configural constructs emerge from 







3.4.2 Measurement & Selection of the Factors 
3.4.2.1 Comprehensiveness & Parsimony 
  Two important and interrelated issues are “selection” and “measurement” of 
the factors. Different safety studies with different measurement perspectives have 
selected dissimilar sets of factors that influence safety. Figure (3.5) shows the 
conceptual relation between supporting fields and theories, measurement, and reality 
of a safety causal model. The layer at the bottom represents the model of reality of the 
safety causation mechanism in an organization. Different supporting fields and 
theories (the top layer) view safety causation through different measurement 
perspectives (the middle layer).  Thus, each field looks at different parts of the 
organizational safety causal model (measurement “bases”) and utilizing different 
measurement “methods”. For example, the literature on safety culture (e.g. Cooper, 
2000, Cox&Cox, 1991) & safety climate (e.g. Zohar & Luria, 2005, Griffin & Neal, 
2000) mostly focuses on psychological causes of safety and with perception survey as 
the main measurement method. On the other hand, safety management literature (e.g., 
Kennedy & Kirwan, 1998) primarily considers organizational safety structure and 
practices using objective auditing measurement approaches. Yet other disciplines 
(e.g. PRA) mainly focus on direct causes of accidents.  
 
PRINCIPLE (F) 
Theorists must specify whether their constructs are individual-level, global, 
shared, or configural. If a construct is shared or configural, the level of the 
construct, the level of its origin, and the nature of the corresponding emergent 




















Figure  3.5 Conceptual relation between supporting Fields & Theories, Measurement, and Reality 
in Organizational safety causal modeling 
 
 
 Complex technological systems are characterized as “open” systems, as there 
are large numbers of dynamic interfaces with outside organizations, commercial 
entities, individuals, physical systems, and the environment. Figure (3.6) provides a 
visual account of the various dimensions of this complexity. The external 
environments include the physical, the regulatory, and the socio-economic 
environment. At the intersection of these environments, the physical system is 
operated and maintained by one or more organizations, through individuals 
interacting directly with the physical system. All interfaces are dynamic, and 
interactions and interdependencies are subject to changes in manners that may or may 
not be planned or anticipated. A comprehensive approach to analyzing and assessing 
the safety performance of such systems would have to clarify the roles and effects of 






Figure  3.6 Domains of a comprehensive system approach to safety analysis 
 
 “Comprehensiveness” means the organizational safety causal model should 
include direct (e.g. hardware, operators) and indirect factors (organizational root 
causes) associated with system safety. It should cover the effects of external 
environments including the physical environment, the regulatory environment, and 
the socio-economic environment on the safety performance. 
 Comprehensiveness is required at both levels of model and construct. At the 
model level, theorists need to make sure all relevant constructs are included in the 
theory (Whetten, 1989). At the construct level, all relevant dimensions of constructs 
need to be included in a construct (this is also related to measurement issues for a 
construct and will be discussed in the next section.)  
 On the other hand, theorists should avoid unnecessary complexity by 
excluding factors that have little effect on the model output. This is called 












3.4.2.2 Measurement Methods  
 The measurement discussion in the context of organizational safety risk 
modeling highlights two important questions: (1) how to measure the factors and 
links (link will be introduced in Section (3.4)) in the safety causal model, and (2) 
which aspects of the accident causation need to be measured. The first question is 
related to different safety measurement “methods”, and the second refers to the safety 
measurement “basis”.  Answers to these questions are scattered across diverse fields 
such as psychology (e.g. methods of data collection in organizational psychology 
mentioned by Jex, 2002), quality studies (e.g. auditing approaches), and different 
safety studies, such as safety data collection methods (e.g. data collection in task 
analysis suggested by Kirwan, 1998), safety data sources (e.g. Hale & Hovden, 1998), 
quantification approaches of safety causal models (e.g. rating and weighting of the 
factors mentioned by  Фien, 2001), safety auditing tool (e.g. The Management 
Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT; Johnson, 1980)and safety performance indicators 
(e.g. Kjellen, 2000).  
PRINCIPLE (G) 
 
a) The organizational safety causal model should integrate the social (e.g. safety 
culture and climate) and structural (organizational safety structure & practices) 
aspects of organization that influence safety. 
 
b) Inclusion of the factors in the theory should be in an optimum manner with respect 





The confusion in this subject mainly comes from mixing the two aspects of 
measurement, i. e. “method” and “basis”. The present discussion is an effort to clear 
up the confusions.  
 Measurement is a mean to learn the state or value of a factor (model element), 
perhaps in terms of the states or values of “attributes” or dimensions of that specific 
factor. These attributes are defined consistent with the nature of each factor. For 
example, the attributes of technical factors, such as equipment calibration and test 
practices, should be developed using the manufacturer’s standards. The attributes of 
some human-related factors, such as selection and reward systems, should be 
specified using human resource literature (e.g. Ostroff, 1995). Some of these 
attributes may be covered by regulatory policies and standards.  
 The factors of the safety causal model can be measured using subjective and 
objective measurement methods. Subjective measurement means specifying the state 
of a factor on the basis of the organization members’ perceptions. In other words, the 
source of measurement in this case is employees’ perceptions. The instrument for 
measurement is often in the form of a surveys or interviews.  These can in turn cover 
the entire organization/group members, a sample, or only a small number of experts 
in the organization (e.g. supervisors and mangers).  
 Objective measurement refers to the case where the person (or group) in 
charge of measuring the factor objectively assesses the compliance of the factor with 
respect to its attributes. In this case, the source of information is assessors’ 
observations of the safety behaviors (using a Behavioral Checklist) and/or inspecting 




“record-based” (organizational records, reports, databases) or a combination. 
Obviously objective measurement is not limited to compliance-based assessments, 
and is also used for nearly all observable properties (e.g., organization size).  
 Subjective and objective methods can be either qualitative (e.g. high, medium, 
and low) or quantitative (e.g. the scale 1-10) or a combination of both. While some 
references (e.g. Фien, 2001) use the term safety performance indicator to mean 
mostly the quantitative objective measurement as defined here, we believe that safety 
performance indicators can be any factor in the safety causal model measured by its 
most fitted measurement approaches.  
 In some cases, it may be necessary or beneficial to combine different 
measurement methods for the same factor. Two combinations can be envisioned: 
“complementary” and “supplementary”. Complementary refers to the case where 
different attributes of the factor are measured with different methods. On the other 
hand, in supplementary combination, all attributes of the factor are measured with 
both measurement methods, providing additional information about that factor. The 
purpose in both complementary and supplementary approaches is to capture the 
highest amount of information on the actual state of the factor from different 
perspectives. The combinational approaches provide more accuracy, but they require 
more time and cost more. A Bayesian representation can be used in order to facilitate 
explaining the relation between the real state of a factor and its measurements. More 







Measurement method for individual-level constructs 
 
 Naturally, individual-level constructs should be assessed at the individual 
level. The individuals’ psychological constructs, such as motivation and satisfaction, 
obviously could only be measured using subjective measure. Some observable and 
documented individual-level factors, such as individual age, demographic 
characteristics, or years of experience can be assessed with the objective method. For 
example, an assessor can directly observe or get this information from the 
organization records. (e.g. Kozlowski & Klein, 2000) The quality of individuals’ 
physical workplace (e.g., light, climate), tools, and procedures, also can be assessed 
by assessors’ (auditors’) inspection.   
 On the other hand, it can be argued that relying solely on either of the 
measurement methods (objective or subjective) for assessing the state of physical 
work place conditions, procedures, and tools could be misleading. For example, the 
auditor might approve of a certain physical work place (e.g., lighting, air 
conditioning) state, but since this is only a snapshot of that work place, the real 
condition may be better captured by accounting for the workers’ perception of their 
PRINCIPLE (H) 
H1: Measurement Methods 
 
Factors of the organizational safety theory can be measured with three different 
methods: objective, subjective, and combinational. The selection of the measurement 
method need to reflect (1) the type, the level, and the underlying theoretical model of 





work environment. In contrast, maintenance crew may perceive that their procedures 
are good, but the objective auditing of the process and documents may indicate 
deficiencies. Thus, a better approach for these types of individual-level factors would 
be supplementary combination of objective and subjective measurement.  
 Another individual-level construct is “individual performance” that can be 
measured either objectively or subjectively or combined. In the objective type, the 
assessor can observe and fill out the behavioral checklist or record the operators’ 
unsafe acts in a specific period of time (e.g., Zohar & Luria, 2005). The other 
possibility of objective measurement of safety performance is assessor’s use of 
organizational reports on human failure events. In the subjective category, a 
supervisor may describe his or her individual subordinates’ performance (e.g. 
Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Another subjective measure is a self-reporting of safety 
behavior, based on individuals’ own perception about their safety performance (e.g. 
Fogarty, 2004). The ideal method for measuring an individual’s safety performance is 
to have a comprehensive objective record of his/her unsafe acts. But obviously 
objective measurement faces difficulties such as the small number of observations, 
and unreliability of organizational recording and reporting. Faced with limitation of 
information, it is prudent to use all possible sources of information and combine (i.e. 
use a supplementary approach to) the objective and subjective measures of individual 






Measurement methods for global constructs 
 Some Global constructs which are observable characteristics of organization         
(such as its size, or the number of accidents) are measured naturally by objective 
measurement methods. Some other global constructs, such as the quality of 
organizational practices (e.g., human resource functions), can be measured either 
objectively or subjectively or combined. The assessor can directly audit the functions 
and the organization’s record. The assessor can also obtain information subjectively 
through interviews or surveys of managers. (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000)  Kozlowski & 
Klein (2000) indicate that for unit’s functions, there is no need to ask all individuals 
within a unit, and a single expert (e.g., manager) can be a reliable informant. But the 
reality of some attributes of functions can be better measured by employees’ 
perceptions. For example, two of the attributes of training, a human resource practice, 
mentioned by Ostroff (1995, p.6), are: (1) to “have formal orientation programs that 
provide new employees with information about the company and the job”, and (2) to 
PRINCIPLE (H) 
H2 : Measurement methods for Individual-level constructs 
a) The individuals’ psychological constructs (e.g. psychological climate) 
should be measured using subjective method.  
b) The observable and documented individual-level factors (e.g., individual 
age, demographic characteristics) should be assessed using objective 
method.   
c) The quality of individuals’ physical workplace (e.g., light, air-condition), 
tools and procedures, can be assessed by assessors’ (auditors’) objective 
inspection. But for more accurate assessment, a combination of objective 
and subjective measurement should be considered.  
d) The ideal method for measuring an individual’s safety performance is to 
have the objective record of his/her unsafe acts. When faced with 
practical deficiencies for objective measurement of individual safety 
performance, supplementary combination of the objective and subjective 




“develop mechanisms so that employees are supported or rewarded for using their 
newly learned skills on the job”. One can argue that the first of these two attributes 
can be more easily measured objectively, while the second one is more subjective. 
Employees who receive this reward system can better judge to what extent those 
mechanisms are supportive and rewarding. Therefore, the assessment of the real state 
of the training can be captured by a complementary combination of subjective and 
objective measurements.  
 Now consider the case of selection, a human resource function, and one of its 
specific attributes, namely to “provide information to job applicants that realistically 
describes the job and company”. (Ostroff, 1995, p.6) In this case, the assessor can 
measure the state of the attribute by objective auditing of the information provided to 
the applicants. This attribute can also be measured by asking employees’ perceptions 
about the information provided to them through the employment process. 
Supplementary combination of these two pieces of information can provide a more 
accurate assessment of the state of selection.  
 One argument in support of using the supplementary measurement method is 
the practical limitation of some objective methods. For example, auditors only get a 
snap shot of the organization and often a very small sample of the character. In 
contrast, perception surveys (subjective measurements) can capture some parts of 
reality that are missed by objective auditing. As Pidgeon (1991) states, the term 
“perception” implies a potential for bias away from some presumed objective 
standard or stimulus. Besides, Ostorm et al. (1993) named some advantages of  




cannot be measured by traditional procedural-engineered criteria like safety reviews, 
audits, and inspectors; (2) the effectiveness of safety efforts can be measured with 
surveys of employee perceptions; (3) a perception survey can effectively identify the 
strengths and weakness of elements of a safety system; (4) a perception survey can 
effectively identify major discrepancies in the perception of program elements( 
between hourly rated employees and the level of management); and (5) a perception 
survey can effectively identify improvements in and deterioration of safety systems if 
administrated periodically”. 
 Obviously subjective measures also have their own limitation. For example, 
employees’ perception about organizational safety practices (e.g., training) can be 
inadequate, since supervisors often function as interpretive filters for the employees, 
thus masking the reality of the state of the factor as viewed through individuals’ 
perceptions. For this reason, relying solely on objective or subjective measurement 







Measurement methods for shared constructs 
 Shared constructs (e.g., safety climate) originate from the individual 
psychological level, and thus there is no doubt that they should be measured 
subjectively through the unit members’ perception survey. One important issue in the 
measurement of shared constructs is construct validity, evaluated through within-
group variance. The aggregate (mean) value of the measure should be assigned to the 
unit if the within-unit variance is in the limited range. (e.g., Hafmann & Stetzer, 1996, 
Kozlowski & Klein, 2000) There are two approaches for the measurement of within-
group variance, including consensus or agreement based approach and consistency or 
reliability-based approach. The detail explanations about the aggregation issues are 
not the concern of this discussion and can be seen in the related references. (e.g., 
Bliese, 2000)  
PRINCIPLE (H) 
H3: Measurement methods for Global Constructs 
a) Global constructs should be assessed at the unit level. 
b) The observable global constructs (e.g., organization size or the 
organization’s number of accidents) should be measured by objective 
measurement. 
c) The best measurement approach for other global constructs, such as the 
quality of “organizational safety practices” (e.g., human resource 
functions) is the combinational approach. Subjective opinion of a single 
expert (e.g., manager) is a possible, but less desirable measure. 
d) In the case of combinational measurement of “organizational safety 
practices” (e.g., reward system), better estimate of reality can be 
obtained by separating the attributes of the function into observables 
(e.g., frequency of training) and unobservables and by using the most 





 The other challenge about shared constructs is item construction for survey 
instruments. Some have suggested guidelines for item construction, such as focusing 
the respondents on the description rather than the evaluation of their feelings (James 
& Jones, 1974) and referencing a higher level, instead of the level of measurement 
(e.g. Klein et al. 1994).  
 
 
A measurement method for configural constructs 
 
 Kozlowski & Klein (2000) have defined two different types of configural 
constructs: descriptive and latent. The former refers to observable features of units, 
such as the pattern of age in unit members, and thus are cases of objective 
measurement. In contrast, latent constructs refer to unobserved properties, such as the 
pattern of individual perceptions, and these should be measured subjectively. There 
are different techniques that can combine the individual-level measures and create the 
configural constructs. Depending on the theoretical definition of the constructs, these 
techniques can vary, for instance “minimum and maximum”, “indices of variation”, 
PRINCIPLE (H) 
H4: Measurement methods for shared constructs 
a) Shared constructs originate from the individual psychological level, and 
thus should be measured subjectively as an aggregate of unit members’ 
perceptions. 
b) Construct validity of the aggregated measure needs to be established by 





“profile similarity”, “multidimensional scaling”, and some modeling techniques such 
as “neural nets”, “net-work analyses”, “system dynamics” and other nonlinear 
models. (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000, p.34) For example, the pattern of age in the unit 
can be shown by indices of variation in age, but the team performance can be 
estimated from a non-linear combination of individuals’ performances. Some further 
discussions on modeling techniques will follow in Chapter 4. 
 
 





 Perception plays two different roles in safety modeling: (1) as a measurement 




H5: measurement method for configural constructs 
a) Descriptive configural constructs should be measured objectively. Latent 
configural constructs should be measured subjectively. 
b) Configural constructs originate at the level of the individual, and 
depending on the theoretical emergence reflected in the configural 
properties, the individual-level data should be combined with variety of 






 If the nature of a construct is perceptional, then subjective measurement can 
capture the actual state of that factor. If the nature of the factor is not perceptional, 
then subjective measurement only presents part of the reality and the actual state of 
the factor should be assessed by a combination of objective and subjective 
measurements. For example, for global constructs, when we use subjective 
measurement to assess organizational functions (e.g. human resource), perception 
plays its first role, i.e. as measurement. Experts’ or employees’ perceptions are the 
sources of information and only reflect part of the real state of the factor. In contrast, 
for the shared constructs, perception becomes important in its second role, namely 
individuals’ performance shaping factor. For example, the concept of psychological 
climate, an individual performance shaping factor, is the individual’s perception of 
organizational practices. Therefore, perception measurement gives us information 
about the actual state of the psychological climate, because the nature of that 
construct is perception. 
 The perceived state of a specific factor can be substituted with different paths 
of influence in the safety causal model. Theorists need to consider these overlaps in 
order to avoid misspecifications of causalities in the model. In view of these two roles 
of perception, one can say that individuals’ perception about a factor can have 
different paths of influence in the safety causal model. For example, an individual’s 
perception about training is an element of the psychological safety climate (described 
in Chapter 4), which is an internal PSF with impact on human behavior through 
his/her motivation. On the other hand, this perception is a subjective measure of 




influence of the reality of training in the safety causal model is essentially through its 
relation to the individual’s level of knowledge. 
 
The effects of measurement on dependencies of the factors 
 
 The interdependencies of factors are also strongly related to their 
measurement approaches. For example, training and reward system measured based 
on perception survey can be highly interdependent because of the common influence 





3.4.2.3 Multi-dimensional Measurement Perspectives 
  Different measurement perspectives for organizational safety can be identified 
through combinations of measurement “methods” and different measurement “bases”. 
There are two kinds of measurement bases: direct and indirect. Direct measurement 
captures organizational safety output (e.g., frequency of accident). Indirect 
measurement accounts for safety enablers or the safety causal factors (e.g., safety 
climate, safety practices). 
PRINCIPLE (J) 





 Direct measurement can be subjective, objective, or a combination of both. 
The direct subjective measurement can be achieved through questionnaires and 
surveys of the organization’s members about their perception of the safety of the 
organization. This is a subject of study in the risk perception field. The value that is 
measured in this approach, sometimes, is not a proper measure of the organizational 
safety state, since forming an opinion about the overall organizational safety output is 
often difficult for organizational members, especially in High Reliability 
Organizations (HRO) (e.g., airlines and nuclear power plants). Since employees’ risk 
perception has an impact on their performance (e.g., turnover) this measurement has 
some applications for managerial decision making as well.  
 Direct objective measurement can be either based on safety outputs 
(accident/incident data), or model-based, or combination of both. Measurement based 
on safety outputs means objectively measuring (either on-site or record-based) the 
number of accidents/incidents, which are sometimes very rare for HROs. Model-
based measurement refers to the use of risk or safety assessment models (e.g., PRA) 
to estimate level of risk or safety, based on more frequent, but less catastrophic 
occurrences. For example, using historical data, the frequency of hardware and 
operator failures are estimated and used in technical system risk scenarios in order to 
calculate the total risk of the system. The other approach is a supplementary 
combination of model-based and safety output-based measurements that integrates 
two different kinds of information and reduces the uncertainty. This combination can 
also be employed using Bayesian approaches. One consideration about using 




Another possibility is supplementary combination of direct objective and direct 
subjective measurements. This means that employees’ belief about total safety/risk of 
organizations is combined with a model-based assessment of total risk, as another 
piece of information (using the Bayesian method described before).    
  For three key reasons, indirect measurements may be preferred over direct 
measurements. First, since direct measurements assess the organizational safety 
outputs, by definition they cover the past or partly the current state of organizational 
safety. Indirect measures, on the other hand, evaluate the state of organizational 
safety enablers whose impact will be revealed in the future (and partly current) 
organizational safety state. The second reason is the lack of accident or even incident 
data for a specific organization. Thirdly, for the purpose of risk management and risk 
prevention, the root causes and indirect factors need to be measured and analyzed.   
Indirect measures can be restrictive or non-restrictive. Restrictive refers to the case 
where indirect factors are assessed either subjectively or objectively. Restrictive-
objective measures are mostly related to the safety management field, where 
organizational practices and structure are measured objectively. Restrictive-subjective 
measures, on the other hand, are mainly used in the safety culture/ climate field, 
where the focus is on psychological constructs (e.g., culture, climate). Indirect non-
restrictive stands for the case where the measurement approaches vary for different 
factors of the model, covering objective, subjective and combined (supplementary 
and complementary) measures. For example, culture and climate are assessed with 




objective measurements, and organizational safety practices (e.g., human resources 
systems) with the combination of objective and subjective methods. 
 A more realistic state of “organizational safety performance” can be measured 
by utilizing a combination of direct and indirect approaches. The purpose of this 
combination is also the integration of two pieces of information in order to reduce 
uncertainty. However, since direct measurements cover mostly the past state of 
organizational safety, and indirect measures evaluate the state of organizational safety 
enablers whose impact will be revealed in the future, combinations should be carried 
out with carefully considering the time confirmation of the two pieces of information. 
For example, based on direct measurement, the trend of the organizational safety state 
in a period of time can be estimated and then extrapolated to predict the future 
organizational safety state. The future organizational safety state can also be 
estimated using indirect measurements (current measures of organizational factors 
predict the future safety state of organizations). These two pieces of information 
could be combined using Bayesian approaches. One challenge for this combinational 












prediction based  























Realistic assessment of organizational safety risk requires a multi-dimensional 
coverage of measurement methods (how to measure) and measurement bases 





































Figure  3.8 Multidimensional measurement Perspectives 
 
 
In summary : 
 
 
• (1) The direct subjective measurement can be achieved through questionnaires 
and surveys of the members of the organization about their perception of the 
safety of the organization. This is a subject in the risk perception field.  
• (2a) Measurement based on safety outputs means objectively measuring (either 
on-site or record-based) the number of accidents/incidents. 
• (2b) Model-based refers to use of risk or safety assessment models (e.g., PRA) 
to estimate level of risk or safety, based on more frequent, but less catastrophic 
occurrences. For example, using historical data, the frequency of hardware and 
operator failures are estimated and substituted into risk scenario in order to 
calculate the total risk of the system. 





• (3)Supplementary combination of direct objective, and direct subjective 
measurement. This means that employees’ belief about total safety/risk of 
organization is combined with model-based assessment of total risk, as another 
piece of information (using Bayesian method described before).   
• (4) Restrictive-objective is mostly related to safety management field, where 
organizational practices and structure are measured objectively. 
• (5) Restrictive-subjective measures, on the other hand, are mainly used in safety 
culture/ climate field where psychological constructs (e.g., culture, climate) are 
the focus. 
• (6) Indirect non-restrictive stands for the case where the measurement approaches 
are different for different factors of the model, covering objective, subjective and 
combined (supplementary and complementary) measures. For example, culture 
and climate are assessed with subjective methods, safety behaviors (e.g., 
maintenance technician actions) with   objective measurements, and 
organizational safety practices (e.g., human resources system) with the 
combination of objective and subjective methods. 
• (7) The last possibility is the combination of direct and indirect approaches. For 
example, based on direct measurement, the trend of organizational safety state in 
a period of time can be estimated and then extrapolated to predict the future 
organizational safety state. The latter can also be estimated using indirect 
measure. These two pieces of information could be combined using methods such 












3.5.1 The Nature of the Links 
 Links (shown by arrows) represent relations (e.g., causality) between the 
factors.  As Wheeten (1989) has stated, theory-oriented studies do not need to have all 
the relationships tested empirically, but the relationships need to be justified either by 
existing literature (theories) or logical propositions.  
 The detected relations that are only based on data and without understanding 
the “Whys” underlying the model, could be misleading. In general, empirical 
correlations are not a sign of causality. As a simple example, the sales of ice-cream 
and sunscreens rise when the summer temperature goes up. Statistical techniques can 
observe a strong relation between sunscreen sale and ice-cream sale, but neither are 
causes of the other one. (see Figure 3.9) These data-driven models might provide a 
good assessment of overall safety behaviors, but risk management needs an 
understanding of causal mechanisms. 
 
PRINCIPLE (L) 
Links should be specified according to all of the following dimensions: level (single 
level and cross-level), nature (antecedent, measurement, and correlation), and 















Figure  3.9 Correlation Vs. Causality 
 
 Another type of link (arrow) is the measurement “link” that relates construct 
to its measurement contents. For example, in Figure (3.10), the relation between the 
measurement contents of B (i.e., B1, B2, and B3) and factor B is of “measurement” 
type. The link between A and B , on the other hand indicates a causal relation 
























Figure  3.11 Structure of the links 
 
  
 An example of “factor-to-factor” links is the link between “selection” (as a 
human resource function) and “group safety climate” (the shared perceptions of a 
PRINCIPLE (L) 
L2: The structure of the link 
Links are either “factor-to-factor” or “factor to link” relations. (see Figure 3.11) 
PRINCIPLE (L) 
 
L1: The nature of the link 
 
a) Any link can be characterized as “antecedent”, “measurement”, or 
“correlation”. 
 
b) Links built based on empirical correlations are not necessarily indicative 





group about organizational safety). A “factor to link” effect is the case when a factor 
influences the relation (link) between two other factors. As an example, the 
organizational context can moderate the strength of the relationship between morale 
and individual safety performance. In a rather authorization organization, there are 
more constraints on employees’ performance and the relationship between morale and 
individual safety performance will be weak. 




 An example of single-level relation is one between organizational structure 
and organizational outcome (a relation at organization-level). Each level of 
organization is embedded in a higher-level context. Individuals are placed in groups, 
groups in organizations, and organizations in industries. Often there are some 
influences (either direct or moderating) from higher-level phenomena on lower-level 
constituent elements. These effects are called top-down influences in the model. For 
PRINCIPLE (L) 
 L3: The level of the link 
a) Links can be characterized as “cross-level” or “single level”.  The cross-
level influences can also be either “bottom-up” or “top-down”. 
 
 
b) Depending on the conceptualization of higher-level phenomena, the 
bottom-up process can be in two forms of “composition” and 
“compilation”. In case of a composition process, theorist must explain in 
detail how within-unit agreement and consensus emerges from the 
individual-level characteristics. In the case of a compilation, the theorists 
must explain in detail the theoretical process (nonlinear complex function) 





example, organizational safety practices (e.g., training, reporting system, and etc.) are 
antecedents of individual-level psychological safety climate (the perception of 
individuals about safety practices). This is the direct effect of organizational safety 
practices on the individual psychological safety climate. In contrast, the top-down 
moderating effects are those where a higher level factor moderates the relationships in 
the lower-level unit. (Kozlowski et al., 2000) as mentioned before, for example, the 
effects of morale on individual safety performance would be different in different 
organizational structure.  
 The bottom-up process describes the emergence of a phenomenon from lower-
level to higher-level contexts; this is a central concept in General System Theory 
(GST, Boulding, 1956 & Miller, 1978). One perspective of GST focuses on the 
collective structure at higher levels resulting from the dynamic interactions among 
lower level elements. For example, the interactions among atoms make the molecular 
structure. Another perspective looks at emergence of an element to a higher level as 
both a process and a structure. This perspective built on theories of chaos, self 
organization, and complexity, analyzes how the interactions among lower-level 
elements gradually and over the time create higher-level structures or phenomena. 
(Kozlowski et al., 2000)  In multilevel organizational safety modeling, the second 
perspective is selected, and thus both process and structure are covered in the 
emergent phenomena. 
 There are two types of emergent processes: “composition” and “compilation”. 
Composition “describes phenomena that are essentially the same as they emerge 




climate emerges from the shared perceptions of group members about organizational 
safety practices (e.g., training, report system, etc.). Thus, the group and individual 
safety climate are the same constructs, although they are at different levels. In 
contrast, Compilation “describes phenomena that comprise a common domain but are 
distinctively different as they emerge across levels”. (Kozlowski et al., p.16, 2000) 
For example, team performance can be the result of pattern of individual team 
members’ performance. In other words, team performance is a complex function of 
individuals’ performance and their interaction with each other. (Kozlowski et al., 
1999) Thus, based on compilation models, a complex combination of diverse lower-
level contributions forms the higher level phenomena. (Kozlowski et al., 2000)  
 For example, a safety causal model can be a relation between group safety 
climate (Ag) and group safety performance (Bg).  (Figure3.12) The link AgBg is of an 
antecedent nature, it is a single-level link, and a direct relation. Ag is a shared 
construct and emerges from Ai, the individual safety climate. The link AiAg is a cross-
level, bottom-up process.  Structurally, it is also a direct link. Group safety 
performance (Bg) is a configural construct and emerges from individual factors (Bi1 , 










3.6 Time Dependence and Dynamics 
 
 Dynamic aspects refer to how an organization behaves in time and in the 
transition from one state to another. The following provides a conceptual discussion 
of the key dynamic issues that need to be analyzed in organizational safety 
frameworks. The topic covers the “time delay” between causes and effects, some 
composite effects such as “feedback loops” and “time scale variations”, and 
“temporal changes” in organizations.  
  The first dynamic issue is the phenomenon of delay .For instance, in Figure 
(3.13), the effect of A or B on C may take place over time and with delay. Delay can 
lead to a composite dynamic effect, named by some authors “time scale variation”. 





















 Now consider Figure (3.14) when factors A and B change from (1) to (2), the 
state of C evolves from (1) to (2). At state (2), both factors A and B have affected C 
and resulted in a less risky state of C. But, at point t1 , B has not yet affected C. A 
static causal model does not see the state of C at that point. This blind spot could be a 
state causing of accident. (see Figure 3.14) Some references (e.g., Sterman, 2000) 
have discussed this issue under the term delay, and some others (e.g., Kozlowski & 
Klein, 2000) utilized time-scale variations for this concept. 
 Time-scale variations can occur at a single-level and/or across levels. For 
example, at the organization-level, the effects of safety performance of organization 
on its financial performance through direct cost of accidents are quicker than the 
effects of financial performance on its safety culture. Lower-level effects are more 
rapid than higher-level and emergent phenomena. (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000) For 
example, the effects of individual-level training on individual performance occur 
faster than the effects of training at the organization-level on organizational 
performance. Individuals’ performances combine through social and work 
interactions, and compose or compile higher-levels performances; process that take a 
longer period of time. (Kozlowski & Salas, 1997)  
 The time-scale difference between higher-level and lower-level phenomena is 
conceptually related to two well-known terms in human reliability, latent condition 
and active failure, coined by Reason (1990), in organizational accident frameworks. 
Reason (1990) expresses the weaknesses in organizational processes, such as 
decisions concerned with planning, designing, and budgeting that are transmitted 




holds that the transfer of latent conditions to the workplaces takes much longer than 
effects of local factors in the workplaces (e.g. inadequate tools, lack of knowledge) on 
an individual unsafe act ( active failure). 
 Another composite dynamic phenomenon in organizational safety modeling is 
feedback loops. Feedback refers to the case where factor A affects factor B, and B 
affects A possibly through a different path of influence. Feedbacks can be either at a 
single level or across levels. For example, at the organization-level, organizational 
safety practices affect safety, and safety affects the financial outcome of the 
organization. Financial outcomes have some impacts on organizational safety 
practices through managerial decisions. There are also many feedbacks in multilevel 
frameworks that originate from the combination of top-down and bottom-up 
processes.   
 Normally all “feedback loops” can be unfolded over the time in which they 
take place. In other words, the path from A to B and the path from B to A have two 
different time phases, and these two cannot occur at the same time. First A must 
necessarily affects B, and then B will affect A in the next “time step”. Since these can 









timet t +Δt  
Figure  3.15 Feedbacks through the time 
 
 In a multilevel framework, a feedback loop could be the path from A to B in a 
bottom-up process and, while the path from B to A can describe the top-down 
process. For example, when the organization is at an early development stage or 
under extraordinary changes, the organizational culture is emerging from individual 
sense making and social interactions through a bottom-up process. After a period of 
time, the organization culture becomes mature and stable. At this stage, 
organizational culture has a more top-down effects on new members joining the 
organization. Thus time stands as a boundary condition for the model. Theorist should 
specify whether the model represents the mature organizations or the new ones. Time 
also can be considered as moderator in the sense that the direction and the strength of 
the links act as a function of organization maturity. (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000) 
 The last dynamic concern is the temporal changes in the organization and its 
elements. Temporal changes refer to any changes over time in factors or links of the 
organizational frameworks. For example, temporal cycles refer to the periods of 
change in organizational circumstances (internal and/or external) that affect the 




Ancona & Chong, 1997, Kozlowski & Klein, 2000, p.24) have used the term 
entertainment refering to “the rhythm, pacing, and synchronicity of processes that 
link different levels”. Task cycles and work flows, budget cycles, and other temporal 
events are examples. For example, the work flow dependency is not considered 
uniform over time in the group and team literature. (e.g., Fleishman & Zaccaro, 1992) 
At some periods of time, some synchronized acts and responses are required, and thus 
dependencies and couplings will be at maximum. 
 The levels of uncertainties about these temporal cycles differ considerably. 
Some of these temporal events, such as task cycles are more predictable and some of 
them are quite hard to model. The complexity arises not only from the difficulties in 
identifying those specific time cycles, but also from the impacts of those cycles on the 
organizational safety framework. In safety frameworks, some of these temporally 
cycles are due to new regulatory concerns, new participants (e.g., new CEO of the 
company), and new safety concerns after occurrences of major accidents. For 
example, Kunreuther & Bowman (1997) studied the dynamic model of organizational 
decision making after the Bhopal accident and showed that how constraints changed 




 Static organizational safety frameworks can not capture the risk originating from: (1) 
delay in influences, (2) temporal changes in factors and links (e.g., temporal cycles), 
(3) composite time effects (e.g., time scale variation and feedback loops). The 
direction and the strength of the links in the organizational safety model is usually a 






3.7 Boundaries & Assumptions 
 Organizational accident causation theory is a statement of cause-effect 
relations between the elements of an organization and various types of accidents and 
incidents within a set of boundary assumptions and constraints. 
3.7.1 The Depth of Causality & Level of Detail 
 One concern in specifying boundaries of an organizational safety theory is the 
“level of causality”. The question is where one should stop the causal chain. Do we 
need to assume the operational managerial decisions (hiring, training, etc.) as “bottom 
layer” factors or it is better to move further in the chain of causality? Do we need to 
stop at the top managers’ strategic decisions or do we need to include the regulators’ 
impacts on them?  
 For example, if an organization is interested in analyzing the effects of its 
internal factors on safety performance, the regulatory factor is out of the boundaries 
of the model. Also, the manufacturers’ deficiencies in the design of some parts are – 
despite their high impacts on safety performance of organizations- assumed out of the 
model boundaries as long as the organization doesn’t have control on them. 
 As we mentioned in the Section (3.5.1), a possible type of link (arrow) is the 
measurement link connecting a construct to its measurement contents. A modeling 
choice is whether to consider a factor as “global” or “multidimensional”. This is one 
aspects of “level of details” for the construct. For example, in Figure (3.16), it is 




appears in the model globally. It is also possible to make different paths of influence 
form factor A to measurement contents of B (i.e. B1, B2, and B3), and in this case 







Figure  3.16 Level of detail 
 
 For example, think of factor A as “human resource system” and factor B as 
“safety climate”. (see Figure 3.16) The modeler can establish a direct link between 
these two, or he/she can observe a relation between human resource and the 
measurement content of the safety climate (e.g. “perception about reporting system” , 
“perception about training”, etc.) . The latter is modeling with a higher level of 
details. The decision about the level of detail depends on the importance of different 
dimensions of the constructs in relation to the model output. For example, if the 
objective is to analyze the effects of B1-B3 on safety performance, and the safety is 







3.7.2 Generality of the Model 
 Theory building needs specifying the boundaries and assumptions in order to 
show how general the model is.( Wheeten, 1989) In the case of a safety causation 
theory, we need to specify, for instance, which aspect of the theory is general for all 
industries and organizations, and which ones are restricted to a specific industry.  As 
Rasmussen (1997) states, safety studies can be divided into three categories 
depending on the frequencies and consequences of the potential accident: (1) 
Occupational safety that focus on small-scale and frequent accidents. (Fahlbruch et al. 
(2000) argue that occupational safety deals with intra-organizational incidents and 
accidents, while system safety considers the interrelationships between an 
organization and some extra-organizational factors), (2) Medium size and infrequent 
accidents (e.g., aircraft accidents), (3) very rare and unaccepted accidents (e.g. in 
nuclear power plants accidents). 
PRINCIPLE (N) 
a) In determining the depth of causality in the model, one needs to consider: 
(1) the objectives of the model (e.g. the level of the decision variables), (2) 
the availability of data, and (3) the level of control (which factors can be 
changed or controlled?) 
  
b) The decision about the level of details in specifying the characteristics of a 
factor should reflect  concerns regarding the impacts of different 














1. Risk assessment techniques such as FT, ESD, BBN in order to assess the 
deviation of technical system from normative level of safety (referring to  
principle C1) 
2. Human Reliability Technique in order to assess the possibility of errors of 
individuals directly operating and/or maintaining the technical system.( 
referring to principle C1) 
3. Social and Behavioral Science that includes Regression-based techniques such 
as “path analysis” and “Structural Equation Modeling” in order to “quantify” 
or “test” the causal relations 
4. Business process modeling to represent the process of organizational practices 
PRINCIPLE (O) 
 Theorists need to specify the level of generality (all organizations, specific 
industry, etc.) and the scale and scope of safety concerns:  occupational safety, 
medium size & infrequent, very rare & unaccepted accidents. 
Principle (P) 
 
Because of multidisciplinary nature of the organizational safety framework, a 
comprehensive technique for organizational safety framework is a “hybrid” 
technique. Candidate ingredients are techniques from Risk Assessment, Human 
Reliability, Social and Behavioral Science, Business Process Modeling, and 




5. Dynamic modeling  techniques to depict the dynamic aspects of framework 
(referring to principle M) 
6. Configurational approach in order to capture the collective and combinational 









4. ORGANIZATIONAL SAFETY RISK ANALYSIS: 




 The focus of this chapter is on model representational schemes and 
quantification. There have been significant improvements over the past two decades 
in the sophistication of quantitative methods of safety and risk assessment, but there 
have not been adequate discussions on adapting the best techniques suitable for 
modeling objectives and boundaries. There is some debate about which “techniques” 
are more or less appropriate for organizational safety risk analysis. Candidate 
techniques for organizational accident causation theory are selected from risk 
assessment, social and behavioral sciences, business process modeling, and dynamic 
modeling techniques. In what follows, most common techniques from these 
disciplines are briefly compared and discussed in order to provide a guide for 
informed choices. This chapter provides a methodology of step by step adapting the 
appropriate techniques, converting them to the common technique, and creating a 
“hybrid” approach consistent with the principles outlined in Chapter 3. The described 
methodology is the second contribution of this thesis.  
 In each step, a number of related techniques are explained to facilitate the 
discussion on adaptation. Technical system risk modeling techniques, regression-
based techniques, and process modeling techniques are explained in Section (4.2), 




technique, Bayesian Belief Network (BBN), and convert process modeling technique 
and regression-based methods to BBN. Section (4.6) is a discussion on integrating 
configuartional approach, and Section (4.7) argues how we could technically involve 
the qualitative data in a quantitative framework. Adaptation of deterministic and 
dynamic techniques is described in Section (4.8). Section (4.9) is a brief discussion of 
adapting human reliability techniques, and Section (4.10) proposes a hybrid technique 
environment for realization of organizational safety analysis. Sections (4.11) and 
(4.12) offer complementary materials on measurement techniques and model 
evaluation techniques. 




 The risk-assessment techniques for technical system can be divided into 
formal and informal approaches. (Diergardt, 2005) The informal models such as 
HAZOP (Suokas, 1993) and FMEA (DoD, 1980) describes the system behavior using 
tabular approaches or some descriptive language. The formal models refer to the class 
of models that apply a logical construct to describe the system. They include the 
classical Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) techniques such as the Event Sequence 
Diagram (ESD), Event Trees (ETs) and the Fault Tree (FT). The following is a brief 
description of aforementioned techniques. More details are included in Appendix D.  
 ESDs are used to define the context within which various causal factors would 
be viewed as a hazard, source of risk, or a safety issue. They have been used both 
qualitatively for the identification of hazards and risk scenarios, as well as 




  Other methods closely related to ESDs and used in risk and safety analysis of 
complex systems are Event Trees and Decision Trees.  Both are inductive logic 
methods for identifying the various possible outcomes of a given initiating event.  
The initiating event in a decision tree is typically a particular business or risk 
acceptance decision, and the various outcomes depend upon subsequent decisions.  In 
risk analysis applications, the initiating event of an event tree is typically a 
component or subsystem failure, and the subsequent events are determined by the 
system characteristics 
  Fault tree (FT) analysis is a technique by which many events that interact to 
produce other events can be related using simple logical relationships (AND, OR, 
etc.); these relationships permit a methodical building of a structure that represents 
the system. Fault tree analysis is the most popular technique used for qualitative and 
quantitative risk and reliability studies (Henley et al. 1981, Malhotra et al. 1994).   
 One of the most effective ways of modeling risks associated with technical 
systems is to use ESDs as the first layer of describing system behavior in case of 
anomalies, and then to provide the more detailed picture of the contributing causes (of 
the events in the ESD) by FTs.  Since ESDs in their most basic form are reducible to 
binary logic, the combination of ESDs and FTs can be converted into a Binary 
Decision Diagram (BDD). A BDD is a directed, acyclic graph. It was introduced by 
Lee (Lee, 1959) and Akers (1978), utilized by Bryant (1987), improved by Rauzy 
(1993 & 1997), and enhanced in efficiency and accuracy by Sinnamon and Andrews 




BDD-based ESD-FT methodology was used in NASA's risk analysis computer code 
















Figure  4.1 Use of BDD to solve combined ESD and FT models (Groen et al., 2002) 
 
 More recently and for the case of highly complex technical systems with 
significant dynamic interactions, simulation-based PRA plat forms (also known as 
Dynamic PRA (Smidts et al., 2000)) have been introduced (e.g. simPRA, Mosleh at 
al., 2007). In the simPRA framework, the engineering knowledge of the system, 
which is reflected in a “planner”, is explicitly used to guide the simulation. A 
“scheduler” would guide the simulation according to the plan, toward events of 
concern. The simulation creates many accident event sequences and estimates the 
“end state” probabilities. We refer the reader to Hu (2005) and Zhu (2005) for more 




4.3 Regression-based Causal Modeling Techniques  
 
 
 Regression-based causal modeling techniques are common in economics and 
the social sciences. Over the past 20 years, causal modeling (James, Mulaik, & Brett, 
1982) has become increasingly popular in organizational psychology. (Jex, 2002) 
Generally speaking, causal modeling is used in order to distinguish true statistical 
causality from “spurious correlation” (Simon, 1954). The process involves defining a 
set of variables and their relations, and “testing” all of the relations simultaneously. 
This is practiced by applying techniques such as “path analysis” or “structural 
equation modeling (SEM)” (e.g., Bollen, 1989). These techniques show some 
differences among themselves, but their underlying logic is that the analyst calculates 
the covariance among the variables in the proposed model (using the actual data) and 
compares it with the expected covariance (the restriction that the modeler places). 
This can show how much the model “fits” to the actual data. According to Jex (p.51, 
2000) causal modeling is a powerful tool if “the model being tested has a strong 
theoretical base”. 
 In path analysis, the variables that make up the causal relations are the 
measured variables (A, B, C, and D in Figure 4.2). In contrast, in SEM there are two 
kinds of variables: measured (observed) and structural (latent) ones. ( see Figure 
(4.3)) Latent variables are hypothetical variables and not measured directly, but they 
are estimated in the model from a number of measured variables. SEM is a 
combination of path analysis (between latent variables) and factors analysis (between 
measured variables and latent variables). The principle assumption in these 
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Figure  4.3 SEM with latent and measured varibles (Jex, 2000) 
 
4.4 Process Modeling Techniques 
 
 The organizational safety risk theory not only should represent the social 
aspects of an organization, but also it also needs a technique to model the primary 
production processes of that organization. Semi-formal techniques have been 
successfully applied for modeling business processes, because their graphical notation 
can represent complex system comprehensively. (Diergardt, 2005) Therefore, a semi-
formal process technique should be adapted and applied to represent the various 




needs to be converted to a formal technique that is consistent with other techniques in 
the framework. Section (4.5.4) describes a conversion approach.  
 There are different types of semi-formal process modeling techniques in the 
literature, such as flow chart, state chart diagram, Event driven process chain, (see 
Diergardt, 2005), Integrated Definition Methodology (Mayer et al., 1995), and 
Structured Analysis and Design Technique (SADT) (Marca and MacGown, 1988; 
Heins, 1993) . In order to determine an appropriate modeling technique, a few of 
aspects need to be considered; (1) ease of conversion to a formal technique, (2) ease 
of communicating the model and results, (3) and generality of the technique for 
different organization. 
 SADT is a good candidate because of its consistency with these criteria. SADT 
originated in the field of software and knowledge engineering, and it is also used to 
model decision making activities. Hale et al. (1997) have adopted this technique for 
modeling a safety management system. 
 Figure (4.4) shows the structure of SADT. The activity process transmits the 
inputs (I) to the outputs (O), given the resources (R) and the control/criteria (C). (Hale 
et al., 1997) The inputs can be information, hardware, raw materials, people, etc.  
Outputs are the products of the process. Resources are the things, which are needed 
for performing the activity, such as tools, equipments, and operating individuals. 
Controls/ criteria include all laws, regulations, and standards that are used to direct 











Figure  4.4 Structured Analysis and Design Technique (SADT) 
 
 The United States Air Force commissioned the developers of SADT to devise 
a process modeling method, named IDEFØ, for analyzing and communicating the 
functional perspective of a system. IDEFØ is a graphical approach similar to SADT 
with the elements of Input, Control, Output, and Mechanism. (called ICOMs). In 
December 1993, the Computer Systems Laboratory of the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) released IDEFØ as a standard for Function 
Modeling in FIPS Publication 183. An IDEFØ represents the whole system as a 
single activity, named context activity (A0). The context activity is decomposed into 
detail levels that include its sub-activities. This decomposition process continues to 





Figure  4.5 A typical decomposition hierarchy in IDEF0 (adapted from FAA report, 2001) 
 
4.5 Converting the Regression-based & Process Modeling 
Techniques to a Common Technique; Bayesian Belief Net 
(BBN) 
 
 Since an organization is the combination of social and structural aspects, there 
is a need to integrate the techniques of these two fields in a way they that can feed 
each other. Process modeling techniques have more mechanistic nature. In contrast, 
social causal models are more holistic. Thus the common technique should be able to 
connect these two different natures. We found the Bayesian Belief Net (BBN) as a 
technique that is capable of accepting the integration challenge. In this section, first 




common technique (Section 4.5.2), and finally, it is explained how we can convert 
regression-based and process modeling techniques to BBN (Section 4.5.3 & 4.5.4). 
4.5.1 Bayesian Belief Net (BBN) 
 
 A methodology that has gained popularity in recent years to represent causal 
connections that are "soft", "partial", or "uncertain" in nature is the influence diagram 
(ID) family, particularly the Bayesian Belief Network (BBN). The applications of 
BBNs, also known as Bayesian Networks, Belief Nets, Causal Nets, or Probability 
Nets, have grown enormously over the past twenty years, with theoretical and 
computational development in many areas.  During the 1990s, Bayesian Networks 
and Decision Graphs attracted a great deal of attention as a framework for artificial 
intelligence and decision analysis, not only in academic institutions but also in the 
industry. Recently, due to its power to deal with the soft data in reliability, it has 
stimulated a strong interest. (Bobbio et al., 1999, Torres-Toledano & Sucar, 1998, and 
Kim & Seong, 2002) 
 Bayesian Networks are a network-based framework for representing and 
analyzing models involving uncertainty.  They handle uncertainty in a mathematically 
rigorous yet efficient and simple way compared with other knowledge-based systems.   
  A Bayesian Belief Network consists of a set of variables (causes and effects) 
and a set of directed edges between variables (paths of influence). Each variable has a 
finite set of mutually exclusive states. The variables together with the directed edges 
form a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Conditional probabilities carry the strength of 




of a variable A with parents B1, …, Bn,  we have the conditional probability of the 
state (A) occurring given the state of the contributing parent nodes: P(A|B1, …, Bn) 
(Jensen et al., 1990) (see Figure 4.6). Bayes' theorem in the subjective theory of 
probability is at the core of the inference engine of BBNs. 
  In the definition of Bayesian Belief Networks, the DAG restriction is critical. 
Feedback cycles are difficult to model quantitatively and no calculus has been 
developed for causal networks that can cope with feedback cycles in a reasonably 










Figure  4.6 A Bayesian Belief Network 
 
4.5.2 Why Bayesian Belief Net (BBN) is Selected as a Common 
Technique? 
 
There are several reasons for this selection: 
1. BBN factors, with a probabilistic nature, can be mathematically linked to the 
technical system models (e.g., event trees and fault tress). (see Figure (4.7)) 














Figure  4.7 Connecting BBN to the technical system techniques (ET & FT) (Mosleh et al., 2005) 
 
 
2. There are mathematical relations between regression-based techniques and 
BBN. ( Roehrig , 1993 , Burns & Clemen , 1993) ( see Section 4.5.3)   
3. Most social and psychological theories are in form of regression-based 
techniques. By establishing the relation between these two techniques, we can 
include (quantitatively) in a more explicit way the psychological and social 
theories into the organizational safety risk theory.  
4. BBN has the capability of utilizing subjective expert opinions. Adapting this 
technique makes the quantification of the organizational accident causation 
theory possible, even with a lack of actual data. 
5. On the other hand, regression-based techniques are capable of testing causal 
theories using actual data. Linking BBNs and regression-based techniques 
makes testing of the organizational safety risk theories ( or at least part of that) 




6. For risk management purpose, it is necessary to have a technique that is 
capable of assessing the impacts of potential changes. BBNs can be applied 
for predicting the effects of changes. (see for example, Anderson and Lenz’s 
(2001) use of BBN  for modeling the impact of organizational change)  
7. Process modeling techniques are semi-formal quantitative techniques and 
need to be converted to formal techniques for the purpose of quantification. In 
Section (4.5.4), we demonstrate how to convert the process modeling 
technique to BBNs.  
4.5.3 The Relation between Regression-based Techniques and 
BBN  
 
 Regression-based techniques are “statistical” techniques rooted in social 
sciences and economics, while BBN is a “probabilistic” technique rooted in Artificial 
Intelligence. These two groups of techniques have been used traditionally in quite 
different areas of application. Path analysis and SEM usually have been applied for 
testing and understanding the causal relationships. In contrast, BBNs have been used 
as a method of knowledge representation and as a reasoning framework. However, it 
can be seen that both methods have the potential of being a “prediction” tool. 
(Roehrig, 1993) Some references such as Roehrig (1993) and Burns & Clemen (1993) 
have discussed the mathematical relationships between these two techniques.  
 The underlying assumption in path analysis and SEM is that the connected 
variables have linear relationships, but it is possible to incorporate the multiplicative 
composite of variables as additional variables in the causal model. In addition, path 




underlying theories can be applied to discrete variables as well. Roehrig (1993) has 
derived the mathematical relation between two techniques, treating a simple causal 
model, where both nodes can only be true or false. His result showed the following 





σ)Pr(Pr −−=            (Equation 4.1)  
 
where rxy is the correlation coefficient between X and Y. sx  and sy stands for 
standard deviation of variable X and Y respectively. Pr (y|x) is the conditional 
probability of y given x. We refer the readers to Roehrig (1993) for more complex 
relations in case of multiple causes. 
4.5.4 Converting Process Modeling Technique to BBN  
 
 We recall that SADT method is an effective approach for representing the 
process system of an organization. We will show that how SADTs can be converted 
into a BBN. 
 IDEF0 is an approach for modeling the system of processes in organization. 
Looking at the hierarchical structure of IDEF0, two activities in this technique are 
either sequential or hierarchical. For example, in Figure (4.8), A2 and A3 are related 
sequentially, and A22 and A2 are related hierarchically (A22 is a sub-activity of A2). 
But in realty, it is possible that an output performance of an organization is the result 



















































Figure  4.8 Modified process modeling technique 
 
  The total output O0 can be broken down into output  O1 to Ok that are the 
outputs of parallel activities A11 to A1k . Each of these activities (based on SADT 
technique) have their own Resource (R), Input (I) and Control/Criteria (C). The 
second layer of activities, comprise those that have R, I, and C of the layer one as 
their outputs. For example, R12 is the resource for activity A12 and the output of 
activity A22R ; I12 is the input of activity A12  and the output of activity A22I ;and C12 is 
the control for activity A12 and the output of activity A22C.    
 The same logic will hold for the activities from layer 1 to layer N (the layer 




model for organization. The process model can become more complex in several 
ways: 
• It is possible that some supporting activities in the second layer, for 
example, are common between two parallel activities in the first layer. 
• It is possible that some I, R, C are common between two parallel 
activities. 
• It is possible that more than one activity support the elements in the 
higher level. For example, C12 can  be supported by a couple of 
activities parallel to A22C 
 









C11 C1KC12I11 R11 I12 R12 I1K R1K
……….Layer 1
A22I A22RA22CLayer 2










Figure  4.9 The conversion of process modeling technique to BBN 
 
 
 In Figure (4.10) the quality of output would be a function of the quality of 
activities A1 to Ak . Knowing the state of A1 to Ak   as well as the conditional 
probabilities for O0 given A1 to Ak , we can reach the probability of output with 
specific state. For example, considering a binary state for the factor (success and 
failure), by knowing the probability of success and failure for activities in layer N, 
and also the conditional probabilities, one can find the probability of total output 
being in the success state.   
4.6 Integrating the Configurational Characteristic  
 
 As we mentioned in Section (3.2.3), one of the challenges in the modeling 
organizational behavior pertains to the “combinational effects” of the factors. 




called configurational approach, a good candidate. Configuration is defined as 
“conceptually distinct characteristics that commonly occur together” (Meyer et al., 
1993, p.1175). Schulte et al. (2006, p.648) believe that configurations “allow for 
examining multiple characteristics simultaneously while accounting for the 
interrelationships and interactions among them”.  
 Configuarational approaches have been applied to different areas of 
organizational research, such as organizational structure and strategy (Doety, 1993), 
Human Resource Management (HRM) (e.g., Delery & Doty, 1996) and climate 
(Schulte et al., 2006). The logic behind all these studies is the characterization of a 
unit or organization based on patterns or profiles of different factors, instead of 
analyzing them independently. For example, in HRM, the idea is that “different HRM 
practices are interrelated and interact as a system in achieving their effects. 
Examining single practice or sets of practices simultaneously in a regression does not 
allow for capturing complementary effects and interrelations among the practices. 
Only by examining configurations across all practices we can determine whether the 
entire system of practices, taken together, explains more than the sum of the effects of 
the individual practices” (Schulte et al., 2006, p.648) 
 Doty et al.(1993) have utilized two configurational theories including 
Mintzberg’s (1983) theory of organizational structure and Miles and Snow’s (1978) 
theory of strategy, structure, and process. Mintzberg defined a set of design factors 
(including the key coordination mechanism, the key part of the organization, the type 
and degree of centralization, formalization, specialization, and hierarchy) and 




environment, and technology).  He also identified five ideal-types of organizations 
(including simple structure, machine bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy, 
divisionalized form, and adhocracy), each as a unique combination of organizational 
design and context. For example, a simple structure organization is highly centralized 
and is directly supervised. The ideal organization for this structure, with respect to 
age and size, is a small and young organization. The ideal context, on the other hand, 
is an unsophisticated, non-regulating technology in a simple and dynamic 
environment.   
 Some other research (e.g., Schulte et al., 2006) has used cluster analysis 
techniques to identify configurations and types. There are different cluster analyses 
approaches, but all apply the same philosophy to distinguish the types. First, the 
entities are assessed on a set of variables, and the profiles of their scores are obtained. 
Second, the similarity of each profile to all other profiles is estimated, using similarity 
metric (e.g., distance metric, correlation coefficient). Third, decision rules are applied 
to similarity scores in order to determine the similar profiles that can be merged 
together into a “type”. (Mumford & Espejo, 2007) The most common decision 
algorithms are: single linkage, complete linkage, average linkage, and centroid. (See 
Ghanadesikan, et al., 1989 for more detail) 
 As we will see in Chapter 5, in the organizational safety risk framework, 
different factors such as safety climate, safety culture, organizational safety practices 
and their related sub-dimensions interact and are interrelated in non-linear ways. 
Rather than quantifying all possible interactions among factors and sub-dimensions, 




 The following describes how we can use the configurational approach to 
operationalize part of a theory. Assume that part of a model has factor A as a 
predictor of factor C. (Figure (4.10)) Factor A and C include four interrelated sub-
factors or dimensions, and there are some interrelations between factors A and C. 
Instead of quantifying the sub-relations between the factors, using the configurational 
approach, we determine the relation between the type (profile) of factor A and factor 













Figure  4.10 Adapting configurational approach 
 
  As a first step, we need to use data from ideally a large number of 
organization, and by applying cluster analysis, find possible types (configuration) for 
factors A and C. The values of sub-dimensions for each category are defined as 
average values in each type. For example, X11 is the average value of factor A1 in the 
configuration number 1. Table (4.1) shows a typical empirical profile of configuration 






Table  4.1 An example of configurations with respect to factor A 
Configuration  
Number 
A1 A2 A3 A4 
1 X11 X12 X13 X14 
2 X21 X22 X23 X24 
3 X31 X32 X33 X34 
4 X41 X42 X43 X44 
 
 The second step is to define the value of fit for each organization with respect 
to each category. The analyst can use the deviation score ( Delery & Doty, 1996, 
Doty et al., 1993) in order to assess the fit between the profile of each configuration 
and the empirical profile of the organizations in the sample.  
 As the third step, the analyst can assess to what extent the fit to a specific type 
of factor A can predict the fit to a specific type of factor C, using regression-based 
model. The estimated values from the regression-based model can be translated to a 
BBN model (describe in Section 4.5.3). In the BBN context we are concerned about 
the conditional probability of having specific type of factor C, given a particular type 
of factor A.  
 In order to assess the effects of change in this model, we need to consider the 
effect of change in a system of factors (from a configural perspective), instead of a 
single factor. Since the configurations are defined as “characteristics that commonly 
occur together” (Mayer, et al., 1993, p.1175), it is reasonable to consider the change 
form one configuration to another, instead of assessing the effects of change in a 




change in factor A from type 1 to type 2, instead of analyzing the effects of change in 
factor A1.  
 The effects of change in organizational factors should be viewed 
systematically, instead of individually. From their study, Schulte et al., (2006) suggest 
that “changing single aspects of the work environment, without attention to other 
related dimensions, may have unintended negative effects on the individuals’ 
attitudes.” By applying a configural approach, decision makers can examine the 
effects of different patterns of organizational factors and find the most appropriate 
pattern. 
 
4.7 Integrating Subjective Qualitative Data in BBN  
 
  As mentioned in Section (4.5.1), one of the significant aspects of BBN method 
is its use of subjective data. In some part of the model, it may be hard to find data, 
and the modelers may want to consider the expert’s knowledge or the qualitative 
knowledge based on theory. For example, based on Figure (4-15), theorists know that 
it is highly probable that a “high” quality factor C leads to “high” quality factor D, or 
it is highly probable that a specific type of factor A, leads to specific type of factor B 
and E. (see Figure 4.11) In such cases, there is a need for a method, capable of 
dealing with qualitative data without assigning them numerical values. The 
Qualitative-Quantitative Bayesian Belief Network (QQ-BBN) (Wang, 2007) provides 
a solution for this case. According to this approach the deeper parts of the BBN which 
are farther from direct observation are assessed using a qualitative scale (e.g., High, 




likelihood "calculus" caries the inference from such deeper layers of the network to 
points where observation based assessments of probabilities are possible, or where the 
experts feel more comfortable expressing their beliefs in a numerical scale. This 
approach, however, requires a linkage between the two scales at the boundary 










Figure  4.11  Qualitative-Quantitative BBN concept (Wang, 2007) 
 
4.8 Integrating Deterministic & Dynamic Characteristics 
  
 In Section (4.5.4), we described how to convert the semi-formal process 
modeling technique to a formal technique, BBN, for quantification purposes. In cases 
where the modeler does not have a detailed deterministic relation between two 
factors, probabilistic techniques such as BBN are preferred. But, modelers may have 
enough information about the interactions of factors for some parts of the model to 
allow the use of deterministic techniques. The deterministic modeling technique can 
be either analytical or simulation-based. Simulation-based techniques such Agent-




Sterman, 2000) usually are the only solution if the formal model is complex and 
analytical solution is not possible or too time-consuming.   
 As sterman (2000, p. vii) explains: “System dynamics is a perspective and set 
of conceptual tools that enable us to understand the structure and dynamics of 
complex systems. System dynamics is also a rigorous modeling method that enables 
us to build formal computer simulations of complex systems and use them to design 
more effective policies and organizations”. 
 System dynamics show significant capabilities for modeling certain human 
behavior and decision making processes, and as such is a good technique for 
modeling aspects of organizational behavior. It was developed initially with the 
intention to study the behavior of industrial systems to show the way policies, delays 
and structures are related and how they influence the stability of the system. As J.W. 
Forrester (1961) explains “It [system dynamics] integrates the separate functional 
areas of management, marketing, investment, research, personnel, production, and 
accounting. Each of these functions is reduced to a common basis by recognizing that 
any economic or corporate activity consists of flows of money, orders, materials, 
personnel, and capital equipment” (p.vii). 
 System Dynamics strength also lays in its ability in accounting for nonlinearity 
in dynamics, feedback, and time delays. This technique is a combination of 











Birth Rate Death Rate  
Figure  4.13  Stock and flow diagram 
 
 The quantification of system dynamics models is done with the help of “stock 
and flow diagrams” (Figure  4.13). Stock (population in Figure (4.13)) represents 
accumulation of some measurable entities (e.g., people, parts, money, or even 
intangibles such as happiness. (Ford, 1999) that are the in the same state. Stocks 
characterize the state of the system and generate the information upon which 
decisions and actions are based (Sterman 2000). It changes with an inflow or an 
outflow. Flows (birth and death in figure (Figure  4.13) are the physical or conceptual 
entities that leave the system state and move over time. Auxiliaries (birth rate and 




Mathematically, a System Dynamics model represents a system of differential 
equations as represented in Equation (4.5): 









            (Equation. 4.2) 
        
Here u (t) stands for the vector input variables, Y (t) is the vector of output variables 
and X (t) the state variables. 
 
4.9 Adapting a Human Reliability Technique 
 
 As Rasmussen (1997) mentioned, human error assessment has moved from 
deviation-based models (e.g., THERP (Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction) 
Swain & Guttmann, 1983) to the cognitive-based operator model (e.g., Mosleh & 
Chang, 2004). Here we do not intend to provide an assessment of human error 
modeling methods and refer the readers to several representative papers in the 
literature (e.g. Mosleh & Chang, 2004). However, since the human performance 
model is part of the organizational performance model, some generic principles are 
highlighted here. 
 As we mentioned in Section (3.2.3), the philosophy of the modeling human 
factor should be based on the combinational effects of the influencing factors. The 
categorical approach to modeling organizations has been applied by some researchers 




Wilson (1985) describe comprehensive configurations of individual and group 
characteristics. They showed, for example, that some personality types are more 
congruent with some situational features, such as the group structure, the reward basis 
in the group, and task difficulty. For example, in their view, affiliation should be 
moderate when the task is highly complex. But the point is that people and their 
contexts are not one-dimensional, and therefore the prediction should be based on 
overall “fit” of individuals and their context. In the climate context, Schulte et al. 
(2006, p.650) conceptualize psychological climate as systems and state that 
“Individual perceptions may work together in forming an overall climate impression, 
or psychological climate system, for a focal person. In this case, different profiles of 
multiple climates reflect the different ways that individuals see the entire system of 
climate”.  
 Using the configurational characteristic with BBN is recommended for human 
error modeling, since it provides a way for dealing with dependency of individual 
performance shaping factors in human reliability analysis. Cluster analysis can find 
the specific profile or pattern across individuals’ attributes. For example, individuals 
can be grouped into categories based on their patterns or profiles across measures of 
their ability and desires. For instance, one profile might reflect high ability, a strong 
desire for autonomy, and weak desire for job variety, while another pattern could 
reflect high ability, strong autonomy and strong job variety desire. Such pattern or 
configurations can then be correlated with specific human error. 
  The concept of “error” by an individual member of the organization can be 




1. It is possible to consider the total performance of an individual as a function 
of his/her internal performance shaping factors (e.g., motivation) and external 
performance shaping factors (e.g., complexity of procedures, quality of tools, 
and resources). Then, the possibility of an individual making an error (unsafe 
act) could be as function of all his/her internal and external performance 








(e.g., complexity of procedure) 
 
Figure  4.14  Individual error model as a function of internal and external PSFs 
 
2. The other view uses the process modeling technique (mentioned in section 
4.4) , expressing the total quality of an activity as a function of an individual 
action, the quality of tools, resources, and procedures. (see Figure 4.15) In this 
case the individual error is defined as a deviation of individual from procedure 














Figure  4.15  Individual error as one of root causes of quality of an activity 
 
 The first view is similar to the approach of human reliability analysis (e.g., 
Mosleh et al. 2004) in order to estimate an individual error. In contrast, in the second 
view, the concept of human error is close to the quality of human performance. Both 
of these approaches are correct, but each has its own practical limitations and might 
be more appropriate for specific objectives.  
 The limitation of the first view is related to the deficiencies of human 
reliability methods. Most of these methods are data-driven, and some that are theory-
based only cover the theoretical relation between internal performance shaping 
factors and the human error. The relation between organizational factors (e.g., human 
resource functions) and internal performance shaping are not adequately modeled. 
Therefore, using the first perspective for the organizational safety theory is 
confronted with this challenge. 
 On the other hand, the second view is more appropriate for models of human 
resource systems, since the concept of error is close to the concept of the quality of 
human performance. The challenge of using human resource references for safety 
causal modeling is that those references mostly focus on the general factors and not 





4.10 Defining the Hybrid Technique for Organizational Safety 
Risk Framework 
 
 Sections (4.2) to (4.10) described different techniques to cover different 
aspects of an organizational safety risk framework. This leads to the idea of creating a 
hybrid modeling technique that can capture different dimensions and objectives in a 
unified, integrated modeling environment. The proposed hybrid modeling includes 
risk analysis techniques for technical systems (ESD/FT methods), ordinary BBN or 
QQ-BBN (for process modeling, social and behavior effects, configurational 
characteristics), and stock and flow diagrams for deterministic relations. The SD 
environment provides a dynamic integration among these different modeling 
techniques. In other words, different modules with different modeling techniques can 
have input and output to system dynamic environments at the core, and thus the 
















 In this environment, there are three kinds of modeling interfaces: (1) between 
technical system techniques and QQ-BBN, (2) between QQ-BBN and SD, and (3) 
between technical system techniques and system dynamics. 
 The first one, which is the interface of QQ-BBN technique with technical 
system risk, has already been dealt with by the Hybrid Causal Logic (HCL). (Mosleh 
et al., 2005, Wang, 2007) HCL has its roots in the conventional risk analysis 
techniques used for complex engineered systems, but it has also been extended to 
facilitate the inclusion of the organizational environment of the physical system. The 
main layers of the HCL are Event Sequence Diagrams (ESDs), Fault Tress (FT), and 
Baysian Belief Nets (BBNs). ESDs on the top (see Figure (4.7)) delineate the possible 
risk or hazard scenarios. The events, conditions, and causes of the scenarios are 
incorporated through the FTs and BBNs, i.e. the second and third layers of the HCL. 
In many cases direct causes of accidents are those system failures or human 
operational errors that appear as the top events of the fault tress or "target nodes" of 
BBNs (or QQ-BBN).  These are usually direct inputs to the ESD pivotal and initiating 
events.  Proximate and root causes, including latent hardware failures, latent human 
errors, and organizational and management effects are modeled through lower layers 
of FTs and BBNs. 
 The interface of SD with QQ-BBN and technical system techniques can be 
captured with importing and exporting the data from the system dynamics 
environment. SD softwares such as STELLA (e.g., Richmond, 2001, Hannon & Ruth, 
2001) and Vensim (e.g., Sterman, 2000) have the capability of importing and 




SD and processed inside SD (with delays and feedbacks), and also the estimated 
values from SD can be exported to the BBN environment. This process can integrate 
the cyclic nature into BBN. The combination of SD and HCL is illustrated through an 
example in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
4.11 Measurement Technique: Bayesian Representation for 
Different Measurement Methods 
 
 In this section we describe the Bayesian approaches as an appropriate 
technique for combination of subjective an objective data. Two advantages are:  
• Reduction of uncertainty: this approach integrates two sources of 
information about the state of a factor (or an attribute), and provides more 
accurate estimate of the actual state of the factor (or the attribute).  
• Possibility of combining subjective and objective information.  
 Here we describe the Bayesian combination through two cases: (1) for 
discrete and (2) for continuous measurement variables.  
 Suppose Msub , Mobj , Mreal stand for subjective measure, objective measure, 
and real state of “training”. For simplicity, we can consider training to have only two 
states: standard and sub-standard, (for all different kinds of measurement.) The state 
of “standard(S)” could mean that more than half of the attributes of the factor meet 
some established standards. The state of “sub- standard ( S )” means less than half of 
its attributes meet the standards. For example, if subjective measurement of training 
results in standard (Msub= S), and its objective measurement finds the factor as 
standard (Mobj = S) as well, then the probability of having standard training in reality 




















   
                        (Equation. 4.3)  
 
 P(Mreal =S) stands for “generic” probability of training being standard, that 
can be estimated based on historical data, and P(Mreal = S ) is equal to (1- P(Mreal 
=S)).  SMSMP realobj == is the probability that training is objectively assessed as 
standard , when it is in fact standard. This value is related to the quality of the 
objective measurement in the organization. The quality of objective measurement 
depends on quality of “auditing system” and also the quality of “assessor”.  
 On the other hand, SMSMP realsub == is the probability that subjective 
measurement, defined training as standard, given that it is indeed standard in reality. 
This probability can be related to the accuracy of perception survey and the accuracy 
of assessors. It also depends on the extent to which organizational members perceive 
training as standard. Since supervisors function as interpretive filters of 
organizational practices for organizational members (Ostroff et al., 2003), this 
probability highly depends on the extent to which supervisors value training in 
organizations. The same discussion holds for the conditional probabilities given Mreal 
= S .  
 Now, consider factor F with k attributes (Ai , i=1,…k).  Factor F has an actual 




represents to what extent attribute Ai is satisfied in factor F. Each attribute may have 






Figure  4.17 Subjective and objective measures of an attribute 
 
 Using Bayesian theorem, both kinds of measurements can be treated as 




























π                                           (Equation 4.4) 
π 0 (xi)  = the “prior” state of knowledge about the actual state of factor F                               
    with respect to attribute Ai  (prior to measuring the factor either   
   objectively or subjectively)  
x*i-subj  = the subjective measure of factor F with respect to attribute Ai 
x*i-obj   = the objective measure of factor F with respect to attribute Ai 
L(x*i_subj ,x*i_obj | xi ) = the likelihood of having the subjective and objective measures 
   as   x*i_subj  and x*i_obj , given that the actual state of the factor 
   with respect  to Ai is xi 
π (xi |x*i_subj ,x*i_obj ) = the “posterior” state of knowledge about the actual state of  
   factor F with respect to attribute Ai 
 
 The next step would be the assessment of π 0 (xi) and L(x*i_subj ,x*i_obj | xi ) in 
order to estimate the posterior distribution. It is possible to assume that the subjective 




managers’ opinions about an attribute, while the objective measure is based on the 
auditor’s observation, and thus these are two independent sources of information. 
With the assumption of independency, the likelihood function can be written as the 









_ , ×=                                                (Equation 4.5) 
 
L(x*i_subj | xi ) = the likelihood of having the subjective measures as                               
    x*i_subj  given the actual state of the factor with respect to Ai is xi 
 
L(x*i_obj | xi ) = the likelihood of having the objective measures as                               
    x*i_obj  given that the actual state of the factor with respect to Ai is xi 
 
 L(x*i_subj | xi ) is a measure of the accuracy of the subjective measure, and    
L(x*i_obj | xi ) is a measure of the accuracy of objective measure of the factor with 
respect to Ai . The shape and functional form of the likelihood may differ from one 
source of data (e.g. informants and records) to another for the same factor. Depending 
on the type of knowledge about the accuracy of measurements, an appropriate 
mathematical model (e.g. additive error model, multiplicative error model) should be 
chosen for a likelihood function. Mosleh & Apostolakis (1984) have discussed 
several mathematical models for the use of expert opinion. Those techniques are 
applicable here, since two types of measurements can be treated as two kinds of 
experts for the same attribute.  
 For example, if the information available on the accuracy of the measured 
values is provided in terms of multiplicative factors of the correct answer, a 
multiplicative error model of the likelihood function is appropriate. Mosleh & 




L(x*i_obj | xi ) are lognormal distributions with median xi and standard deviation si_subj 
and si_obj respectively, and if π 0 (xi) is also lognormal with median xi0 and standard 









_0=                                                                (Equation4.6) 
 
In the Equation (4.6), both objective (x*i_subj ) and subjective measurement        
(x*i_subj  )need to be in the same scale ( e.g. between 1-7) , and they provide the same 







































π                                        (Equation4.7) 
 






















σ                                                                          (Equation4.8) 




















































 Then, the range of the actual state of factor F with respect to attribute Ai with a 
90% confidence level is: 
 
xip exp (-1.645sip)§ xi §xip exp (1.645sip)  
                                                                                                                 (Equation4.13) 
 
 The inverses of variances are the confidence indices for the prior and the 
likelihood, respectively. Therefore, the weights ( wi0, wi_subj, wi_obj) represent the 
theorist’s relative confidences in his/her prior measure and the measures he/she has 
received from objective and subjective approaches. These confidences are related to: 
1. The accuracy of different measurement instruments (auditing system or 
perception survey) 
2. The accuracy of assessors 
3. The accuracy of sampling 
4. The accuracy of informants (for subjective measurement) 
5. The accuracy of organizational records (for objective measurement)  
6. The compliance of each measurement method with the type, level and 
underlying theoretical nature of a specific factor (or the attributes) 
  
Items1 to 4 can be assumed as a global estimate of accuracy (using historical 
data or expert opinion), or it can be evaluated based on a constructing root-cause 
model of error. For example, in the case that subjective measure is based on 




function not only is affected by the reality of that function, but also is influenced by 
his/her own value and supervisors’ behaviors. (Ostroff et al., 2003) Then, the 
accuracy of employees’ perception is affected by these influencing factors as well.   
 The accuracy of subjective measurement instruments refers to construct 
validity and item constructions in surveys (to be discussed later). In contrast, the 
accuracy of objective measurement instruments refers to the reliability of auditing 
system.  
 The prior confidence depends on the availability of historical data (generic 
data) for that specific factor. In the absence of any prior information, the modeler can 
assume a prior distribution with very large relative standard deviation. 
The discussion about the appropriateness of different measurement methods 
for specific constructs based on the methods’ type, level and theoretical nature is 
presented later in this section. If the modeler believes that objective measurement is 
the ideal approach for an attribute and that there is no need for subjective 
measurement, then he/she sets wi_subj as zero in the Equation (4.8); and in this case we 
can say that the attribute is measured objectively. Similarly, if the modeler believes 
that there is no need for objective measurement, then he/she sets wi_obj as zero in the 
Equation (4-8); and in this case we can say that the attribute is measured subjectively. 
Any other cases, in which both wi_subj and wi_obj are not zero, are the cases of a 
“supplementary combination” of objective and subjective measurements.  
 For example, consider the case where the modeler’s evaluation leads to the 
confidence objective measurement of factor F with respect to Ai is likely to be within 




made believes with a confidence of 80% that the likely range of error by subjective 
measurement is anywhere between a factor of 3 smaller to a factor of 3 larger than the 
actual value. Then, for si_obj   the error factor (EF) at 90% confidence is 2555 =× , and 
similarly for si_subj the error factor is 933 =×  at an 80% confidence level. Thus, for a 





















When no prior information is available, very diffuse lognormal distributions can be 
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The total measure of factor F, named (x), will be an aggregated measure with respect 









ω     ∑ = 1iω                              (Equation 4.14) 
 
 If all xi’s are measured subjectively, it is said that factor F is measured 
subjectively. Similarly, if all xi’s are measured objectively, it is said that factor F is 
measured objectively. If some xi’s are measured subjectively and others are measured 
objectively, then x is a complementary combination of objective and subjective 
measurements. If all xi’s are measured both objectively and subjectively, then the 
value of x is a supplementary combination of objective and subjective measurements 
and should be estimated using the Bayesian approach similar to procedures applied 
for attributes. But in this case the variable of interest in Bayesian equation is x, the 
total measure of factor F, instead of xi . 
 
4.12 Evaluation Techniques 
 
 
 A major challenge in organizational accident theory is the lack of appropriate 
evaluation techniques. Fahlbruch et al. (2000, p.22) believe that “Traditional validity 
measures cannot easily be applied to this process”. In this section, first, we provide an 
overview of “evaluation” processes, and discuss the specific challenges in evaluating 
organizational safety risk framework. In addition, some approaches are proposed to 




 The “evaluation” and “testing” of the model are discussed under the titles of 
“verification” and “validation” in the literature. A practical perspective is offered by 
Sterman: “All models are wrong, so no models are valid or verifiable in the sense of 
establishing their truth. The question facing clients and molders is never whether a 
model is true but whether it is useful”. (2000, p. 890) In other words, the purpose of 
evaluation and testing is to find out whether the model is good “enough” to be used 
for a specific purpose and end objective. There are different definitions for the terms 
“verification “and “validation”. In the following discussion, we will attempt to 
develop an evaluation framework that would be more appropriate for organizational 
performance theories and models (see Figure 4.18). 
 As Figure (4.18) illustrates, a “theory” is built based on the principles of 
theory building, and thus an appropriate technique should be adapted in order to 
“implement” it. As the next step, the model needs to be “validated”. Validation refers 
to the method(s) of finding out the extent to which the implemented model can 
predict the safety performance data. If the validation is satisfied, it means the 
implemented model is good enough to be used, and it is the end of the procedure. But 
if the validation is not satisfied, then the verification and modification need to be 
done in an iterative procedure. The failure of validation can be due to inaccurate input 
data, theory, implementation, objective output data, or any combination of these 
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Figure  4.18  Model evaluation procedure 
 













Figure  4.19 The possible causes of validation failure 
 
   Thus “Verification” refers to testing the possibility of the occurrences of one 
of these possible causes or combination of them. Most of the validation and 
verification tests in the literature refer to one or a combination of these possibilities, 
but we categorize them in order to avoid missing some of the probable causes and the 




analyze the challenges of each verification category for safety context and their 
potential solutions. 
 There are several possible approaches for the validation part of the “model 
evaluation procedure”. We only propose the approaches that are appropriate for 
validation of the organizational safety risk model: 
 
Validation (1): Configurational technique  
 This approach is similar to the method described in section 4.6, but here the 
modeler tries to find the pattern in all high-level factors (e.g., safety culture, safety 
climate, etc.) in the model. The researcher should have a sample of organizations and, 
using cluster analysis try to find the possible types of pattern of high-level factors in 
the model. Then, the validation would be the extent to which the value of fit to those 
types can be a predictor of objective safety output. This approach can validate the 
comprehensiveness of the factors, but can not validate the relations between the 
factors. For risk management purposes, managers need to know the relations among 
the factors, because they want to know how to change the organization (from one 
pattern to the other pattern). In other words, they should know the order and priority 
of changes in the factors. 
 
Validation (2): Combination of SEM or path analysis with configurational techniques: 
 
 As we mentioned in Section (4.3), SEM and path analysis are the tools for 




organizational accident model, we can not test all of them simultaneously. Thus, a 
combination of path analysis and configurational approach is suggested in order to 
test the relation between high-level factors. First, the modeler should search for 
different types of profiles for each high-level factor of the model. For example, 
different types of safety culture, safety climate and safety structure need to be found 
using samples of different organizations. Then, the values of fitnesses of different 
organizations with respect to each factor are plugged into a path analysis or SEM, in 
order to test the model relations. 
 
Validation (3): Behavior reproducing testing (e.g., Sterman, 2000, Galvin, 2002):  
 If the model (or part f the model) is quantified in the system dynamics 
environment, then the validation would be running the system dynamic model for 
some organizations as case studies. The past data of organizations are entered into the 
model as input data, and the model is run for a period of time to predict the current 
organizational safety outcome. 
 
Validation (4): Sensitivity Analysis  
 Sensitivity analysis can highlight the factors that largely affect the output of 
the model. In the validation phase, sensitivity analysis gives modelers the information 
about the factors that are more important to be verified accurately.  
 If the validation is satisfied, it means that none of the possible causes of 




then the molder needs to try all the following types of verification to find the sources 
of validation failure: 
 
Verification (1): Input data and objective safety data  
 This is related to the verification of the measurement methods described in 
Section 3.3.2. For example, it is the verification of the: 
• accuracy of sampling  
• reliability of measurement of the instruments and the assessor 
• accuracy of informants 
• accuracy of organizational records 
• compliance of each measurement method with the type, level, and 
underlying theoretical nature of a specific factor 
 
 One of the challenges of data verification for safety model is the case of a new 
organization and the lack of historical data. In this case, the modeler can use the data 
from other applications. These soft data involve uncertainties due to the degree of 
relevance to the organization of interest. They should be approached by Bayesian 
methods, and the evidence can be implemented using procedures such as weighted 
posterior, weighted likelihood, and data averaging. The other issue for soft data is 
expert elicitation and aggregation (e.g., additive models & multiplicative models). 
(Mosleh & Apostolakis, 1984)  
 Another difficulty is the case of rare accident organizations and lack of output 




precursors (instead of accidents) can provide relevant information. For example, in 
the case of organization of airlines, instead of relying on aircraft crash, the modeler 
can use major, but not catastrophic events such as engine failure as an objective safety 
output. These precursors are basically “more frequent” and “less consequent” events 
(compared to accidents) in the technical system risk models (Section 4.2). This is the 
basic idea in developing the scenarios of accidents in the PRA technique in order to 
estimate the ultimate risk of the system. 
 The other obstacle is the unreliability of historical data due to the inaccuracy 
of documentation and reporting system. As Fahlbruch et al. (2000) has indicated: 
“The analysis of an accident is always a retrospective social reconstruction process, 
starting with insufficient information about what happened and resulting in inferences 
about the causes/contributing factors”. A possible solution for this problem is 
observing the organization in a specific period of time. During this period, an expert 
team would measure the organizational factors as input data. At the same time, a 
voluntary reporting system should be established in the organization so that 
employees can report incidents confidentially. The reports must be in a structured 
format, describing the problem and also the circumstances surrounding the incidents. 
In the structured form, participants need to specify the sources of incidents based on a 
model-based taxonomy of factors, and also other possible sources based on their own 
opinions. Then, periodically these reports need to be reviewed by risk management 
expert in order to map the incidents to the possible root causes. With this data 
gathering approach, it is possible to verify (1) the reliability of input and output data, 




theory), and (3) some causal relations in the theory ( this is related to the verification 
of the theory). 
Verification (2): Theory  
 Theories need to be verified with respect to underlying logical propositions 
and supporting literature. In addition, they should be verified by “boundary adequacy 
tests”. (e.g., Sterman , 2000). This test verifies the appropriateness of the boundaries 
with respect to objectives of modeling and the extent to which the external factors 
(outside the model boundary) have significant impacts on the model parameters. 
 
Verification (3): Implementation  
 Implementation needs to be verified with respect to two different aspects: (1) 
the extent to which the techniques are fitted to the theory and (2) the extent to which 
the techniques are implemented correctly. In Section (4.10), the criteria for adaptation 
of the appropriate quantification technique are explained. Verification of the 
quantification technique with respect to the second aspect, to some degree, depends 
on the type of quantification techniques. But some of the tests are more general such 
as the dimensional consistency test (e.g., Streman, 2000), extreme condition test (e.g., 
Sterman, 2000, Galvin, 2002), integration error test (e.g., Streman, 2000), sensitivity 
analysis, time step testing (e.g., Galvin, 2002) and face validity (e.g., Carson, 2002, 
Galvin, 2002).  
 A common approach for verifying quantification techniques is testing the tool 
on a simple case. Although it is not always possible to generalize the verification of a 





5. SOCIO-TECHNICAL RISK ANALYSIS (SoTeRiA)3 
FRAMEWORK 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 The focus of this chapter is on developing an organizational safety risk 
analysis framework, named “Socio-Technical Risk Analysis (SoTeRiA) that is the 
third major contribution of this thesis. The proposed theory, which is a realization of 
modeling principle described in Chapter 3, is intended to overcome some of the 
limitations of existing models, mentioned in Chapter 2.  In Chapter 6, we will explain 
which ones of those aspects are improved by this research. In Sections (5.2) to (5.11), 
we elaborate step by step on building the theory (based on the described principle in 
Chapter 3) and clarifying its elements. The final Section, (5.12), summarizes the 
theory and provides a schematic representation covering the entire range from 
organizational factors up to the technical system risk scenarios.  
5.2 Defining the Unknown of Interest 
 Referring to principle (A), the unknown of interest is organizational safety 
risk. Although most part of this theory is general and can be applicable to three types 
of organizational safety performance mentioned in principle (O), here we mainly 
focus on infrequent and medium size accidents such as aircraft accidents, and very 
rare and unacceptable accidents such as those in nuclear power plants.  
                                                 





5.3 Safety as an Organizational Performance 
 Based on principle (B), safety is one of the organizational 
outcomes/performances, thus organizational accident theory should be grounded on 
the organizational performance model. The theoretical frameworks for organizational 
effectiveness were reviewed, and the model developed by Ostroff et al. (2003) 
(Figure (5.1)) was adopted for two key reasons: 
  First, it considers the theoretical relation between organizational culture, 
organizational structure/practices, and organizational climate, with specific 
distinction between culture and climate. Based on principle (G), the 
comprehensiveness of safety model needs the coverage and integration of the social 
(e.g. safety culture and climate) and structural (organizational safety structure & 
practices) aspects of organization that influence safety. Most of the previous safety 
models focus on either social or structural aspects. But previous researches that have 
attempted to include these two aspects have not established the theoretical relations 
between them. Besides, there is no clear distinction between safety culture and safety 
climate in the safety frameworks, and these two have been used, most of the time, 
with a verity of definitions and interchangeably. A systematic view of safety culture 
and safety climate fills an important gap in modeling complex system risk, and 
therefore, this organizational effectiveness model (Figure (5.1)) that has a theoretical 
relationship between the two concepts of culture and climate has been adopted to fill 
this gap. 
 Second, it is a multi-level framework. Based on principle (D), for the purpose 




macro and micro perspectives is needed. Thus, this model, which is a multi-level 
organizational performance framework, has been adopted and modified for 
organizational safety risk framework.  
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Figure  5.1 Multi-Level model of organizational culture and climate (Ostroff et. al, 2003) 
 
  Using this organizational effectiveness model as a basis for organizational 
safety causal model is reasonable, because safety culture is a sub-facet of 
organizational culture, and is defined as common safety value in organization (see for 
example Cooper, 2000, Cox & Cox, 1991). Likewise, safety climate is a sub-facet of 
organizational climate, and is expressed as shared perception of employees regarding 




Therefore, we substituted safety culture for organizational culture, safety climate for 
organizational climate, and safety outcome for organizational outcome to create the 
multi-level organizational safety causal model. We also added a group level in the 
model in order to analyze the relations at the group level as well. (see Figure 5.2)  
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Figure  5.2 Adapting an organizational performance model for safety purpose 
 
 
5.4 The Interaction of Safety & Other Organizational 
Performances 
 
 Based on principle (B), safety has interaction with other organizational 




performance and financial performance that is an important non-safety performance. 
(see Figure (5.3))  
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Figure  5.3 The interaction of safety outcome and financial performance 
 
 
  Safety performance impacts financial performance, and financial performance 
affects safety performance through a number of paths of influence. The financial 
performance affects the safety performance both directly and indirectly. The indirect 
effects, for example, would be decisions that a manager makes on training, work 
environment, operational procedures, etc., based on lack of budget or other distresses. 
An example of the direct effects is the collapse of morale because of the news on 
extreme financial distress (e.g. possible bankruptcy). These direct and indirect effects 




organization is operating perfectly and safety management practices are fine, but due 
to sharp increase in the oil price, the company moves towards bankruptcy rapidly. On 
the other hand, safety performance may affect the financial performance directly by 
internal costs (direct loss of asset as a result of an accident), and indirectly through 
loss of public confidence, new regulation, and market value, to name only a few 
parameters.   
  It can be argued that in high-reliability organizations (e.g. aviation, nuclear 
power plants) these consequences do not propagate through the organization 
immediately. There exists an inertia which enables the organization to maintain its 
stability against financial fluctuations.  These barriers or damping mechanisms 
include:   
• Technology Resilience 
• Regulation 
• High Levels of Professionalism 
  
 In the current model (Figure (5.3)), we use safety culture as a barrier that 
damps the direct effects of financial pressure on the safety practices in organizations. 
Then, we need a statistical relation between financial pressure and safety culture. 
Most of the related research has studied the effects of culture on the financial 
performance (e.g. Siehl and Martin, 1990), not financial performance on the culture. 
Besides, the investigation of the existence of a possible correlation between financial 
wellbeing of a firm and the safety performance of firms has been of interest to 
researchers and managers for a long time. This is particularly important if unsafe 




a suitable set of financial factors and correlating them to safety culture. The preferred 
method of studying the existence of such a correlation and the degree of its strength 
however is outside the scope of this thesis and future research needs to be devoted to 
this topic. 
5.5 The Path of Cross-level Analysis  
 Referring to principle (D), a cross-level safety causal model needs the 
coverage of paths of influence from the level of organization as a whole, to groups , 
to individuals, and then from the individual-level back up to organization-level safety 
outcome. Figure (5.4) shows the path of cross-level analysis in the proposed multi-
level framework. 
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5.6. Organizational Safety Risk as a Measure of Safety Output 
Deviation 
 
 Based on principle (C), the organizational safety risk is a measure of deviation 
of organizational safety output from a normative level of safety. Here, we limit the 
theory to major accidents, and thus the measure of deviation can be the deviation of 
the technical system from the normative level of safety. Technical system risk (e.g. 
risk of aircraft crash, risk of core melt in nuclear power plants) can be a measure of 
deviation from the normative level of safety. Technical system risk, which is 
substituted as organizational safety output in the Figure (5.4), is a configural construct 
at the organization level, and emerges from group and individual level performance in 
a compilation process. Next sections describe this compilation process.  
 
5.7 The Relation between Group Safety Performance and 
Organizational Safety Output 
 
 Organizational safety outcome, which is the technical system risk in this 
theory, emerges from group and individual performance. Based on principle (L), 
depending on the nature of emergence, a technique should be used in order to 
combine the lower-level constructs into the higher-level construct. As we explained in 
Section (4.2), technical system risk can be represented using logical techniques such 
as Fault Trees (FT) and Event Sequence Diagrams (ESDs). Thus, these are the 
candidate techniques that connect the group and individual performance to 
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Figure  5.5 The link between group safety performances and organizational safety output 
 
  
 ESDs (see Figure (5.5)) delineate the possible risk or hazard scenarios.  The 
events, conditions, and causes of the scenarios are incorporated through the FTs. In 
many cases direct causes of accidents are those system failures or human operational 
errors that appear as the top events of the fault trees. The top events of fault tress (e.g. 
System 1) are plugged into the ESDs. ESDs represent a set of possible risk scenarios 
where, given the occurrence of the initiating event, the state of System 1 (a Pivotal 
Event) determines whether the sequence leads to success (end State S), when it 
works, or a human action is required, when it fails. Given the success of human 
action, the final outcome would be success (state S). The failure of Human Action 
leads to Failure (state F). The failure of System 1 can be due to different types of 




is the concern of this causal theory. The other sources of failure can be related to 
inherent hardware failure that represents failure mechanisms which are beyond the 
control of the organization in charge of operating and maintaining the technical 
system, and for instance it may be related to the manufacturer.  
 The group or individual performances that have direct effects on the elements 
of technical system risk scenarios are named Safety Critical Tasks (SCTs). For 
example, maintenance performance is a safety critical task since it directly affects 
hardware failure (an element of risk scenarios). In general, SCTs can be either events 
explicitly specified (e.g. human actions) in the accident scenarios, or implicitly 
through model parameters (e.g. equipment failure rate). SCTs help to focus on what 
matters most for safety among many activities in organization.  
 There can be several SCTs as representations of different group safety 
performances (e.g. maintenance performance, operation performance). As Figure 
(5.5) shows the path of connection between group safety performances (SCTs) and 
organizational safety outcome covers some techniques including FT, ESD, and also 
Omega Factor (Mosleh & Golfeiz, 1999). The Omega factor technique is a parametric 
function that converts the nature of group safety performance to the nature of failure 
rates of the elements of risk scenarios. A more detail explanation about the Omega 
factor approach can be found in Chapter 5 through the example application.  
5.8 The Relation between Individual Safety Performance and 
Group Safety Performance  
 
 The group safety performance, which has been defined as SCT in the previous 




compilation process (referring to principle F). Based on principle (H4), depending on 
the nature of emergence, a technique should be used in order to combine the lower 
level constructs into the higher level one. As we explained in the principle (P) and 
also Chapter 4, process modeling technique can model an activity (or a set of 
activities), and thus we use this technique to model the safety performances of the 
groups and make a non-linear connection between group members’ performances and 
unit’s output performance (SCT).  We name this linkage module the “unit process 
model” in the model. Unit process model includes the direct activities that perform 
the Safety Critical Tasks (group safety performance).  
 As Section (4.4) described, the process modeling technique transmits the 
inputs (I) to the outputs (O) given the resources (R) and the control/criteria (C). The 
resources may include tools, equipments, and also the individuals performing the 
task. We make a distinction among the resources and represent any activity as a 
function of human action, holding at the same time resources to be tools and 
equipments, and procedures to be a means of control/criteria. As Figure (5.6) shows, 
unit process model, for example, may include two “direct” activities (i and j)( those in 
direct relation to technical system) and their “direct" resources, procedures and 
human actions that make those activities happen. In other words, individuals’ safety 
performances are linked into group safety performance through the process modeling 
technique. A detail application of the process modeling technique will be described in 
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Figure  5.6 The link between individual safety performance and group safety performance 
 
 
 The unit process modeling, presented in Figure (5.6), is a technique to 
describe how individual performances non-linearly interact with and emerge to the 
group performance. As Figure (5.3) illustrates, the relation between group and 
individual performance is a two directional one, meaning that group performance can 
affect individual performance as well. Most of the effects of higher-level performance 
(group performance) on individual performance would be indirect. For example, 
when the unit or organization is performing well, it increases individual’s motivation, 
confidence, and the desire to do well, which in turn is likely to influence individual 
performance. But there could be some direct link as well; for example, if the group is 
very cohesive and works interdependently, with members helping one another, then 
the group performance could then influence the individual’s performance.  
 The rest of the framework will describe how the organizational factors affect 
the SCTs through their effects on the direct resources, procedures and individuals’ 





5.9 Safety Culture, Safety Structure/ Practices, Safety Climate, 
and Their Relationships 
 
5.9.1 Safety Culture 
5.9.1.1. Definition 
 There is some confusion and contradictions about the meaning of safety 
culture among the safety community. Most of these ambiguities are due to the lack of 
a clear definition of safety culture, overlap of safety culture and climate, and 
inadequate multi-level studies of these concepts. In order to clarify what we mean by 
safety culture, we start by viewing safety culture as a subset of organizational culture. 
 The concept of organizational culture has become a booming research 
paradigm after three best-selling books: Ouchi’s (1981) Theory Z: How American 
Business Can Meet the Japanese Challenge; Deal and Kennedy’s (1982) Corporate 
Cultures: The Rites and Rituals of Corporate Life; and Peters and Waterman’s (1982) 
In search of Excellence. The main concern of theses books is to emphasize the strong 
relationship between organizational culture and organizational effectiveness. Since 
1982 many researchers have studied the impacts of organizational culture on different 
aspects such as effectiveness of a total quality management program (Tata & Prasad, 
1998) and technical innovation (Delisi, 1990).  
 Still, because of the interdisciplinary nature of this concept, a variety of 
meanings is prevalent among different disciplines such as sociology, psychology, and 
anthropology. However, as Hofstede, Neuijen , Ohaya, and Sanders (1990) have 
introduced , there are several commonalities among these various definitions. These 




and aspects (i.e. cognitive and symbolic ones) of organizational circumstances, (2) 
being a socially constructed phenomenon affected by historical and spatial 
boundaries, and (3) being a “shared” construct.  
 Based on Ostroff et al. (2003) opinion, the definition offered by Schein (1992) 
most comprehensively integrates these key commonalities. Schein (1992) defines 
culture as:  
 
“A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group 
learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation 
and internal integration, that has worked well enough to 
be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in 
relation to those problems”(p.12)  
 
 Schein (1992) proposed three fundamental layers for any given culture, 
including observable artifacts, espoused values, and basic underlying assumptions. 
Observable artifacts are visible organizational characteristics including its “symbols” 
(e.g. performance and functions), “organizational language” (e.g. gestures, 
metaphors), “narratives” (e.g. stories, legends), and “practices” (e.g. rituals, 
ceremonies). (Trice and Beyer, 1993) Espoused values are the values “endorsed by 
management, and in contrast enacted values are those converted into employee 
behavior” (Ostroff et al., 2003, p.568). Basic assumptions are deep and unobservable 
assumptions that over time turn to values.  
 Although the concept of safety culture is akin to that of organizational culture, 
the term “safety culture” originated after the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident 




(INSAG) of the International Atomic Agency described that the most probable cause 
as “poor safety culture” (Cox & Flin, 1998). International Nuclear Safety Advisory 
Group (INSAG, 1991) proposed that “Safety culture is that assembly of 
characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as 
an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receives the attention warranted by 
their significance”. The term rapidly spread to the other industries such as chemical 
processing and commercial aviation, and thus several definitions of safety culture 
have appeared in the literature. According to James Reason, “the safety culture of an 
organization is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, competencies, 
and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and 
proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety program” (Reason, 1997, p.194). 
In the aviation industry, Wiegmann and his colleagues describe safety culture as “the 
enduring value and priority placed on worker and public safety by everyone in every 
group at every level of an organization. It refers to the extent to which individuals and 
groups will commit to personal responsibility for safety, act to preserve, enhance and 
communicate safety concerns, strive to actively learn, adapt and modify (both 
individual and organizational) behavior based on lessons learned from mistakes, and 
be rewarded in a manner consistent with these values.” (2002, p.8)  
 Despite the variety of definitions of “safety culture” in different industries and 
by different researchers, this concept as such has the notion of organizational culture 
as its parent and the various definitions share the same three commonalities 




organizational culture definitions. Therefore, we borrow Schein’s definition of culture 
and adapt it for safety, as following:  
Safety culture is a pattern of shared basic assumptions 
that the group learned as it solved its safety problems 
(external and internal), that has worked well enough to be 
considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in 
relation to those safety problems.  
 
 This is a broader definition than previous ones, and has Schein’s formulation 
as its parent. It clearly refers to three layers of safety culture including observable 
artifacts, espoused values, and basic underlying assumptions. Relying on a well-
founded definition of culture helps to avoid some industry specific contents of safety 
culture. 
 There is not enough research on the antecedents of safety culture, and not 
even on organizational culture. Ostroff, et.al (2003) based on the results of other 
researchers have found that enterprise environment (market characteristics, nature of 
industry, ownership or control, resource availability, and socio-cultural dimensions), 
industry and business environment, as well as organization senior leaders’ visions and 
behaviors can be viewed as antecedents of organizational culture. Thus, we have 
adopted this view point , as shown in Figure (5.3). 
 
5.9.1.2. The Elements of Safety Culture 
 The next challenge is to identify the elements of safety culture. To date, there 
have been only a few studies on identifying the subject. Most of the measurement 




Reason (1997, pp.191) proposes that a safe culture is an “informed culture”. 
An informed culture is “one in which those who manage and operate the system have 
current knowledge about the human, technical, organizational, and environmental 
factors that determine the safety of the system as a whole” (Reason, p.294) Reason 
argues that an informed culture has four different ingredients : (1) reporting culture, 
(2) just culture, (3) flexible culture, and (4) learning culture. A reporting structure 
refers to an atmosphere of trust in which people are willing to “confess” to their 
errors. In other words, a reporting culture is a supporting culture of people who 
report. Also, an informed culture is a just culture, with an atmosphere in which people 
are clear about what act is acceptable, and what is not. Reason believes that if the line 
between safe and unsafe behavior is clear, then unacceptable acts can be reported 
without any fear. Thus, a reporting culture can not be successful without a just 
culture. A flexible culture is the one that can adjust to changing internal and external 
demands. Wieck and Sutcliffe (2001) relate the concept of flexible culture with the 
characteristics of HROs, which “allow decisions to migrate to expertise during 
periods of high-tempo activity”. They argue that if hierarchies are more flattered, the 
information can flow more freely, and a flexible culture is more possible. The last 
dimension of culture offered by Reason is a learning culture. A reporting, just, and 
flexible culture help people understand the best practices and learn from past 
mistakes. 
 Some studies have attempted to develop assessment instruments for safety 
culture. For instance, Gibbons et al. (2005) developed their instrument for 




(safety value, work environment, safety fundamentals, and safety training), (2) 
Supervisors (supervisory environment, maintaining standard), (3) Informal Safety 
System (accountability, technician’s authority, professionalism), and (4) Formal 
Safety System (Reporting system, Response & feedback, and Safety Personnel). 
Following are few statements that point to meaning of some of their factors: 
• Safety Value: “management is more concerned with making money than 
being safe (true or false)” 
• Safety Fundamentals: “shift work and day-off scheduling policies at my 
company greatly contribute to stress and fatigue in technicians (true or 
false)”  
• Work Environment: “My company ensures that the environment (e.g. 
lighting, air conditioning, ventilation) is conductive to effective maintenance 
work (true or false) ” 
• Supervisory Involvement: “Supervisors distribute the workload evenly 
among technicians (true or false) ” 
• Accountability: “Management shows favoritism to certain technicians (true 
or false)” 
• Reporting System: “Technicians don’t bother reporting mishaps or close 
calls since these events don’t cause any real damage (true or false)”  
 
 Based on our proposed definition of safety culture and safety climate, we 





 A more comprehensive organizational safety culture survey can be developed 
by adapting multiple methods, as suggested by Ostrof et al. (2003) for organizational 
culture. These include:  Organizational Culture Inventory (OCI) and Competing 
Values Framework (CVF), as well as Organizational Culture Profile (OCP), in order 
to assess multiple levels of organizational safety culture.  OCI is a survey with 120 
items that assess 12 sets of normative beliefs that are categorized in three types of 
organizational cultures: constructive culture, passive-defensive culture, and 
aggressive-defensive. We refer the reader to Cooke & Szumal (2000) for more detail 
explanation of OCI. Another instrument, named CVF (Quinn & McGrath, 1985; 
Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983), measures the values and norms, and classifies culture 
into four types namely a group culture, developmental culture, hierarchical culture, 
and the rational culture. The OCP was developed to measure person fit (O’Reilly et 
al., 1991). It has 54 items for values and uses the Q-sort methodology to categorize 
the organization from least characteristic to most characteristic. 
 Future research is needed to implement these instruments for assessment of 
safety culture and its different types. As an example, Ron Westrum (1992) has 
proposed a classification of safety culture types including generative, pathological, 
and bureaucratic. Generative organization refers to the one with deep learning 
characteristics. Such organizations encourage people to observe, make conclusions, 
and report to higher managements. Pathological organizations do not support new 
ideas, punish the failures, and in Reason and Hobbs (2003, p.156) views, “keep one 
step ahead of the regulator”. The third type, which is bureaucratic, is a culture 




fixing the proximate/superficial causes of safety problems, rather than more 
fundamental root and causes.  
 As another example, Hudson (2002) extends these three types of safety culture 
to five types including Pathological (“who cares as long as we don’t get caught”) , 
Reactive (“safety is important; we do a lot every time we have an accident”), 
Calculative (“we have systems in place to manage all hazards”, Proactive ( “we work 
hard on the problems we still find”), and Generative (“we know that achieving safety 
is difficult; we keep brainstorming new ways in which the system can fail and have 
contingencies in place to deal with them”). Hudson believes that organizations need 
to pass each stage (type) in order to achieve the next stage. 
5.9.2 Safety Climate 
 
5.9.2.1 Definition 
 In order to define the concept of safety climate, we first clarify the concept of 
climate and then specify safety climate as a subset of organizational climate. Climate 
is widely considered to be a multi-dimensional phenomenon describing the perception 
of formal and informal organizational policies, procedures, and practices (Reichers & 
Schneider, 1990). However, there are a number of issues that originally caused 
confusion and contradictions about this term.  
 One reason is the overlap of this term with safety culture. Some of the more 
recent work (e.g. Denison, 1996) brought up the issue of similarity between culture 
and climate. Denison argued that both culture and climate refer to a common 
psychological phenomenon within an organization. Ostroff et al. (2003) believe that 




due to the empirical methods to assess these concepts. A number of quantitative 
culture studies appeared during the 1990s that have used a survey style very similar to 
climate studies, and often with the same dimensions. Also, some of the culture studies 
focused on the assessment of perceptions of organizational practices. It can be argued 
that these studies mostly consider the artifact layer of culture rather than its deeper 
layers. According to Zohar (2003), the use of safety culture and climate 
“…interchangeably, or operationalising culture with climate scales, as in the common 
practices, results in conceptual slippage damaging both.” (p. 123) 
 The three other causes of disagreements about climate came from the 
objective versus perceptual nature of climate, the level of analysis, and the 
aggregation of climate perceptions. (Ostroff et al., 2003) Today, it is widely accepted 
that climate is a perceptual construct originated at the level of the individual, named 
psychological climate. If the consensus among the individuals’ perceptions is exited, 
their perceptions can be aggregated to create subunit or organizational climate. 
(James, 1982) However, there are still some contradictions about the aggregation 
problem in climate. 
 Schneider (1975) proposed that climate research should move from a molar 
perspective toward climate for a specific outcome and goal such as climate for 
service. This notion created a ground for constructing the term safety climate (Zohar, 
1980), which is a climate for safety. From then, several definitions have been 
proposed in different industries. For instance, Zohar (2003) defined the term as 
“….shared perceptions with regard to safety policies, procedures, and practices.” 




attitudes. Cheyne et al. (1998) highlighted safety climate as a temporary state measure 
of safety culture. Wiegmann et al. (2002) based on the commonalities found in the 
literature in the definitions of safety climate, concluded that “safety climate is the 
temporal state measure of safety culture, subject to commonalities among individual 
perceptions of the organization. It is therefore situationally based,   refers to the 
perceived state of safety at a particular place at a particular time, is relatively 
unstable, and subject to change depending on the features of the current environment 
or prevailing conditions” (p.10). 
 We proposed the following definition of safety climate based on the concept 
of organizational climate, referring to the model represented in the Figure (5.4): 
 
Safety climate is a perceptual construct originated at the level of 
individual, named psychological safety climate. Psychological 
safety climate is the individual perception about organizational 
safety structure and practices. If the consensus among the 
individuals’ perceptions is exited, their perceptions can be 
meaningfully aggregated to represent subunit or organizational 
safety climate. 
 
5.9.2.2 The Elements of Safety Climate 
 Today, climate researchers have mostly focus on the multi-dimensional 
climate rather than a global nature. They have proposed some dimensions such as 




 Similarly, the concept of safety climate has been described multi-
dimensionally. Flin and his colleague ( 1998 & 2000) reviewed 18 studies and 
characterized five main dimensions of safety climate including 
management/supervision, safety systems, risk, work pressure and competence. 
Cheyne et al. (1998) also found other dimensions such as “communication”, 
“individual safety responsibility”, and “group involvement in safety” as important 
ones. Zohar (1980), too, has a five-dimensional construct for safety climate including 
“perceived management attitudes towards safety”, “perceived effects of safe conduct 
on promotion”, “perceived effects of safe conduct on social status”, “perceived 
organizational status of safety officer”, “perceived importance and effectiveness of 
safety training”, “perceived risk level at work place”, and “perceived effectiveness of 
enforcement versus guidance in promoting safety” (p. 98). Comparing Zohar’s 
dimensions with the previous mentioned items, it can be concluded that three terms, i. 
e. “incentives for safety”, “involvement on the possibility for promotion”, and “social 
status” are important to be considered as well. 
 A number of surveys have been developed by researchers assessing the 
various dimensions of safety climate. The main focus of these studies is to build the 
measurements in a way that can predict safety performance effectively. Trying to 
achieve this objective, sometimes the items that are not part of the concept of climate 
are included. For example, the perception of employees about the adequacy of tools 
and equipment is not a real climate aspect, but since it has an effect on the safety 
output of organization, including this item can make safety climate a better predictor. 




individuals’ motivations and finally individuals’ safety performances. But the total 
safety performance of organization is not only related to individuals’ performances, 
but also depends on the physical system that individuals work with. We propose that 
safety climate measurements should only be devoted to the items that have really 
climate nature and have an effect on individuals’ motivation. Using this kind of safety 
climate concept in a comprehensive model of accident renders a more effective safety 
prediction. 
 
5.9.2.3 The Antecedents of Safety Climate 
  Most of climate researchers have focused on the outcomes of climate rather 
than its antecedents. Ostroff et. al (2003) As we mentioned in the previous section, 
safety climate emerges from individuals’ perceptions about organizational safety 
structure and practices, and thus the most important antecedent of safety climate 
would be organizational safety structure and practices. There is some evidence on the 
relation between climate and the organizational practices and structure. For example, 
Kozlowski & Hults (1987) have shown a relation between technical, structural, and 
reward systems and a climate for technical updating. Besides, Klein & Sorra (1996) 
and Schneider (1990) strongly believe that human resource management practices are 
the causal root for the creation of specific types of climate, but there have been 
limited studies on testing the presence of these linkages. (Kopelman et al., 1990)  
 Another point that is highlighted in the definition of safety climate is the 
concept of “consensus”. Ostroff et al. proposed that “…these shared perceptions will 




Thus, “emergent process factors” including supervision/leadership, social 
interactions, and homogeneity are the other antecedents of climate. Although 
emergent process factors are affected by organizational practices, because of the 
importance of these processes as antecedents of climate, we considered them as 
separate factors influencing climate.  
 One of the emergent process factors, homogeneity, is based on the Attraction-
Selection-Attrition (ASA) theory developed by Schneider (1987).The idea is that 
individuals are attracted to organizations that have attributes similar to their own 
characteristics and views. The selection and hiring procedures in a given organization 
try to choose people who have more similarity to the organizational attributes. 
Individuals would leave the organization if their attributes don’t fit the characteristics 
of the work context. As a result the organization will end up with more similar people 
who perceive the work context more similarly. With this explanation, it is clear that 
the quality of selection in organizational practices influences homogeneity. (see 
Figure 5.7) 
  Another factor in emergent process, i.e. social interaction, is based on the 
process of interaction and social exchange in the development of a specific 
interpretation of the work context among the members of the same group. Ostroff et 
al. (2003) believe that informal interaction groups have more effects on the formation 
of a shared climate than formal interaction groups. With this description of social 
interaction process, we can propose a relation between “team systems”, a human 




 In the emergent process, a third major factor is “leadership”.  Kozlowski & 
Doherty (1989) believe that leaders or supervisors act as interpretive filters for all 
group members’ perceptions about the relevant organizational structure and practices. 
For example, Borucki & Burke (1999) have shown a relation between the importance 
of service to managers and the employees’ perceptions of the service climate. Rentsch 
(1990) highlights the fact that those leaders that clearly communicate their own 
interpretations with organizational members are more likely to create a common 
interpretation among them. Kozlowski & Doherty (1989), for example, have tested 
the strong interaction between leader-member relationship and within-unit consensus 
on climate perception. This concept can lead to different climates in different groups 
of organizations. For example, according to Zohar & Luria (2005) , a supervisor who 
encourages workers to ignore some safety procedures for the sake of production 
creates the potential for different safety climates within an organization. It can be 
argued that supervisors’ behaviors, like any other individuals in an organization, are 
in turn affected by organizational practices (human resource practices). (see Figure 
5.7))  






















5.9.2.4 The Outcomes of Safety Climate 
 The outcomes of climate have been studied at the individual-level and unit 
/organization-level. (Ostroff et. al 2003)  
 At the unit/organization level, for example, Lin, Madu, & Kuei, (1999) have 
linked the global climate dimensions to the quality management outcomes. Climate 
for service has been related to employee perception of service performance, and in 
turn to organizational financial performance (e.g. Borucki & Burke, 1999). Also, 
Zohar (2000) has shown the relation between group-level safety climate and 
objectively measured injuries. The relations of unit-level safety climate have been 
shown in Figure (5.3) as the links between organizational safety climate and 
organizational performance, and also group-level safety climate and group 
performance. 
 At the individual-level, some studies have been devoted to the effects of 
psychological climate on individual-level outcomes. For example, Johnson & 
McIntyre (1998) have shown the relation between global dimensions of psychological 
climate and satisfaction, and Pritchard & Karasick (1973) have related psychological 
climate and performance. Some other individual-level researchers have focused on 
the relations between unit-level climate and individual-level outcome. For example, 
unit-level climate has been related to individual safety behavior (Zohar, 2000), 
satisfaction, turnover intention, absenteeism, and involvement (e.g. Jackofsky & 




 The effect of unit-level safety climate on individual performances has been 
shown in the Figure (5.4) through the cross-level path of influence. Section (5.10) 
describes the path of influence of climate on individual performances in more detail. 
5.9.3 Organizational Safety Structure & Practices as a Link 
between Safety Culture and Safety Climate 
 
5.9.3.1 Definition 
 In the framework represented in Figure (5.1), organizational practices, 
management practices, policies, and procedures, are covered under the title of 
organizational practices. Ostoff et al. (2003) define organizational practices as “the 
linking mechanism between culture and climate, not a measure of either culture or 
climate”. In other words, culture is not equivalent to practices, but it leads to a set of 
practices. On the other hand, practices are the antecedent of climate as well. But, 
climate is the organizational members’ perceptions of the practices, not the objective 
practices. (Rentsch, 1990) For example, a culture that values the customer may lead 
to adaptation of a set of reward practices about how to treat customers. Then, a 
service-based climate can be created based on organizational members’ perceptions 
about these practices and the agreement among them. (Schneider, 1990) “If the 
adapted practices do not reflect the culture, or if practices are poorly implemented, 
climate perceptions may develop that are counter to the underlying cultural values 
and assumptions” (Ostroff et al., 2003, p. 576). 
 In the model represented in Figure (5.3), organizational safety practices are 
the organizational practices that have effects on Safety Critical Tasks (SCTs), 




critical task, all organizational practices such as human resources, calibration and 
testing and so forth are assumed as organizational safety practices. The same 
argument applies to safety structure. Although organizational structure and 
organizational practices have overlaps and are strongly interrelated, in this report we 
most cover organizational practices, while a deeper study of the effects of 
organizational structure on safety needs future effort.  
5.9.3.2 The Content of Organizational Safety Structure 
 For structural factors, we refer to the set of “design factor” in Mintzberg’s 
theory (1983). Several researchers have developed questionnaires to measure the 
organizational structure. As an example, we name the one developed by Doty et al. 
(1993) Their factors include the Mintzberg’s set of design factors including the key 
coordination mechanism, the key parts of the organization, the type and degree of 
centralization, formalization, specialization and hierarchy. The following are their 
sample questions for different factors:  
 Vertical and Selective decentralization: 
“To what extent do you delegate decision making authority in each of 
the following areas… 
• Hiring mid-level management personnel? 
• Making major changes in the way your organization produces 
its products and/or service?” 
 Coordination Mechanism 
“To what extent does your organization coordinate activities 
through... 
(Direct Supervision) 
(Standardization of Work) 
(Standardization of Skills) 
(Standardization of Outputs)” 
 Formalization 
“To what extent is your organization currently characterized by ... 
 • Strict enforcement of written rules” 




“How many organizational levels are there below you (do not include 
yourself)?” 
 Specialization 
“How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements about your organization? 
• Most employees do similar types of work.” 
 Key Part of the Organization 
 “Approximately what percentages of your organization’s employees are 
in ... 
a. Line operations, performing the basic work related directly to 
the production of products or services? 
b. Line management positions below upper management and including first line 
supervisors?” 
 
5.9.3.3 The Content of Organizational Safety Practices 
 Organizational safety practices include all organizational practices/activities 
that support the resources, tools/equipments, and human actions in the unit process 
model (see Figure 5.6) that ultimately link to the safety critical tasks. We classified 
organizational safety practices into four groups including (1) resources-related 
activities, (2) procedure-related activities, (3) human-related activities, and (4) 
common activities. All the first three of activities are supported by the fourth one 
(common practices). Common activities include design, implementation, internal 

































Figure  5.8 Organizational safety practices 
 
 Resource-related and procedure-related activities are the practices that support 
resources and procedures of the unit process model, respectively. They are more 
specific than human–related activities. They depend on the specific unit process that 
supports the related SCT .For example, in the case of maintenance unit process, one 
of the resources-related activities is in-house calibration and test that supports locally 
produced tools and equipments, and one of the procedure-related activities is 
alteration that supports records and reporting. Chapter 6 provides a more detailed 
example for maintenance unit process and its related organizational safety practices. 
 Human-related activities are those that support individual performances in the 
unit process model as well as in all other organizational practices (e.g., Resource-
related activities). Human-related activities include the human resource functions and 
also the quality of physical work conditions that affect human actions. The physical 
work conditions such as lighting, ventilation, and human-system interface are 
mentioned in all human reliability models (e.g. IDAC; Chang & Mosleh, 2004b) as 




 Human resource functions are extracted from a study by Ostroff (1995) that 
considers the functions that human resource system should cover. Since in our 
framework by “organizational practices”, we mean the “actual” organizational 
practices of organization, we should consider all functions that an appropriate human 
resource system should do (not the ways it currently does). Ostroff in her study 
identified all human resource activities, and using a survey she assessed the 
importance of each activity in different industries and different business strategies.  
Table (5.1) shows all human-related activities. The description of all human resource 
functions can be found in the Appendix A. 
 











•Selectivity in recruiting/ Hiring
•Internal staffing
•Contingent Workforce
•Training and Employee Development
•Appraisal

















 The next layer of organizational safety practices, named common activities, 
include “design”, “implementation”, “internal auditing”, and “internal change 
system”. (see Figure 5.8) All bottom layer “procedures” and “resources” in the 
framework (the procedures and resources that do not have any lower layer supporting 
factor) are affected by design, implementation, internally auditing, and internal 
change factors.  
 Design is planning an item (procedure or resource) so that is in accordance 
with organizational policies and satisfies the characteristics of a qualified item. 
Implement is to execute what has been designed for the item. Internal auditing refers 
to monitoring the item against the policies and objectives characteristics, and also 
reporting the findings. Internal change translates into taking action to fix the findings 
problems in the item. Internal auditing and internal change system are part of 
organizational learning process, and more specifically single-loop learning (Agyris 
& Schon, 1996, Carroll et al., 2002). In single-loop learning the actions are modified 
based on the gap between the real and expected results. 
 These four activities (design, implementation, internal auditing and change) 
refer to the PDCA cycle (plan, do, check, and act) that has its roots in the quality 
control field (e.g. Shewart, 1939 and Deming, 1986) and the current ISO 9001-2000. 
 
5.10 Individual Safety Performance and Its Antecedents  
 It is important to consider the effect of underlying cognitive, emotional, and 
physical factors when evaluating human safety performance.  Llory (1992) maintains 




to Chang and Mosleh (2004) for a description of the IDAC model for human 
reliability analysis for use in the nuclear power industry, where these factors and their 
significance have been discussed. Based on the IDAC model, an operator interacts 
with the external world (i.e. other operators, the system, the external resources) to 
achieve the operator’s goals. The operator’s problem-solving process is influenced by 
the factors, internal and external to the operator. The internal influencing factors 
relate to the operator’s psychological, cognitive, and physical states. The external 
influencing factors include team-related factors, organizational factors, and those, 
usually beyond organizational control. The team related factors relate to the team 
structure, team tasking, and interactions between teammates. The organizational 
factors relate to influences resulted from organizational emphases (e.g.,productivity 
vs. safety), and organizational practices (e.g. financial and human resources 
management and task planning). Examples of factors usually beyond organizational 
control are the conditioning events (i.e. latent system faults) and environmental 
factors (e.g. change of habitation due to unanticipated events). The external factors 
must be perceived by the operator to influence the operator. Realization of the states 
of the external factors could affect the internal factors. The internal and external 
influencing factors are collectively labeled as Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs). 
Figure (5.9) is a modification of the IDAC internal PSF categories. We added 
“psychological climate” to the model, which addresses individual perceptions of 
organizational safety practices.  





















Figure  5.9 Internal PSF categories adapted from IDAC (2006) 
   
 Our concern in this report is mostly organizational factors and their paths of 
influence on human performance; therefore a simplified version of individual-level 
performance shaping factors is utilized. Boxall and Purcell (2003) proposed that 
performance is a function of ability (A), motivation (M), and opportunity (O).  We 
use the AMO theory to separate the attitude node (in Figures 5.1 to 5.4) into these 
three general components. In most human reliability literature such as IDAC, ability 
(physical competence as well as knowledge) and motivation are referred to internal 




the AMO-framework, but we define opportunity as some temporal opportunity (or 
lack of it) such as time opportunity (e.g. time pressure due to work schedule) or 
physical opportunity (due to physical working environment such as lighting).  
 Motivation is most affected by psychological climate, referred to in such 
literature as Kopelman et al. (1990) and Parker et al. (2003). As Figure (5.3) 
describes, psychological safety climate, that is individuals’ perceptions of safety 
practices, is influenced by group safety climate and personal value. The individuals’ 
values are affected by their background and the organizational selection process. 
 Ability and opportunity are the factors that can be most affected by 
organizational practices and structure. For example, the quality of training and 
selection in an organization affects the level of knowledge, and the quality of time 
schedule as well as  staffing affects time opportunity. The link between organizational 
practices and A and O can also be supported by Kopelman et al. (1990). In their 
analysis of organizational productivity, human resource affects motivation through 
climate. The productivity /performance is not only affected by motivation but also is a 
function of other factors that are directly affected by human resource practices.  
 Although some of the literature such as Neal and Griffin (2002) make a 
connection between knowledge and climate, it can be argued that while this 
connection shows a correlation between climate and knowledge, this doesn’t mean 
that climate is the antecedent of the level of knowledge. It can be argued that climate 
and the level of knowledge are correlated, because the quality of training (that is 




 Figure (5.10) shows the relation between individual PSFs and the individual 
performance. Deviation of human performance from standard safe action can be in 
two forms of error and/or violation. Error is the unintentional deviation, whereas in 




































































































Figure  5.10 The links between “Individual-level PSFs” and “Human Action” 
 
5.11 Contextual Factors  
 As Figures (5.1 to 5.4) show, the organizational culture is affected by industry 
and business environment, national culture, and the organization’s vision, goals, and 
strategy (Aycan, Kanungo, & Sinha, 1999). The elements of “industrial and business 
environment” are adapted from contextual factors of Mintzberg’s theory (1983), and 
are listed in Section (5.11.1). Also, as another contextual factor, we point out to 
regulation in Section (5.11.2). Although some aspects of regulatory environment have 




safety, we have discussed them separately discuss about it. The last contextual factors 
are in the category of physical environmental such as climatic conditions. (Section 
5.11.3) 
5.11.1 Industrial and Business Environment 
 Doty et al. (1993) applied Mintzberg’s theory and developed a questionnaire 
to measure contextual factors. Here, we list a few example questions from Doty’s 
questionnaire: 
• Environmental Turbulence 
“Over the past year, how many important changes have occurred in the 
behavior of key... 
 • Suppliers? 
 • Competitors? 
 • Customers/clients? 
 • Regulators?” 
a) Environmental Complexity 
 “To what extent does your organization... 
  • Face a complex external environment?” 
b) Analyzability and Number of Exceptions 
 “To what extent... 
(Analyzability) 
 • Is there a clearly known way to do the major types of work 
that these groups deal with?” 
(Number of Exceptions) 
   • Do these groups perform about the same tasks in the same 
way     most of the time?” 
  
5.11.2 The Effects of Regulatory Environment  
 The effects of regulatory environment are either through policies and 
standards, or through the quality of a given regulatory auditing system. The effects of 
regulatory environment through policies, to some degree, are related to the 




previous section. Understanding the impacts of regulatory policy making needs future 
efforts. In this thesis, we mainly refer to the regulatory auditing responsibility. 
Regulatory auditing is a three stage task and consists of:  
a) assessing whether the safety policies are in compliance with regulations, 
and whether organizational practices are designed according to safety 
policy;  
b) assessing whether organizational performance practices are implemented 
based on designed statements; 
c) reporting the detected deficiencies in a timely and effective manner.  
 Most of the procedures and resources (such as manuals, inspection 
procedures, calibration and test procedures, and tools/equipments) in the organization 
are audited by regulation directly and therefore there should be some links between 
regulatory auditing system and “organizational safety practices” in the organizational 
safety framework. In other words, the actual quality of org. safety practices and their 
related procedures and resources are affected by the quality of the regulatory auditing 
system as well. 
 Figure (5.11) pictures the relationships within the actual state of 
organizational practices and the effects of the regulatory auditing system. This 

















Figure  5.11 The relation between organizational safety practices and the Regulatory Auditing 
System 
The axes of the graph are: 
 X-axis: “Common” activities, which refer to implementation, design, 
internal auditing and change system  (see Section 5.9.3.3) 
 Y-axis:“Human-related”/“Resource-related”/“Procedure-related” 
(HRP)activities  
 Z-axis: Regulatory Auditing System  
 
 Each point in the plane XY represents the state of common activities with 
respect to each HRP activity. For example, point (A) shows how good the specific 
HRP activity is designed, implemented, audited and changed internally.  Each point in 
the plane YZ represents the state of RAS regarding HRP. For example, point (B) 




system. Each point in the plane YZ represents the state of RAS regarding the internal 
auditing and change system. For example, point (C) shows how good the internal 
auditing and change system is audited externally by the regulatory system. Based on 
this three dimensional relation, the actual state of each HRP activity can be shown as 





Figure  5.12  The actual state of HRP activities as a function of common activities & the 
regulatory auditing system 
 
5.11.3 The Effects of Harsh Physical Environment (Climatic 
Conditions) 
 
 Harsh environmental factors such as weather conditions have also direct 
effects on the system safety through hardware hazards and the adverse conditions for 
individuals who operate the system. The path of influence of weather condition in 
safety framework is described in Chapter 6 through the example application. 
5.12 Schematic Representation of the New Theory: From 
Organizational Factors to Accident Risk Scenarios  
 
 This part depicts the cross-level path of analysis highlighted in Figure (5.4), 




causal framework is represented in Figures (5.13) and (5.14). Both figures show the 
same paths of influences, but Figure (5.13) is more detailed in technical elements. 
 The development of an organizational safety causal model starts from the 
system risk model (the scenarios on the top of Figure (5.13)) and moves to the 
organizational root causes (the bottom layers of Figure (5.13)). A top-down risk 
model delineates the possible risk or hazard scenarios (ESDs) and decomposes them 
into their contributing elements. The events, conditions, and causes of the scenarios 
are incorporated through the FTs. The top events of fault tress (e.g. System 1) are 
plugged into the ESDs. ESDs represent a set of possible risk scenarios where, given 
the occurrence of the initiating event, the state of System 1 (a Pivotal Event) 
determines whether the sequence leads to success (end state S), when it works, or a 
human action is required, when it fails. Given the success of human action, the final 
outcome would be success state (S). The failure of Human Action leads to failed state 
F. The failure of System 1 can be due to different types of causalities. One source of 
system failure can be related to organizational activity that is the concern of this 
causal framework. The other sources of failure can be related to an inherent hardware 
failure that represents failure mechanisms which are beyond the control of the 
organization in charge of operating and maintaining the technical system (e.g., related 
to the manufacturer).  
 The group or individual performances that have direct effects on the elements 
of technical system risk scenarios are named Safety Critical Tasks (SCTs). For 
example, maintenance is a safety critical task, since it directly affects hardware failure 




specified (e.g. human actions) in the accident scenarios, or implicitly through model 
parameters (e.g. equipment failure rate). SCTs help to focus what matters most for 
safety among many activities in the organization.  
 The Unit process model (e.g. maintenance unit, operation units) includes the 
“direct” activities that affect SCT (which is the unit output). The direct activities are 
decomposed to their direct resource, human factor, and procedures in the unit process 
model. The rest of the causal model will describe how the organizational factors 
affect the SCTs through their effects on the direct resources, procedures and 
individuals’ performances in the unit process model. In the scope of this project, 
organizational safety factors are the social (culture and climate) and structural 
(organizational texture and managerial practices) aspects of an organization that 
influence safety critical tasks. 
 Organizational safety practices include all organizational practices/activities 
that support the resources, tools/equipments, and human actions in the unit process 
model (see Figure 5.6) that ultimately link to the safety critical tasks. We classified 
organizational safety practices into four groups including (1) resources-related 
activities, (2) procedure-related activities, (3) human-related activities, and (4) 
common activities. All the first three of activities are supported by the fourth one 
(common practices). Common activities include design, implementation, internal 
auditing, and internal change system. Internal auditing and internal change system are 
part of organizational learning process, and more specifically single-loop learning 
(Agyris & Schon, 1996, Carroll et al., 2002). In single-loop learning the actions are 




activities (design, implementation, internal auditing and change) refer to the PDCA 
cycle (plan, do, check, and act) that has its roots in the quality control field. 
 Organizational safety practices affect resources and procedures in the unit 
process model, through the direct link indicated in Figures (5.13) and (5.14). 
Organizational Safety Structure & Practices also affect internal PSFs and ultimately 
individual safety performance through two different paths of influence: (1) 
Organizational safety practices collectively influence organizational safety climate, 
which is the shared perception of employees about actual organizational safety 
practices. Organizational safety climate affects group safety climate, which in turn 
influences psychological safety climate (an element of individual-level PSF). 
Psychological safety climate is the perception of organizational safety practices at the 
individual level. It impacts individuals’ motivation in the unit process model. For 
example, high quality training programs and work conditions collectively create a 
climate in which employees believe in their managers’ commitment to safety. This 
belief impacts the employees’ motivation. This is the indirect effect of organizational 
safety practices on individual-level PSFs, and (2) Different sub-factors in Org. Safety 
Structure & Practices can also directly impact individual internal PSFs. The direct 
effects are caused by the influence of “human-related activities” on the “ability” and 
“opportunity”. For example, a low quality work environment, such as poor air 
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Figure  5.13 Schematic representation of SoTeRiA (#1) 




 The strength of the shared climate depends on the emergent process including 
the social interaction process, leadership/supervision, and homogeneity in the 
organization. As Figures (5.13) and (5.14) depict, the emergent process is also 
affected by organizational practices. 
 It should be added that some of the individuals’ opportunities, are not only 
directly affected by organizational practices, but also by supervisors’ behavior. For 
example, the time pressure due to bad schedule not only is affected by human 
resource function (e.g. staffing), it is also related to supervisors’ performances. This 
relation is not represented in  Figures (5.13) and (5.14), in order to avoid complexity 
of the figures.  
 Some multi-level studies such as Zohar & Luria (2005) and Simard & 
Marchand (1995, 1997) have indicated that individuals’ safety behaviors are strongly 
affected by their immediate supervisors, with organization providing the incremental 
effects.  Thus, in Figure (5.13), we only include group safety climate, and not 
organizational safety climate, again in order to avoid the complexity of the figure.  
 Zohar & Luria (2005) discussed that some hazards in the organization 
(investigated by safety engineering) are only related to top management’s procedural 
action (which support the direct link between organizational practices and the unit 
process model in Figures (5.13) and (5.14)), but workers’ safety behaviors are 
affected by both procedural (which support the direct link between organizational 
practices and human individual-level PSFs in Figures (5.13) and (5.14)) and 
supervisory situations (which support the path from emergent process to group 




 At the organizational level, safety culture shapes managerial decisions 
regarding organizational safety practices and structural features. Culture is more 
stable and related to employees’ ideologies, assumptions, and values. Climate is the 
perception of “what happens” in organization and can be described as temporary 
attributes of an organization. Culture defines “why these things happen” (Ostroff et 
al. 2003). As Figures (5.14) show, organizational culture is influenced by the type of 
industry and business environment, social/national culture, and organizational vision, 
goal and strategy. Besides, there are some feedback effects from organizational safety 
and financial performances on the safety culture. These effects are part of 
organizational learning processes, and more specifically double-loop learning 
(Agyris & Schon, 1996, Carroll et al., 2002). In the double-loop learning, the 
underlying assumptions, values, and policies that led to the specific performances are 
analyzed, questioned, and adapted (if it is needed). 
 There is a reciprocal relationship between the individual level and the 
organizational/unit level construct. Individual level constructs create the 
unit/organizational level construct, and individual level constructs are affected by the 
existing organizational level construct. For example, the individual psychological 
climate is affected by the organizational/unit climate. But these two mark different 
time phases, and the boundary assumption clarifies the direction of these effects. 
 Physical environmental factors (e.g. extreme weather conditions) also impact 
system safety through hardware hazards as well as the individuals who operate the 
system. Regulations have two different effects on safety: first, through policies and 




organizational practices and unit process elements (such as maintenance procedures 
and resources). 
 The financial performance affects the safety performance both directly and 
indirectly. The indirect effects, for example, would be the feedback effects of 
financial stress on safety culture and ultimately on organizational practices such as 
training, work environment, operational procedures, etc. An example of the direct 
effects could be the collapse of morale because of certain news on extreme financial 
distress (e.g. possible bankruptcy). On the other hand, safety performance may affect 
the financial performance directly by increasing internal costs (e.g. higher insurance 
rates as a result of an accident) and indirectly through loss of goodwill, new 
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 This chapter covers the last contributions of current thesis that are on the 
subject of implementation in aviation system. In the wake of several highly 
publicized aviation accidents in the past 15 years, safety is of primary interest to 
many travelers.  There is an obvious push to reduce the number of accidents in any 
industry. Much of recent research in aviation, space exploration, and nuclear power 
operation has focused heavily on reducing risk through improvements in safety 
analysis. 
  In order to create the aviation-based safety causal model, we: (1) reviewed 
the literature in aviation safety analysis, (2) constructed our causal model based on 
the developed accident causation theory described in chapter 4, (3) and developed the 
sub-factors based on combination of general factors in organizational and safety 
literature, and the factors  particularly specified in aviation literature.  
 NASA has addressed the effect of safety climate in flight operations in a 
review of the effectiveness of flight checklists (Degani and Wiener, 1990).  Both 
erroneous use of checklists and non-compliance with rules mandating the use of 
checklists have contributed to many aviation incidents in the past 25 years.  Among 
the influences that Degani and Wiener cite is airline culture, which they have defined 




(that is, the differing social mores in different cultural groups).  They also discuss the 
changing state of pilot duties and expectations imposed by changes in regulation at 
the federal level and the aircarier level; they maintain that shifting expectations 
strongly affect pilot morale and emotional state.  Pilot actions are further influenced 
by outside factors including pressure to be on time, external distractions, and crew 
interaction dynamics. 
 Ten years after the Degani and Wiener study at NASA, Soeters and Boer 
(2000) discussed additional factors that influence pilot decision-making.  They 
maintain that the “national culture” correlates with the number of aviation accidents 
and they offer multinational data for support.  They indicate that the “mental 
programming” from the early years of education, which varies greatly across cultures, 
dictates how people relate to superiors and subordinates.  In addition to affecting the 
pilots and mechanics’ motivation and perceived level of authority, mental 
programming has an effect on regulatory oversight and company goals. 
 Spirkovsa and Lodha discuss a more specific aspect of the flight operations 
safety climate in their 2004 NASA report.  The focus of their report is on pilot 
“situational awareness” as it is affected by interaction with ground authorities such as 
weather forecasters.  Loss of situational awareness, especially in poor weather 
conditions, is a leading cause of Part 135 accidents and has been a contributing factor 
in Part 121 accidents.  Additional demand on ground personnel during poor weather 
conditions leads directly to reporting difficulty and increased response time.  These 
factors likely have a negative effect on the pilots’ performance level as perceived task 




 The research studies in the aviation field have highlighted some of the 
contributing factors to accidents, but there is no comprehensive study or model 
tracing the paths of influence starting from root organizational factors to the accidents 
and incidents. Aircraft accidents can be related to airline, airport, or air traffic control. 
All these are affected by contextual factors including regulatory factors, industrial and 
business environment, social and political culture and climate, and weather 
conditions. Some of the contextual factors such as weather condition affect the 
occurrence of accidents directly (not through the organizations) as seen in Figure 
(6.1). In this study we focus on the root causes that start from contextual factors and 
create accidents through the airlines. From the contextual factors, regulation 
(regulatory auditing system) and weather condition are considered in the model 
represented in this chapter. The effects of air traffic control and airport on the 
accident are also considered through accident scenarios, but the organizational factors 
rooted in airport and air traffic control have not been included in our causal model. In 
Section (6.2) of this chapter, the organization safety framework has been 
implemented for maintenance activities of a generic airline. Although the risk 
scenarios are general and cover both operation and maintenance, the effects of 
organizational factors are only modeled through the maintenance activities. Future 
study can be devoted to implementing the framework for operation (e.g., flight crew) 
as well. The gray parts of Figure (6.1) highlight the scope of implemented model in 
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Figure  6.1 The scope of implemented model 
 
 
 In Section (6.3), we used the combination of system dynamics, BBN, ESD, 
and FT techniques to operationlize a simplified version of causal model described in 
Section (6.2). The objective of Section (6.3) is to demonstrate how a hybrid technique 
as proposed in the Chapter 4 can practically operate. System dynamics tool is added 
to IRIS4 , which is a risk analysis software, in order to incorporate the dynamic 
causation mechanisms of the organizational framework. IRIS is built based on Hybrid 
Causal Logic (HCL) methodology (Wang, 2007). This part was collaboration with 
another student as part of which has been presented in Society for Risk Analysis 




                                                 
4 IRIS  stands for Integrated Risk Information System developed by the Center for Risk and Reliability 




6.2 Implementing SoTeRiA in Aviation Maintenance 
 
 
 Figure (6.2) shows the maintenance-related paths of causality from airline to 
the system risk (aviation accidents involving aircraft operations). This model is 
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Figure  6.2  Safety framework (airline maintenance-related paths) 
 
 




6.2.1 System Risk Model 
 The system risk model consists of Event Sequence Diagrams (ESDs) and 
Fault Trees (FT). The ESDs delineate the possible risk or hazard scenarios.  ESDs 
represent a set of possible risk scenarios where, given the occurrence of the initiating 
event, the state of engine (a Pivotal Event in Figure 6.3) determines whether the 
sequence leads to success (End State S) when the system works properly, or to a 
second Pivotal Event in which the flight crew action is required, when the system 
fails. Given the success of flight crew, the final outcome would be Success (S). The 
failure of flight crew leads to Failed State (F). As described in the FT, the failure of 
engine can be due to different types of causalities including internal causes, 
maintenance deficiencies, mismanagement by crew, and external factors. The 



























 For the technical system failure, we used the scenarios developed by Roelen 
& Wever (2005). They developed aviation scenarios in five different phases including 
Taxi Phase, Takeoff Phase, Climb Phase, En route Phase, and Landing Phase. The 
following are sample failures for each phase:  
o Taxi Phase  
 A. Incorrect presence of aircraft/vehicle on runway in use  
   A.1. ATC fails to resolve the conflict 
   A.2. Flight crew or vehicle driver fails to resolve the conflict 
o Takeoff Phase 
    
A. Flight crew fails to maintain control    
B. Aircraft handling by flight crew inappropriate    
C. Aircraft fails to rotate and lift-off   
D.  Aircraft stalls after rotation   
E. Aircraft system failure   
F. Single engine failure   
  
o Climb Phase 
  
A Flight crew fails to maintain control   
B. Flight control system failure   
C. Flight instrument failure   
D. Aircraft encounters adverse weather   
E.  Flight crew incapacitation   
F.  Single engine failure   
G. Aircraft positioned on a collision course  
 H. Cracks in aircraft pressure cabin  
I.  Flight crew decision / operation error  
  
o En route Phase 
A Flight crew fails to maintain control  
B. Fire onboard aircraft  
C.  Single engine failure  
D. Flight crew member spatially disoriented  
 
o Landing Phase 
 
A. Failure to achieve maximum braking   
 B. Cracks in aircraft pressure cabin  
C.  Flight crew decision / operation error  
D. Thrust reverser failure 





 A full description of all possible scenarios is available in (Roelen & Wever, 
2005). The hardware failure elements (e.g., engine failure) of technical system 
scenarios are linked to the maintenance group performance, and ultimately to their 
root organizational factors that are going to be described in the next sections.  
6.2.2 Maintenance Performance 
 This part of the model represents how well all necessary maintenance work is 
carried out based on manufacturers’ instructions. For this purpose an aircraft 
airworthiness BBN (Eghbali, 2006) was used as basis for to relate maintenance-group 
work quality to organizational roots. Aircraft airworthiness is a Safety Critical Task 
(SCT).  As discussed in Chapter 5, SCTs are those activities that have direct effects 
on the elements of technical system risk scenarios. In the example scenario of Figure 
(6.3), maintenance-related cause of engine failure provides the link to the rest of the 
risk model. In the following, we will describe various key links and factors of the 
model. 
6.2.3. The link between Aircraft Airworthiness & System Risk 
Model (Link “A” in Figure 6.2)  
 
 This link is established utilizing a parametric approach, named Omega Factor 
(Mosleh & Golfeiz, 1999). For example, using Figure (6.3), an engine failure rate 
(λEngine) can be divided into four contributors: The rate of “inherent” failures (λI), the 
rate of failure due to maintenance error (λMX), the rate of failure due to 




The inherent portion of the failure rate represents failure mechanisms which are 
beyond the control of the organization in charge of operating the airline.  In its 
simplest form, λI represent the expected failure behavior as specified by the 
manufacturer. If there are no additional influences by the organization, no adverse 
external factors, and no mismanagement by crew, the component should perform 
according to the manufacture's expected λI (an exponential constant failure rate model 
is assumed).  
A parameter ω  is defined as : 
ω = λMX / λI = NMX /NI                        (Equation.6.1)  
where,  NMX is the number of maintenance related failure, and NI is the number of 
inherent failure for engine. 
In order to establish a relation between omega( w) factor and maintenance 
performance model, P1 is defined as probability of aircraft non-airworthiness, which 
can be estimated from the target node of the maintenance causal model (a BBN target 
node). P1  could also be viewed as the probability of substandard maintenance and 
estimated from Equation (6.2): 
P1  = NsubSTD / N T-maint (Equation. 6.2) 
where N T-maint is total number of maintenances performed on an aircraft and NsubSTD is 
the number of substandard maintenances. The total number of maintenance (N T-maint  




procedure (random)  maintenance (Nrandom ) . Since Nrandom   is a lot smaller than Nmaint  
, N T-maint  is roughly equal to Nmaint .            
We also define P as the probability that maintenance activities result in an engine 
failure: 
P=  N MX/ Nmaint   
P=   P1 * P2                  P2 = N MX/ NsubSTD                    (Equation. 6.3) 
where, P2 stands for the probability that substandard maintenance will result in engine 
failure. These equations show that P1 and omega ( w) are proportional: 
ω = P1* P2 *K            K= Nmaint / NI                                (Equation. 6.4) 
K is a constant design factor (e.g., a particular aircraft & manufacturer) and not 
related to airline, P1 is related to maintenance organization, and P2 represents the 
sensitivity of each main component to the maintenance. However, the value of P2 is 
different for different main components, and thus the value of ω is specific for each 
main component (e.g., engine, gear). Therefore, there is a constant value (K') for each 
main component:  
K'=K*P2=ωEngine_G/P1G                                                                             (Equation. 6.5) 
where ω Engine_G  is the generic value of ω for engine and can be estimated from 
generic failure rates. P1G is also the generic value (based on data) for the probability 




(maintenace quality) is affected by the root organizational factors. If we change 
(make better/worse) the organizational factors, the new value of engine failure rate 
due to maintenance (λ MX_new ) is estimated as follows:  
λ MX_new  = ω Engine_new  * λ I 
ω Engine_new = P1new * K'     (Equation. 6.6)  
 
where, ω Engine_new  is the new value of the Omega factor for engine and P1new stands 
for the new value of P1 estimated from new  state of organizational factors.  The 
states of organizational factors impact the value of P1 through their effects on the 
factors of safety causal model (see Figure 6.2).  
λ MX_new is used in the fault tree in the Figure (6.3) to estimate the probability of 
Engine Failure, Pr (Engine). Considering the changes in organizational factors, the 
new value for probability of Engine Failure, Pr (Engine_new), is calculated using the 
Equation (6.7):  
λEngine_new_ = ( 1+ ω Engine_new  ) (λI ) + λExt + λC 
Pr (Engine_new)= λEngine_new * Tmission   (Equation. 6.7) 
where ,Tmission stands for mission time. It should be mentioned that λC may also vary 
due to changes in organizational factors, but for simplicity this is not considered here. 
The same approach can be used to assess the effects of changes in the pilot error due 
to organizational factors, and estimate the new value for probability of pilot error in 




are plugged into ESD in order to estimate the new accident probability, Pr (F), which 
is based on new states of organizational factors: 
Pr ( F) = Pr (Engine_new) * Pr ( Pilot Error_ new | Engine failure)       (Equation. 6.8) 
         
6.2.4 Maintenance Unit Process Model 
 Maintenance unit process model includes the direct activities that result in 
quality of maintenance make the aircraft airworthiness (Safety Critical Task). Based 
on maintenance model developed by Eghbali (2006) the direct activities are identified 
as “In-house maintenance”, “outsource maintenance”, “through flight maintenance”, 
and “return to service inspection (RTSI)”. These activities are modeled using process 
modeling technique; name IDEF0 (that was explained in the Section (4.4) of thesis). 
Using this philosophy, any direct activity in the unit process model is affected by its 
direct causes including the direct resource, procedure and other human actions. Figure 
(6.4) presents the causal model of the maintenance unit process model. The target 
node of this causal model is aircraft airworthiness (maintenance quality). In other 
words, the state of maintenance quality depends on the states of direct activities, and 
the sate of direct activities depends on the state of individual’s performance, states of 
procedures and tools/ equipment affecting them. By procedures, we mean manuals, 






Return to Service 
Inspection
Maintenance Quality














































































































































































































































































































































































Figure  6.4 Maintenance Unit Process Model 
 
 
 As Figure (6.4) presents, level (1) of the unit process model include the direct 
activities that support maintenance quality. The factor named “outsourced/ In-house” 
shows the percentage of outsourcing (a managerial decision). Level (1-1) includes the 
direct procedures, tools / equipment, and human actions through which the direct 
activities are realized. For example, the direct resources for in-house maintenance are 
tools, equipment, parts/materials, and maintenance facilities. The direct procedure for 
“In-house maintenance” is “CAMP procedure”. Direct individuals for “in-house 
maintenance” are technicians and 4th party contractors.  
 Next layer, Level (1-1-1), of the model includes the subdivision of resources 




maintenance schedule, manuals, records and reporting , repair procedure, inspection 
program, and Airworthiness Directives/ Certificated Maintenance Requirements/ 
Supplemental Type Certificate / Service Bulletin ( ADs/CMR/ STC/ SBs) . Also, 
tools and equipment are either locally produced or purchased. Pats/materials can be 
either operator produced or purchased. The nodes purchased/ produced shows the 
percentage of purchased over produced and is a managerial decision. 
 Level (1-1-2) of the unit process model covers the procedures that guide some 
of the procedure of the level (1-1-1). This includes engineering procedure, and SFAR 
procedure that guide the repair procedure. 
 The state of procedure in the model refers to procedure quality and means the 
extent to which procedures are in compliance with manufacturers suggested 
procedures and regulatory entities mandates/advisory circular.  The state of resources 
(tools/ equipment) and human nodes include both their quality and their availability. 
For example, the quality of human action is the extent to which human actions are 
complied with air carries’ maintenance procedure and /or organizational policies and 
government regulations and rules. The quality of tools means the extent to which the 
specification of the tools used in maintenance comply with the manufacturer’s 
standards. The availability of these items is the probability of them being available 
when needed.   The availability of direct human and resources are lumped in one 
factor, named “availability of resources”, which influence the quality of maintenance 
schedule. With this approach, both the availability and quality of human and 




influence. We refer the reader to the report prepared by Eghbali (2006) for more 
description of the factors. 
6.2.5 Organizational Safety Structure & Practices 
 
 
 For structural factors, as we mentioned in Chapter 5, we have used the set of 
“design factor” in Mintzberg theory (1983) including the key coordination 
mechanism, the key part of the organization, the type and degree of centralization, 
formalization, specialization, and hierarchy. We used a questionnaire developed by 
Doty et al. (1993) to measure Mintzberg’s design factor. In Section (5.9.3.2), samples 
of their questions are provided. 
 Although organizational structure and organizational practices have overlaps 
and are strongly interrelated, in this research we mostly cover organizational 
practices, acknowledging that study of the effects of organizational structure on the 
safety needs future effort. 
 As we described in the Section (5.9.3.3), organizational safety practices 
include all organizational practices/activities that support the resources, 
tools/equipment, and human actions in the unit process model that ultimately affect 
the safety critical tasks. For the maintenance-related causal paths, we consider the 
organizational practices that have effects on the maintenance unit process, and they 
are classified into three groups including (1) resources-related activities, (2) 
procedure-related activities, and (3) human- related activities. All these three kinds of 
activities are supported by common practices including design, implementation, 
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Figure  6.5 Organizational safety practices (Maintenance-specific) 
 
 All the practices/ activities of the framework (including the practices in the 
unit process model and organizational practices) are classified in three layers (1, 2, 
and 3). Layer (1) is in the unit process model that was described in the previous 
section. The other two layers are included in the organizational practices and are 
explained in the following. 
 
6.2.5.1 Resource-related Activities 
 Continuing the layers in the unit process model, this part consists of layer (2) 
of the framework including the activities that support resources of layer (1-1-1) of the 
unit process model. The activity that support locally produced tools and equipments is 
in-house calibration and test, the activity that support purchased tools and equipment 
is outsourced calibration and test, and the activities that supports purchased parts 
and materials are procurement and receiving inspection. The factor outsourced/ in-
house means the percentages of outsourced tools & equipment over In-house and is a 




human actions that are needed for the activities in the Layer 2. For example, in-house 
calibration and test activity needs technician actions, Master calibration and test 
equipment, calibration and test procedures, and 4th party contractor’s actions. (see 
Figure 6.6). We refer the reader to the report prepared by Eghbali (2006) for 
















































































































































































































































































































































Figure  6.6 The causal paths for Resource-related Activities (maintenance-specific) 
 
6.2.5.2 Procedure-related Activities 
 Continuing the layers in the unit process model, this part consists of Layer (2) 
of the framework including the activities that support the procedures of Layer (1-1-1) 
of the unit process model. The activity that supports records and reporting is 
alteration and the activity that support MX schedule is fleet utilization. Layer (2-1) of 
this part includes the procedure and human actions that support the activity in the 
Layer 2. Alteration activity is supported by engineering staff actions and design 
alteration station (DAS) & delegation option authorization (DOA) procedures. Fleet 
utilization is related to operation of airline, therefore, it is assumed as input to the 



















































































Figure  6.7 The causal paths for Procedure-related Activities (maintenance-specific) 
 
6.2.5.3 Human-related Activities 
 Continuing the layers in the unit process model, this part consists of Layer (2) 
of the framework including all human resources practices and physical work 
conditions that affect human actions in the unit process model and also all human 
actions involved in other organizational practices (e.g., Resource-related activities). 
For human-related activities we used the general factors developed in Chapter 5 (see 
Table 5.1).  
 Layer 2-1 of this part should include the related resources, procedures, and 
human actions for the human resource functions. We have not developed layer 
corresponding to human resource, and future work should be devoted to this aspect. 
6.2.5.4 Common Activities 
 This part covers Layer (3) of the framework, named common activities, 




system”. (see Figure 6.5) All bottom layer “procedures” and “resources” in the 
framework (the procedures and resources that don’t have any lower layer supporting 
factor) are affected by design, implementation, internal auditing, and internal change 
factors. Figure (6.8) shows the connections between “common activities” and 
“resource-related activities”. Figure (6.9) shows the links between “common 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure  6.9 The links between “common activities” and “procedure-related activities” 
(maintenance-specific) 
 
 As we mentioned in the previous section, since we have not developed layer 
(2-1) of the human related activities, we cannot show the detail connections between 
“common activities” and “human-related activities”.  
 Layer (3-1), which is not developed in this work, should include the 
procedure, resources, and human actions that are needed for layer 3. Like any other 
layer of the framework, these items can be found with developing the process model 
(referring to IDEF0 technique) of the factors in layer 3. For example, Continued 
Airworthiness Surveillance System (CASS) internal auditing system need “CASS 
auditing procedure”, and “CASS auditing procedure” would be an element of layer 3-
1. Layer (3-1) needs future effort to be expanded. 
6.2.6 The Direct Link between Organizational Safety Practices and 
Maintenance Unit Process Model (Link “B” in Figure 6.2)  
 
 The direct link between organizational safety practices and maintenance unit 




1. The connection between “resource-related activities” and unit process model: 
This connection would be through the layer 2 of the “resource-related activities” and 
resources of layer (1-1-1) of the unit process model. (see Figure 6.10) These links are 
based on the relations identified by Eghbali et al. (2006) 
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Figure  6.10 The links between “Resource-related activities” and “Maintenance unit process 
model” 
 
2.  The connection between “procedure-related activities” and unit process 




activities” and procedures of layer (1-1-1) of the unit process model. (see Figure 6.11) 
These links are based on the relations identified by Eghbali et al. (2006).  
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Figure  6.11 The links between “Procedure-related activities” and “MX unit process model” 
 
3. The connection between “common activities” and bottom layer procedures 
and/or resources of the unit process model: as we mentioned in the previous section, 
bottom layer procedures and/or resources of the unit process model are the procedures 




factor. (see Figure 6.12) These links are based on the relations identified by Eghbali 
et al. (2006).  
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Figure  6.12 The links between “Common activities” and “Maintenance unit process model” 
 
6.2.7 Organizational Safety Culture & Its Connection to 
Organizational Safety Practices (Link “C” in Figure 6.2) 
 
 Analyzing the factors developed by Gibbons et al. (2005) for the safety 
culture of airline maintenance organization, we found the factor “safety value 
(attitudes and values expressed (in word and actions) by upper management regarding 
safety)” to be similar to the definition of organizational safety culture in our 
framework. The rest of their factors are mostly safety climate and we will consider 




 Safety culture shapes managerial decisions regarding organizational safety 
practices. The connection of safety culture with organizational safety practices is by 
its influences on the layer (3-1) of the framework, i.e., the supporting procedures, 
resources, and human actions for four practices of design, implementation, auditing, 
and change. For example, the quality of designers is related to managerial safety 
value. 
  Safety culture is also directly affects the managerial decision nodes such as 
the percentage of outsource over produced maintenance (outsource/produced) and the 
percentage of purchased over produced resources (purchased/produced). We use the 
safety culture as a barrier that eliminates the direct effects of financial pressure on the 
safety practices in organizations. 
 In this report, for simplicity, we took the “safety value” as a substitute of 
safety culture, but we there is a need for a more comprehensive organizational safety 
culture survey by adapting the methods such as Organizational Culture Inventory 
(OCI) and Competing Values Framework (CVF) , and Organizational Culture Profile 
( OCP) .  (See Ostroff et al., 2003) 
 
6.2.8 Individual-level Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) & Its 
Connection to MX Unit Process Model (Link “D” in Figure 6.2)  
 
 Simplified version of individual PSFs (see Figure 4.10) consists  of 
“motivation”, “ability”, “opportunity”, psychological safety climate, and individual 
values.  As we explained in Section (4.10), motivation is directly affected by 




perception of safety practices, is influenced by group safety climate and personal 
values. Ability includes both knowledge and physical ability. Opportunity is also 
divided into physical opportunity (due to physical working environment such as 
lightning) and time opportunity (e.g., time pressure due to work schedule). In human 
reliability literature, physical opportunity also includes the quality and availability of 
direct resource and procedure for human action. But, in our framework, we separate 
the equality of resource and procedure from human action and the human action 
nodes do not cover the human error due to shortcomings in his/her resources and/or 
procedures. The probability of this error on the quality of any activity is considered 
through procedure and resource nodes. Both of these modeling views have the same 
philosophical ground and can be applied interchangeably. (see Section 4.9) 
 The connections between individual PSFs and unit process model (or 
organizational safety practices) are through their effects on the human actions nodes 
(except the contractors). Deviation of human from standard action can be in the form 
of error or violation (indented action). Figure (4.10) shows the connection between 
Internal PSFs and any human node in the framework. 
 Contractor’s causal model is different from other human node in the 
framework because they are not working in the climate of the specific airline being 
studied. Therefore, we model these nodes simply by the effect of an item, named 
“contingent workforce”, in the human resources factors, and do not consider the paths 





6.2.9 The direct link between individual-level PSFs & 
Organizational Safety Practices (Link “E” in Figure 6.2) 
  
 Organizational safety practices have direct and indirect effects on the 
individual PSFs. The indirect effects are through safety climate (Section 6.2.10 & 
6.2.11), but the direct effects are by the influence of “human-related activities” on the 
“ability” and “opportunity”. For example, the quality of training and selection in an 
organization affects the level of knowledge, and the quality of time schedule and 
staffing affects time opportunity.  
 
Table  6.1 The direct Links between “Human-related activities” and “Internal PSFs” 
NYNNContingent Workforce (CW)






































 Table (6.1) shows the factors in “human-related activities” that have direct effects 
on Individual PSFs (sign Y stands for “direct relation”, sign N stands for “no 




scattered in different psychology literature, but here we relied on Ostroff( 1995), and 
separately eliciting her judgment . A more detail analysis of these relations needs 
future research. 
 
6.2.10 Maintenance Group Safety Climate and Its Links to Internal 
PSFs (Link “F” in Figure 6.2) 
 
 For the maintenance group safety climate, we use the factor developed by 
Gibbons et al. (2005), except the “safety value”. We also changed “organizational 
commitment” to “routine system” that covers the individuals’ perception regarding 
training, work environment, work schedule, and corresponding resources. Figure 
(6.13) shows maintenance group safety climate and its link to internal performance 
shaping factors. The climate contents are presented in the figure, but we refer the 
readers to Gibbons et al. (2005) for their complete descriptions. (see Appendix B)  
 Because of the importance of supervisors and their impacts on the other 
elements of climate, we give the group safety climate factors two layers. The bottom 
layer is the factor, named “supervisors”, which influence the factors of the upper 
layer. Supervisor’s effect is not only directly an element of group safety climate, but 
also they have impacts employees’ interpretation of other aspects of organizational 
practices. As Ostroff et al. (2003) describe, leaders and supervisors function as 
interpretive filters of organizational practices for organizational members. For 
example, the antecedents of employee’s perception about “training” are both “actual 




































































































































































































































































































































































Figure  6.13 MX Group Safety Climate and its link to “Individual-level PSFs” 
 
 As it was explained in Section (5.10), group safety climate affects 
psychological safety climate and ultimately motivation in the individual-level PSFs. 
Psychological safety climate includes the same factors of group safety climate, but is 
measured at the level of individual.  
 As a complementary point, we need to mention that group climate for 
technicians are different from group climate for staffs or inspectors. The elements of 
climate are the same, but perception survey should be filled with different employee 





6.2.11 The Link between Organizational Safety Practices & 
Maintenance Group Safety Climate (Link “G” in Figure 6.2)  
 
 The link between organizational safety practices and the contents of group 
safety climate are built by making connection between human-related activities and 
the content of group safety climate. For example, the actual quality of training has 
effect on the employee’s perception about training. This perception is also affected by 
supervision (an element of emergent process).  
  


































Table (2) presents the causal connections between human resource activities and 
maintenance group climate. These relations are built based on analysis of the 




safety climate adapted from Gibbons et al. (2005) ( Appendix B). Expert judgment 
has been used for some of the justifications.  
 The abbreviations used for the factors of Table (6.2) can be found in appendix 
A and B. “Y” refers to the presence of relation. For example, the table shows that 
empowerment as a practice of human resource influences accountability (AC). More 
specifically empowerment affects employees’ perceptions about accountability. “N” 
stands for no relation. 
 
6.2.12 Emergent Processes & Their Links to the Framework (Link 
“H” & “I” in Figure 6.2)  
 
  There are three possible links between emergent processes and the other parts 
of framework. The first one is the link between emergent process and group safety 
climate. As mentioned in the Section (5.9.2), emergent process factors including 
supervision/leadership, social interactions, and homogeneity are antecedents of 
climate. Figure (6.14) represents the relation between emergent process and group 
safety climate. Supervision in the emergent process affects the perception of 
employees about supervisors (an element of group safety climate). The other two 
emergent process factors affect all elements of group safety climate and create relate 
to the strength of shared perception regarding those aspects.  
  The second link of emergent process with other elements of the framework 
represents the effects of human resources on the emergent process, as depicted in 




 The third potential link of emergent process represents the possible direct 
effects of supervision on the opportunity (an element of individual PSFs). This link is 
not shown in Figure (6.2) in order to keep the figure simple .For example, time 
pressure can be due to supervisors’ attitudes and/or human resource function. Zohar 
& Luria (2005) have argued that the procedural formalization in organization limits 
supervisory discretion. Therefore, the strength of direct effects of supervision on 













































































































































































































6.2.13 Regulatory Auditing System & its Link to the Framework 
(Link “J” in the Figure 6.2)   
 
 Regulatory effect is either through policies and standards or through the 
quality of the auditing system. In the present framework only the auditing aspect is 
considered. Regulatory auditing in aviation is a three-stage task and consists of:  
a) SAI (Safety Attribute Inspection): assessing whether the safety policies 
are in compliance with regulations, and whether organizational practices 
are designed based on safety policy;  
b) EPI (Element Performance Inspection): assessing whether organizational 
performance practices are implemented based on designed statements; 
c)  RE (Reporting): reporting the detected deficiencies in a timely and 
effective manner.  
 Looking at the SAI and EPI documents, we have noted that some of the 
procedures and resources such as manuals, inspection procedures, calibration and test 
procedures, and tools/equipments are directly audited by FAA, and thus there should 
be some direct links between regulatory auditing system and those elements. Others 
such as engineering procedures, repair procedures, purchased parts and materials are 
not audited directly by FAA, and are only audited internally by airlines. 
6.2.14 Financial Effects and Feedbacks (Link “K” & “M” in Figure 
6.2)   
  
 Most studies have been devoted to the effects of culture on the financial 
performance (e.g., Siehl and Martin, 1990), leaving the impact of financial 




existence of a possible correlation between financial wellbeing of a firm and the 
safety performance of firms. 
 Like any private enterprise, though, an airline has to generate revenues in 
order to stay in business and even to plan for offering safe service. With that in mind 
and considering the fact that being safe naturally costs the airline, if an airline appears 
to be profitable does it mean that it is safe? Will a safer airline attract more travelers 
and be at a better financial standing? Are people aware of the level of the safety of 
airlines in the market and do they consider this in their decision making about 
transportation? Is the history of financial performance a strong predictor of its safety 
in the coming years? Is the history of safety a predictor of their financial wellbeing in 
future? Although some of these questions might seem to be trivial, researchers have 
struggled to provide answers. The results in the literature range from no relationship 
between finances and safety to strong correlation between the two. The spread of the 
results in this area alone emphasizes the importance of investigating the interactions 
of financial status of an airline and its safety.  
 We tried to collect all the factors that different research works in aviation 
domain, have pronounced as important. Finding the most representative ones and 
determining the best method of analyzing the existence of correlation between such 
factors and safety culture is outside of the scope of this thesis. Future research need to 
be devoted to this topic. 
 D. Golbe(1985) has studied the relationship between profitability and safety in 
airlines using data from US airline industry. She examines the statement in a US civil 




measures, removal of entry and price controls would be likely to degrade safety. Any 
serious financial difficulties would be conducive to a deterioration of safety.” She 
argued that the firm maximizes utility by choosing expected profit and safety. 
However, neither expected profits nor safety is directly observable. Realized profit is 
used as a substitute for expected profits and total number of incidents is as a 
substitute for the firm’s safety. The model is thus the system of structural equations:         
),( 1xIncidentfprofit =         
),( 2xprofitgincidents =    
where 1x  and 2x , are measures of exogenous variables that determine profit and 
incident rates. Golbe then proposes a model of a set of two cross-section equations, 
and as a measure of safety chooses the square root of the total number of incidents. 
The factors involved in her model are: total number of incidents, load factor, stage 
length (miles), number of departures, and net income or rate of return (as a measure 
of profitability). 
 Golbe then performs regression once on two separate groups of data on 
domestic flights in the US from 1963 to 1966 and from 1967 to 1970 to look for the 
possible effects of changes in technology. She also performs a regression on domestic 
flight data from 1952 to 1970. She claimed that the evidence on airline safety and 
profitability does not support the popular wisdom and no statistically significant 
relationship seems to exist between safety and profitability. She also indicates that 
there is even a weak negative relationship between the two, that is, more profitable 




 It is worthwhile, however, to note that the profits of the airline in a year have 
been regressed against the accidents of the same year. This might lead to incorrect 
interpretation, since there is probably a delay between the onset of financial troubles 
and effects on the operations and safety.  
 Noronha and Singal (2004), explored how financial distress could lead to 
riskier strategies in an airline. They, too, ran a regression on an equation to examine 
the relationship between the frequency of mishaps and the financial situation of the 
airlines. As a representative of financial status, they have picked the bond quality of 
the firms and have given those letter grades, cardinal values. The regression has been 
conducted on data from major airlines only and covers years 1983 to 1998 in three 5 
year periods.  The factors in their model are: bond rating, number of departures, 
passenger miles, and number of incidents. They did not considered incidents due to 
causes such as airport congestion and severity of weather because of data limitation.  
Their finding supports the idea that the financial health of an airline affects its ability 
and willingness to provide safety and financially stronger airlines are significantly 
less at risk than weak ones.  
 Financial characteristics and its impact on airline safety in Taiwan is the 
subject of work by Wu et. al (2002).  They believe that poor financial conditions may 
weaken the airline safety in two ways. First, airlines may cut off the investment 
budget. They claim that, although under-investment or under-profitability may not 
directly undermine the airline safety, enough investments or excellent profitability 
will directly influence the safety environment through good training facilities and 




expenditure of crew training and maintenance for unprofitable airlines in a short term. 
They believe that financial distress might cause the firms to pursue riskier strategies. 
For this study they have categorized financial ratios to reflect six categories of: 1- 
Short-term liquidity; 2- Capital structure; 3- Long-term solvency; 4- Return on 
investment; 5- Asset utilization; and 6- Operating performance.  
 The factors (variables) in this model are: current ratio, quick ratio, debt ratio, 
permanent capital to fixed asset ratio, return on assets, return on equity, operation 
revenue to total assets ratio, operation assets to fixed asset ratio, operating income 
ratio, and net income ratio.  The authors rank each variable from 1 to 8, from the best 
to the worst, and use the Overall Concordant Order Ratio (OCOR) and Marginal 
Order Ratio (MOR) developed by Chang et. al (2000) to measure the overall ranking 
of the financial performance of airlines. Their conclusion potentially supports the link 
between financial conditions and safety.  
 The brand name effect of airline crashes has been studied by Maloney (2000). 
In this paper, in contrast with the above mentioned papers, the effect of accident 
(safety) on the reputation of the airline and its financial situation is of interest to the 
author. Even though the airlines would not suffer from loss of a plane and liability 
claims, since they are fully insured, but in cases where airline is at fault in an 
accident, the study shows that there is a significant negative stock market reaction to 
the event. But this negative effect does not occur if there is less reason to suspect that 
the airline shirked its responsibilities. Accidents will also cause an increase in 
insurance rates which increases the cost of airline’s operation and will draw 




here support the idea that customers do indeed avoid riskier airlines. Another 
interesting finding of this paper is that it finds no evidence of deregulation in the 
pattern of brand name effect. Since the market is efficient and punishes the airline 
responsible and at fault for an accident, the study claims that the need for increased 
airline safety regulation is not apparent.  
 Squalli (2004) examines the effect of safety and accidents on customers’ 
reaction towards an airline and demand. First it is stated that carriers’ accidents lead 
to a generalized fear of flying. This may indicate that when accident happens 
consumers do not feel immediately safer by switching to other carriers. There is also 
no statistical evidence that large airlines would want to vary their fare in response to a 
recent accident. 
But small carriers tend to lower their fares in reaction to their own accidents. On the 
other airlines would charge higher when their rate increases.  
 In terms of demand and financial loss, the aggregate impact of accidents on 
large carriers’ enplanement is 3% of their quarterly enplanement and 1.8 million 
passengers which is equal to $284 million in revenue losses in the quarter following 
the accident and no sign of recovery during the following four quarters. This study 
also investigates if people recall the accidents or partially remember them, or forget 
about accidents completely and consider them as totally random events and forgive 
the carrier.  Factors in this study are: passenger enplanement, average ticket fare, total 
operating expenses, crashes, fatalities, bankruptcies, bond rating, mergers and 




 A model has been presented by Hartmann (2000) that estimates how accidents 
affect consumer purchasing behavior and how this influences airline’s provision of 
maintenance. This study models consumers as utility maximizers and firms as profit 
maximizers. It concludes that information disclosed by accidents influences the 
competitor carriers’ demand as well as that of the carrier involved in the accident. 
Moreover, overall industry demand is more sensitive to changes in safety provision 
by less safe carriers than changes in overall industry safety provision.  
 Naturally, it seems intuitive and trivial to think that safety and financial health 
of any organization that offers any service, including airlines, go hand in hand. 
However, one study (Golbe, 1986) indicates otherwise. As mentioned before this 
study has missed the concept of delay that exists between the appearance of financial 
distress and risky behavior of airlines. Generally the works presented fall in one of 
the two categories: 1) exploring what happens to the airline’s safety policy and 
concerns and its risk level if the firm is financially in trouble, and 2) exploring what 
happens to the airline’s financial standing if an accident happens in that carrier or 
another carrier, given that the airline is at fault for that accident or not. 
 Exploring all afformentioned references, the potential financial factors in the 
safety framework in aviation context would be:   
- Total number of incidents 
- Load factor 
- Stage length (miles) 
- Number of departures  
- Net income  
- Rate of Return 
- Bond rating 
- Number of Departures 
- Passenger mile 




- Current ratio 
- Quick ratio  
- Debt ratio 
- Permanent capital to fixed asset ratio 
- Return on assets 
- Return on equity 
- Operation revenue to total assets ratio 
- Operation assets to fixed asset ratio  
- Operating income ratio  
- Net income ratio 
- Passenger enplanement 
- Average ticket fare 
- Total operating expenses 
- Crashes, Fatalities 
- Bankruptcies  
- Bond rating 
- Mergers and acquisitions 
- Average industry fare 
 
 To our knowledge there has not been a study that carefully looks at the 
interactions of these two terms (safety and financial performance) in a dynamic 
environment. A couple of the questions that are to be answered with further studies, 
in our view could be:  
1. How long does it take before a sign of a financial distress affects the safety 
policies and safety culture? 
2. How long does it take before an incident or accident can shift the firms’ 
financial situation? 
3. What magnitude of financial difficulty can create change in the risk level of 
an airline? 





6.2.15 Weather Conditions (Link “L” in Figure 6.2)  
 Weather conditions affect the physical environment of the aircraft and also 
affect crew decision-making.  In other words its effects are on the system risk 
(hardware) and the human in the operation path (not the human in the maintenance 
path). Its connection to the technical system risk model is through its influence on the 
system failure rate due to external factors (see fault tree in the Figure 6.3). Roelen & 
Wever (2005) include the weather condition factors including weather observation 
source, visibility, wind, and precipitations in the aviation risk scenarios. Weather 
observation source is the source that the crew consulted to receive weather 
information. Visibility is provided in miles.  Wind is provided as a speed in knots and 
a direction in degrees.  Precipitation is indicated as either none, rain, freezing rain, 
sleet, snow, hail, or mixed.  Intensity is indicated as low, moderate, or heavy.  
 
6.3 An Example Application of Hybrid Technique: Integrating 
“STELLA” & “IRIS” in Aviation Context 
 
 In this section, a simplified version of the causal model, described in the 
Figure (6.2), is used to demonstrate the application of a hybrid technique (see Section 
(4.10)). The main objective of this section is to show how an example of a hybrid 
technique can practically operationalize the organizational safety theory. 
  Integration of STELLA (a system dynamics software) and IRIS (a risk 
analysis software produced in Center for Risk & Reliability) provides this hybrid 
environment.  IRIS is a combination of BBN, ESD, and FT techniques. STELLA has 




SD is added to the bottom layer of the risk model (see Figure 6.15) to depict some 
deterministic and dynamic causation mechanisms. SD is a deterministic tool and its 
combination with BBN adds a stochastic dimension. This integrated software has 















































Figure  6.15 Integration of STELLA and IRIS 
 
 The following briefly describes how different elements of Figure (6.2) are 
implemented in STELLA and IRIS environments.  
6.3.1 Organizational Safety Culture in SD Environment 
 
 In Section (6.2.7), we explained the safety culture factor and its link to the 




a measure of safety culture. Management commitment shapes the managerial 
decisions regarding organizational safety practices. In this model, we only connect 
management commitment to safety practices, “training’ and “hiring”, in order to run 
the example.  
 The management commitment module of the model illustrates important 
feedback loops that rule the dynamics affecting management’s commitment to safety. 
Naturally, management should balance priorities between safety and profitability of 
the airline. One possibly is that financial pressure may reduce the relative importance 
that managers give to safety, which eventually leads to the lowering of technicians’ 
commitment to safety (see Section 6.3.4). In Figure (6.16) financial priority exponent 
indicates the degree of influence that safety has on management commitment 
changes. 
 Since technicians will try to meet the service expectations imposed by 
management, they will respond to low management commitment to safety by 
skipping the procedures or perform them in a substandard manner, and in general 
more risky behavior to meet the deadlines and the schedule set by the management. 
As a result there will be an increase in incident rate and human error probability.  
 This, on the other hand is balanced by the way increases in incident rates 
increase management’s commitment to safety. A change in management commitment 
to safety is a function of deviation of safety output from normative safety level. 
Normative level of safety is usually set by regulators or social and cultural standards. 




exponent indicates the degree of influence that safety has on management 
commitment changes.  
 The two exponents including safety and financial priority exponents refer to 
the efficacy of organizational double-loop learning process that is mentioned in the 
Section (5.12). 
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Figure  6.16  management commitment module in SD environment  
 
 
 Cooke (2004), constructed a management commitment module designed for 
mine industry, and the present module is a modified version that captures the effect of 




commitment” in SD, follows the concept of “sea anchor and adjustment” by Sterman 
(2000). It describes the process of ‘groping” towards a proper quantity. It assumes a 
certain level of commitment for managers and technicians as a starting point, which 
changes according to pressures (safety and financial states) that are applied to the 
organization. A complete list of equations used in this module is provided in 
Appendix C. 
6.3.2 Financial Stress in SD Environment   
 
 The idea of the financial subsystem is to demonstrate how financial distress 
affects safety culture and how safety output impacts financial wellbeing.  One 
possibly is that as an organization faces a financial distress, the management 
intuitively concentrates on service and increasing the turn over. This might translate 
into a lower level of safety commitment which means less attention to training and 
more time pressure on maintenance technicians that leads to higher error probabilities 
by the technicians and finally higher risks. But this immediate solution ignores the 
fact that higher risk and higher incident rates in an airline will ultimately affect 
market’s perception of the airline and result in deeper financial distress. 
 Section (6.2.14) discussed the financial effects and feedbacks, and provided a 
set of factors suggested in the literature. The financial distress subsystem has been 
constructed based on Albert Altman’s Z score model (1968). Z score model contains 
a combination of some of those factors. Altman’s model suggests that a “Z” score that 
consists of a linear combination of a set of financial ratios available on a firm’s 
balance sheet can be a representative of the firm’s financial standing. The model 




                     (Equation 6.9) 
 
The Z score is: 
54321 6.03.34.12.1 xxxxxZ ++++=                                                     (Equation 6.10) 
 This model is applicable to firms that are publicly traded, otherwise a 
modified version of the model need to be used. According to this model, if the Z 
score is less than 1.81, the firm is facing a financial distress the following year with a 
probability of 95%. Z scores between 1.81 and 2.67 are of concern but not threatening 
and above 2.67 raises no concern about the financial stress. 
 This model has been incorporated in the financial distress subsystem in order 
to capture the organization’s behavior when facing a financial situation (low Z 
scores). The stress will cause management to ultimately be distracted from the safety 
concerns, concentrating on recovering balance sheet figures. Lower management 
commitment level to safety will result in lower technician commitment to safety, and 
higher incident rates, substandard training and higher technician error probability, 
which increases accident risk. This will affect consumers’ perception of the airline 
safety and affect its sales and the firm’s market value of equity directly and will lower 









































Figure  6.17  Financial pressure module in SD environment  
 
 The structure of equations that shapes these changes is provided in Appendix 
C. The multipliers in this module are assumed values. More realistic values require 
empirical studies. 
6.3.3 Organizational Safety Practices in IRIS & SD Environment 
 
 In Section (6.2.5), we classified organizational safety practices into:  “human-
related activities”, “procedure-related activities”, “resource-related” activities, and 
“common activities”. In this example, we select “training” and hiring” for human 
related activities. The maintenance procedure- and resource-related activities are all 
covered in this model. From common activities, we only include internal auditing 





6.3.3.1 Modeling Training in SD 
 
 This subsystem is intended to capture the way the experience level in an 
airline changes. Attrition, rookies or senior technicians, reduces the average 
experience in the maintenance department and hiring and training adds to it. 
Technicians also gain experience on the job. The level of training and its quality are 
also a managerial decision and is affected by the management commitment to safety. 
The goal is to fill the gap that exists between the level of experience needed in the 
organization (Target experience in Figure (6.18)), and the level that currently exists at 
any time. Less commitment to safety obviously decreases the level of training and 
therefore the amount of experience in the airline which could lead to higher 
probability of technician error. There is also a time lag involved in the training 
process that has been considered in this module. (Cooke, 2004 & Sterman, 2000) 
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Figure  6.18 Training module in SD environment  
 





6.3.3.2 Modeling Hiring in SD 
 
 Cooke (2004) illustrated hiring relations in the mining industry. Mc 
Cabe(1998) has also presented similar relations for airline employees. Our module 
and its equations are modified from these two models.  
 The hiring subsystem describes the process of hiring rookie maintenance 
technicians, and their transition to experienced technicians. In this process some 
technicians including rookies and seniors quit the organization for  different reasons 
(for example, poor work condition, excessive workload resulting from financial 
pressure, and lack of management’s commitment to safety, and technician’s lack of 
commitment to safety).This is shown as “quit rate” in Figure (6-19). Hiring has been 
defined as a process of trying to reduce the gap between the existing total number of 
technicians in the organization and the number of technicians required to fulfill the 
maintenance tasks, according to the market or regulating demands on the airline 
(Target technician demand, in Figure (6.19)). On the other hand, hiring is a 
managerial decision, and hence depends on the level of management’s commitment to 
safety. It is management’s decision to hire and train more people to meet the demand 
or place more pressure on the existing work force. There is also a time lag associated 
with the hiring process that has been considered in the subsystem. The outcome of the 
module is the total number of technicians in the system which will be used in training 
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Figure  6.19 Staffing module in SD environment  
 
 
The list of equation in this section is provided in Appendix C. 
 
6.3.3.3 Modeling other organizational safety practices & regulatory auditing 
factors in IRIS 
 
 
 In the organizational safety practices categories, training and hiring are 
molded in SD. For the rest of organizational safety practices including resource-
related activities, procedure-related activities, and internal auditing activities, we have 
used a (static) probabilistic model in form of BBN. As we explained in Chapter 4, in 




factors, the probabilistic model is more appropriate. This example represents the 
feasibility of combining of these two tools. 
 The factors described in the Sections (6.2.5.1) and Section (6.2.5.2), (the 
internal auditing activities and external regulatory auditing factors), are entered in the 
IRIS in form of a BBN model. These factors will be connected to the BBN 
representation of a “maintenance unit process model” that will be explained in the 
Section (6.3.5). 
6.3.4 Individual-level PSF in SD Environment  
 
 In Section (6.2.8), the individual-level factors including psychological 
climate, motivation, ability and opportunity are described. Here, we designed 
“Human Reliability” module (Figure 6.20) to assess technicians’ error probability as a 
function of its individual-level PSFs .  
 In the “Human Reliability” module, for “ability”, we considered “knowledge” 
to be equivalent to level of experience, which is imported from the of training 
module. For opportunity, we selected “time pressure”, which is a function of demand 



























Figure  6.20  Human reliability module in SD environment  
 
 Base on Section (6.2.8), motivation is affected by psychological climate and 
group climate. Here, we have not modeled the psychological climate and group 
climate explicitly. To execute the example model, we considered a term “technician 
commitment”, which is directly affected by management commitment. Figure (6.21) 
shows the ‘technician commitment” module which is a modified version of Cooke’s 
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Figure  6.21 Technician’s commitment module in SD environment  
 
 As Figure (6.20) shows, “relative management commitment to safety” 
influences technician’s “personal commitment to safety”. Higher management 
commitment to safety pressures technicians to be more committed to safety and 
follow the standard procedures (for maintenance). Another factor also effects 
technicians’ level of commitment and that is the incident rates. Higher incident rates 
(which basically mean higher risk) will raise their commitment to safety. Obviously 
lower management attention to safety will eventually lead technicians to be less 
conscious about safety. 
 Similar to the “Management Commitment to Safety” module, “technician 
commitment to safety” has also utilized the concept of “sea anchor and adjustment” 
(Sterman, 2000) in modeling commitment changes. All related equations to 




 The human error probability model used in “Human Reliability” module is 
adopted from Nuclear Action Reliability Assessment (NARA). This model uses a set 
of Generic Task Types (GTTs) to describe various tasks modeled in Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment (PRA). These GTTs are modified by considering further factors, 
which are known as Error Producing Conditions or Performance Shaping 
Factors(PSF),  affecting performance. The process is mathematically simple, but 
needs a great deal of judgment specially when deciding which Error Producing 
Conditions (EPC) are present and what Assessed Proportions of ‘Affect’ (APOA) 
should be used. (B. Kirwan, et.al., 2004). Appendix C includes equations used in the 
“Human Reliability” module. 
 The output of this module, technician error probability, is fed to “management 
commitment” module to model the dynamics of management commitment to safety. 
Also, the assessed human error probability is an input to maintenance unit process 
model (see Section 6.3.5) in order to obtain maintenance quality index, which is the n 
used to calculate engine failure rate due to maintenance error. 
 
 
6.3.5 Maintenance Unit Process Model & Aircraft Airworthiness in 
IRIS Environment  
 
 Section (6.2.4) describes the unit process model. Those factors are included in 
the IRIS using BBN modeling. (see Figure 6.22) The factors of this unit are affected 
by BBN factors of organizational safety practices (mentioned before) and regulatory 









Figure  6.22 Maintenance unit process model in BBN  
 
 
All the probabilities of the nodes and their related conditional probabilities are based 
on Eghbali’s maintenance model (2006) developed for airlines. 
 
 
6.3.6 Technical System Risk in IRIS Environment 
 
 
 In Section (6.2.1), we described the technical system risk models. In order to 




developed in IRIS. (see Figure 6.23 & 6.24) The scenario consists of two event 
sequence diagrams (ESD1 & ESD 28). 
 Aircraft system failure (ESD1) describes the accident type “uncontrolled 
collision with ground”. The initiating event is the aircraft system failure and it takes 
place in the take off phase. Single engine loss of power during landing (ESD28) 
describes the accident type “uncontrolled collision with ground” with single engine 
failure as initiating event and at landing phase. 
 
 











 Both ESDs are linked to related fault trees (see Figure 6.25). Maintenance 
related engine failure from ESD 28 is linked to the aircraft airworthiness (BBN 




Figure  6.25 Fault tree for maintenance-related engine failure (IRIS environment)  
 
6.3.7 Typical Outputs 
 
 
a) Figure (6.26) displays the trend that could be traced in management 
commitment to safety, technician commitment to safety, and technician error 
probability in a period of 15 years. The advantage of these results over those 
of static models is that they are able to show the periods of increase in safety 
output (e.g. technician error probability in Figure (6.26)). Organization may 




other periods. Modeling the dynamics of the organizations provides warnings 
for the potential accidents (the pick of human error in the figure). 
 
 
10:06 PM   Wed, Jul 04, 2007Page 1































Figure  6.26 Management commitment, technician commitment, and technical probability of 




b) Increase in human error probability leads to increase in management 
commitment with a time delay. This also raises technician’s commitment to 
safety. After a while, because of the higher commitment levels of technicians, 
error probability starts to decline and eventually decreases management 
sensitivity to safety issues hence decreasing their commitment to safety, 
leading the rise in error probabilities.(see Figure 6.26) 
 
c) Trend of risk over time can be seen in Figure (6.27), which shows the results 




in risk over the 15 years, and it emphasizes the need for dynamic 
organizational safety risk analysis. (referring to principle M) Since the current 
example, only considers the effects of organizational factors on the 
technicians in the maintenance module, we can not make any conclusion 
about the values of risk from this analysis, and only the existence of changes 
is highlighted. More realistic value of risk needs future research that includes 
the effects of organizational factors on the other elements of maintenance unit 



















Figure  6.27  Total system risk over 15 years 
 
 
d) Figure (6-28) illustrates that if for any reason (i.e. A disaster such as 911 that 
effects the whole industry) an airline is subjected to financial distress, 
management commitment to safety will decline and at the same time decrease 
in management commitment will cause technician error probability to incline. 
Observing higher error probabilities will force management to set the 




The results will be a gradual increase in error probabilities and gradual decline 
in management commitment to safety. 
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Figure  6.28 Financial stress as a trigger point for gradual decline in management commitment to 
safety 
 
e) Figure (6-29) displays the case, where lower error probabilities remains 
basically constant for the first seven years. These low error probabilities will 
take management concentration away from safety, suggesting that the 
organization is safe as is. But as the management commitment and 
consequently technician commitment to safety declines, error probabilities 
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Figure  6.29 A period of low-stable human error as a trigger point for gradual decline in 











The results of the effort documented in this thesis can be summarized as follows:  
 
1. A comprehensive set of “principles” upon which organizational safety theory 
could be built and evaluated, has been introduced. In the absence of such  
principles and modeling guidelines rooted in theory and empirical studies, all 
models look equally good, or equally poor, with very little basis to 
discriminate and build confidence. Therefore, this research focused on the 
possibility of improving the theoretical foundations and principles for the field 
of “Organizational Safety Risk Analysis”. These principles are a series of 
testable propositions with supporting rationales, insights from other research 
efforts, and/or integration of different theories across diverse disciplines. 
2. This research also offers a process for adapting appropriate techniques to 
create a “hybrid” modeling method in order to operationalize the theoretical 
organizational safety frameworks, in a manner consistent with the articulated 
principles. Ingredients are taken from techniques in Risk Assessment, Human 
Reliability, Social and Behavioral Science, Business Process Modeling, and 
Dynamic Modeling.  
3. Additionally an organizational safety risk framework, named “Socio-technical 
Risk Analysis (SoTeRiA), has been proposed as the realization of 




safety risk theory are: (1) theoretically supported relations between 
organizational safety culture, organizational safety structure/practices, and 
organizational safety climate, with specific distinction made between safety 
culture and safety climate, and (2) the multi-level nature of the framework 
which explicitly recognizes the relationships among constructs at multiple 
levels of analysis. 
4.  Other contributions of this research are in implementing the proposed 
organizational safety framework in the aviation domain, particularly the 
airline maintenance system. We also applied an example of the proposed 
hybrid modeling environment including an integration of SD, BBN, ESD, and 
FT to demonstrate the feasibility and value of hybrid frameworks. This hybrid 
technique integrates “deterministic” and “probabilistic” modeling 
perspectives, and provides a flexible risk-informed decision making tool. 
  
 The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which partially supported 
this research effort, has recognized the role of organizational factors as one of the 
most critical aspects in the quest to achieve 80% reduction in aviation accidents at the 
same time that the volume of flights is expected to increase by a factors of 2 or more.  
Since catastrophic accident rates are already extremely low, the identification of 
causal factors that could contribute to such risks and those that might help in 
mitigating them is very difficult. The solution requires a systematic and 
comprehensive methodology for causal modeling in order to relate the risk scenarios 
to their human and organizational performance roots, and to the regulatory and 




 The challenge is that human and organization have “holistic” and “collective” 
natures, and predicting their performances needs modeling such holistic nature. On 
the other hand, we need to identify the controllable characteristics of individuals and 
organization in order to be able to prevent incidents and accidents. This requires a 
causal model that can provide specific links between such characteristics and 
organizational safety performance.  The four contributions of this research attempt to 
strike a balance between these two competing needs. The foundations developed in 
this report form a basis for formulating the needed techniques. The resulting causal 
model, through proper integration with models of the technical systems, can help 
manage risks proactively, based on leading indicators in the safety related practices of 
the organization, and relevant regulatory and oversight activities.  
 
7.2 Answers to the Open Challenges  
 
 Considerable improvements during the past two decades in the sophistication 
of quantitative methods of safety and risk assessment have led many to assume that 
the same style of causal modeling is an effective way of assessing and managing 
organizational safety risks. There are, however, a number of open challenges in 
developing a predictive model of organizational safety risk, as highlighted in Chapter 
(2) in details. In the path towards defining a set of “principles”, developing 
organizational safety “theory”, and implementing the “model”, we have found 
answers for many of the open questions, addressed in Chapter (2). Our answers are at 




implementation in certain cases. The following is a summary of our answers to the 
specified challenges identified in Chapter (2): 
 Principles (C) discuss the importance of moving from models, based on 
“deviation from normative performance” (i.e., second-generation models) toward the 
models based on “actual performance” (i.e., third-generation models). We argue that 
the concept of “error” and “deviation” can be clearly defined for the technical system 
and the individuals directly operating and/or maintaining it, but this concept should 
not be extended to the internal factors (e.g. ,emotional and  cognitive factors) and  
external factors (e.g. team and organizational factors) affecting the performance of 
individuals. The “collective” effects of organizational factors create the 
organizational safety performances. It is difficult to point to a single term as 
management or supervisor error that can be lined up in a chain of failures (holes in 
the Swiss Cheese Model (Reason, 1990)), and indeed the combined effects of 
different factors and “misfit” of the factors is what leads to output error of an 
organization. In other words, performance is a collective characteristic of an 
organization that emerges from the interaction of its elements.  
 The majority of second-generation quantitative frameworks cover three parts: 
organization model, operator model, and technical system model. Based on principle 
(Da), the proposed safety framework in this thesis is developed as a “multi-level” 
theory of organizational safety performance in order to integrate macro- and micro-
organizational perspectives, taking into consideration the relationships between 
constructs on different levels of the analysis. Thus, the proposed framework has three 




purpose of “risk management”, organizational safety framework is cross-level, 
covering paths of influence from organization level as a whole, to groups, and 
individuals, and then from the individual-level back up to organization-level safety 
outcome.  
 Technical system risk, which is the organizational-level safety outcome in the 
proposed theory, emerges from group and individual performance. Based on principle 
(L), depending on the nature of emergence, a technique should be used in order to 
combine the lower level constructs into the higher level construct. As we mentioned 
in chapter (4), technical system risk can be represented using logical techniques such 
as Fault Trees (FT) and Event Sequence Diagrams (ESDs). Thus, these are the 
candidate techniques that connect the group and individuals’ performances to 
organizational safety outcome. 
 Assessing and evaluation of the third-generation technical system models is 
out of scope of the current thesis. Regarding the technical system, we theoretically 
discussed the place of technical system model in the integrated organizational 
framework. In the implementation part, we used second-generation models for the 
technical system, in order to facilitate the discussion on integrated organizational 
safety framework, and focus mostly on organization part. 
 Roelen et al. (2003) have used the concept of safety Critical Tasks (SCTs), as 
a link between organization and technical system scenarios. In this thesis, we 
borrowed this concept, and called the group or individual performances that directly 
affect on the elements of technical system risk scenarios as Safety Critical Tasks 




directly affects hardware failure (an element of risk scenarios). In general, SCTs can 
be either events explicitly specified (e.g. human actions) in the accident scenarios, or 
implicitly through model parameters (e.g. equipment failure rate). SCTs help to focus 
on what matters most for safety among many activities in organizations. The path of 
connection between group safety performances (SCTs) and organizational safety 
outcome covers some techniques including FT, ESD, and also Omega Factor (Mosleh 
& Golfeiz, 1999). The Omega factor technique is a parametric function that converts 
the nature of group safety performance to the nature of failure rates of the elements of 
risk scenarios. In this thesis, we implemented the concept of SCT and Omega factor 
in the aviation maintenance context. 
 The other possible connection in the proposed framework is the link between 
individual performance and group performance (i.e. SCT). As we explained in the 
principle (P) and also chapter (4), “process modeling technique” can model an 
activity (or a set of activities), and thus we use this technique to model the safety 
performances of the groups and make a non-linear connection between group 
members’ performances and their output performances (SCTs).  We name this 
linkage module “unit process model”. Unit process model includes the direct 
activities that produce the Safety Critical Task (group safety performance). 
Davoudian, (1994a and 1994b) has used a similar concept (i.e. work process) in his 
safety framework. We generalized this concept to the multi-level framework, with 
separating the group level process model and the process model of supporting 




activities, and procedure-related activities). The process modeling technique is also 
implemented through the aviation maintenance in Chapter 6. 
 The proposed organizational safety framework is grounded on a “theory”, 
rather than relying on a “set of factors” (e.g. WPAM (Davoudian et al. 1994a and 
1994b)) or accident data (e.g. MACHINE (Embrey, 1992)). Based on principle (B), 
safety is one of the organizational outcomes/performances, thus organizational safety 
framework should be grounded on the organizational performance model. The 
theoretical frameworks for organizational effectiveness were reviewed, and the model 
developed by Ostroff et al. (2003) was adopted in order to create a systematic relation 
between safety culture, safety structure, and safety climate in a multi-level 
framework. The comprehensiveness (mentioned in principle G) of safety model needs 
the coverage and integration of the social (e.g. safety culture and safety climate) and 
structural (organizational safety structure & practices) aspects of organization that 
influence safety. Most of the previous safety models focus on either social or 
structural aspects. But the research that attempted to include both aspects has not 
established their theoretical relations. Besides, there is no clear distinction between 
safety culture and safety climate in the existing safety frameworks, and these two 
have been used, most of the time, with a verity of definitions, and interchangeably, in 
the frameworks.  
 Some of the existing second-generation safety frameworks (e.g. Embery, 
1992) have mentioned human model as a link between organization and technical 
system risk. Modeling the third-generation human (individual) model, which is a 




discussed with respect to its link to the organizational factors. The term, 
psychological climate, is missing in the current human reliability models. We added 
this term as “psychological safety climate” to the individual model, as the 
individual’s perceptions of organizational safety practices. Organizational safety 
structure & practices affect internal Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) and 
ultimately individual safety performance through two different paths of influence: (1) 
Organizational safety practices collectively influence organizational safety climate, 
which is the shared perception of employees about actual organizational safety 
practices. Organizational safety climate affects group safety climate, which in turn 
influences psychological safety climate (an element of individual-level PSF). 
Psychological safety climate impacts individuals’ motivation in the unit process 
model. (2) Different sub-factors in Organizational safety structure & practices can 
also directly impact individual internal PSFs. The direct effects are caused by the 
influences of “human-related activities” on the “ability” and “opportunity”. For 
example, a low quality work environment, such as poor air conditioning and lights, 
can affect physical opportunity, and training has effects on people’s knowledge.   
 The other challenge in the human and individual model is capturing the 
collective nature of human performance that is similar to the collectiveness in 
organization. In this thesis, configurational approach is proposed as a solution for 
dealing with dependency of individual performance shaping factors in human 
reliability analysis. Cluster analysis can find the specific profile or pattern across 




 Most of the previous studies have developed a set of organizational factors 
without adequate discussion about measurement approaches. Measurement approach 
has been studied in my research, especially for the following objectives: developing a 
more accurate understanding of the real state of each factor; identifying different 
aspects of a specific factor; understanding different paths of influences; and better 
treatment of the dependencies among factors. The principle (H) of the current 
research is proposed that the factors of the safety casual model can be measured in 
three different ways: objective, subjective, and combinational. Theorists need to 
choose the measurement method based on (1) the type, the level, and the underlying 
theoretical model of construct, (2) the objective accuracy, and (3) the availability of 
data. Besides, a Bayesian approach for combinational measurement method is 
proposed. Theorists should consider a Bayesian combination of two measurement 
approaches as an appropriate technique because of its two advantages: (1) Reducing 
uncertainty: this approach integrates two sources of information about the state of a 
factor (or an attribute), and provide more accurate estimate of the actual state of the 
factor (or an attribute), and (2) Possibility of combining two pieces of information 
with different natures including subjective and objective. 
The confusion in the subject of safety measurement mainly comes from 
mixing the two aspects of measurement, i. e. “method” and “basis”. Measurement 
methods answer the question of how to measure the factors and links in the safety 
causal model, and measurement bases refers to which aspects of the accident 
causation need to be measured. The present study is an effort to clear up the 




perspectives that have been introduced based on measurement “methods” and 
different measurement “bases”. 
 Based on principle (B), safety has interaction with other organizational 
performances. None of the second-generation models has considered the financial 
performance in their frameworks, but some of the third-generation such as Cook 
(2004) has considered the non-safety performance (e.g., production) in their models. 
In this thesis, the performance of the organization is divided into safety performance 
and financial performance. Safety performance impacts financial performance, and 
financial performance affects safety performance through a number of paths of 
influence. The financial performance affects the safety performance both directly and 
indirectly. In the current study, we use the safety culture as a barrier that eliminates 
the direct effects of financial pressure on the safety practices in organizations. Then, 
we need to substitute the statistical relation between financial pressure and safety 
culture. Most of the existing research has studied the effects of culture on the 
financial performance (e.g. Siehl and Martin, 1990), not financial performance on the 
culture. Besides, the investigation of the existence of a possible correlation between 
financial wellbeing of a firm and the safety performance of firms has been of interest 
to researchers and managers for a long time. This is likely of extra importance if 
unsafe operation could translate into a disaster. One of the challenges here is the 
selection of a suitable set of financial factors and correlating them to safety culture. 
The preferred method of studying the existence of such a correlation and the degree 




 The other important aspect that is highlighted in the proposed framework is 
the need for dynamic modeling of organizational safety frameworks. Static 
organizational safety frameworks cannot capture the risk originated from: (1) delay or 
time-scale variations, (2) feedback loops, and (3) temporal cycles in the model. The 
direction and the strength of the links in organizational safety model are the function 
of organizational age. The time boundary and reference point of theory must be 
explicitly specified. The dynamic aspects of organization are discussed conceptually; 
a hybrid appropriate technique to capture dynamic aspects is proposed, and also 
implemented through the example in Chapter 6.  
 There is some debate about which “techniques” are more or less appropriate 
for organizational safety risk analysis. The candidate techniques for organizational 
accident causation theory are selected from risk assessment, social and behavioral 
science, business process modeling, and dynamic modeling techniques. As we 
mentioned in chapter (2) of the thesis, most of the existing second-generation safety 
frameworks use variations of the Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) or Influence 
Diagram, which is a probabilistic technique. As a first step of building the hybrid 
technique, we adapted BBN because of the following advantages; (1) BBN factors, 
with a probabilistic-based nature, can be mathematically linked to the technical 
system techniques (e.g., event trees and fault tress). Mosleh et al. (2005) and Wang 
(2007) have discussed the detail explanation about the procedure of this link, (2) there 
are mathematical relations between regression-based techniques and BBN. (Roehrig, 
1993, Burns & Clemen, 1993) Most social and psychological theories are in form of 




we can include (quantitatively) the psychological and social theories as parts of the 
organizational accident causation theory, (3) BBN has a capability of applying 
subjective expert opinion. Adapting this technique makes the quantification of the 
organizational accident causation theory possible, even with a lack of actual data, (4) 
regression-based techniques are capable of testing causal theories using actual data. 
Having the relation between BBN and regression-based techniques makes the testing 
of the organizational accident causation theory (or at least part of that) possible, (5) 
for risk management purposes, it is necessary to have a technique that is capable of 
assessing the impacts of potential changes. BBN is a technique that can be applied for 
predicting the effect of changes, and (6) process modeling techniques that are 
appropriate for modeling unit processes and organizational practices, are semi-formal 
techniques, and need to be converted to formal techniques for the purpose of 
quantification. Since BBN is a formal technique, we proposed the conversion of 
process modeling technique to BBN. 
 On the other hand, BBN models are inadequate for representing dynamic 
behaviors of organization. For example, feedback loops and delay cannot be modeled 
properly. Therefore, the existing third-generation organizational safety frameworks 
mostly used System Dynamics, in order to tackle the “dynamic” mechanism of 
organization. Some of the third-generation frameworks (e.g. Cooke, 2004 & Leveson, 
2003) have not included the existing technical system risk techniques in their 
frameworks. Considering that technical systems mostly lean towards “unifinality”, 
the concept of “error” and “deviation” can be clearly defined for the technical system 




technical risks. Therefore, as a second step of building the hybrid technique, we 
proposed that the hybrid technique should have the capability of pre-existing classical 
PRA techniques (i.e., ESD, FT), which have been able to develop technical risk 
scenarios successfully.  
 We also argue that the deterministic techniques are appropriate for the case of 
knowing detailed information about the interrelations of the factors. But, the modelers 
may not have enough information about the interactions of the factors for some part 
of the model, and that part should be quantified using a probabilistic technique such 
as BBN. Thus, as a third step of building the hybrid technique, we proposed that an 
integration of deterministic (SD) and probabilistic (BBN) can be appropriate in that 
case. 
  For some part of the safety framework, in which the factors are highly 
interrelated, and modelers even have less information about the relations, a candidate 
technique is configurational approach. Configuration is defined as “conceptually 
distinct characteristics that commonly occur together” (Meyer et al., 1993, p.1175). 
Schulte et al. (2006, p.648) believe that configurations “allow for examining multiple 
characteristics simultaneously while accounting for the interrelationships and 
interactions among them”. Configurational approach helps to capture the collective 
nature, without knowing the detailed relations of the factors. Therefore, 
configurational approach should be another possible technique in the proposed hybrid 
tool.  
 In this thesis, an example of Hybrid technique is implemented in the aviation 




al. 2003), with main layers of Event Sequence Diagrams (ESDs), Fault Tress (FT), 
and Bayesian Belief Nets (BBNs), and it integrates HCL with System Dynamics 
technique.  ESDs on the top delineate the possible risk scenarios. The events, 
conditions, and causes of the scenarios are incorporated through the FTs and BBNs, 
i.e. the second and third layers of the HCL. SD is added to the bottom layer of the risk 
model to depict some deterministic and dynamic causation mechanisms. SD is a 
deterministic tool and its combination with BBN brings a stochastic insight of this 
tool to the field of organizational safety risk analysis. 
7.3 Future Work 
 The challenge of this project has given us many new research thoughts that we 
mention here as a suggestion for future works: 
 We have already applied the proposed safety framework for an aviation 
maintenance system, and future work needs to extend this to the operation (e.g., flight 
crew), and analyze the common effects of organizational factors on operation and 
maintenance of an airline, and ultimately the airline risk performance. Although the 
main concern of this project are high risk organizations, such as nuclear power plants 
and airlines, and even though the risk scenarios are referring to “major” accident 
scenarios , the approach is general and can be applied for occupational safety as well. 
 Organizational structure and practices are strongly interrelated, but in this 
research we have not focused on the relation between safety structure (e.g. 
centralization, formalization) and safety practices (e.g., human resource practices, 




safety practices and safety performances. Future research needs to uncover the 
detailed relations between organizational safety structure and safety practices.  
 Layer (2-1) of the organizational safety practices, mentioned in Section 
(6.2.5.3), should include the related resources, procedures, and human actions for the 
human resource functions. We have not expanded this layer in the current work. 
Besides, layer (3-1) of the organizational safety practices, mentioned in the section 
(6.2.5.4), should include the procedure, resources, and human actions that are needed 
for “common activities” including design, implementation, auditing, and change 
system. Future work could be devoted to the development of process models for 
human resource practices and common activities. 
 As the proposed theory highlights, at the organizational level, safety culture 
shapes managerial decisions regarding organizational safety practices and structural 
features. There is some confusion about the differences between safety cultures and 
climate. Most surveys for safety culture include safety climate rather than safety 
culture.  There is a need for a more comprehensive organizational safety culture 
survey. This can be done by adapting multiple methods, suggested by Ostrof et al. 
(2003) for organizational culture, including Organizational Culture Inventory (OCI) 
and Competing Values Framework (CVF), as well as Organizational Culture Profile ( 
OCP).   
 As it is argued in the proposed framework, financial performance affects 
safety performance both directly and indirectly. One of the challenges here is the 
selection of a suitable set of financial factors and their relation with safety culture. 




the degree of their strength needs future research. To our knowledge there has not 
been a study that carefully lookED at the interactions of these to fields in a dynamic 
environment.  
 The measurement aspect of organizational safety framework is analyzed 
“conceptually”, the “techniques” are also discussed, but not implemented in the 
current thesis. Future efforts can focus on gathering data in a longitudinal study to test 
the predictive power of different measurement approaches and value of the inference 
methods suggested in this thesis. One of the technical challenges is to account for the 
impact of time lags in predictions and in combining different methods of 
measurements. 
 In this thesis, we have referred to the configurational approach as an 
appropriate technique since it takes into consideration the simultaneous effects of 
social and structural elements of the safety causal model on safety performance. One 
important discussion about applying the configurational “fit” to safety prediction 
would be determining which safety causal factors to include among the many. 
Theoretically, incorporating more factors will make the predictions better, but at 
some level, it may make the model too complex to be analyzed. Future work is 
needed to study the configurational fit model as a predictor of safety performance and 
to uncover the most appropriate factors for such a study. A configurational approach 
was conceptually discussed in the hybrid technique, but it is not implemented in the 
example of Section (6.3). Future work needs to be devoted to this difficult problem. 
 In the example of hybrid technique in Section (6.3), we combined the second-




system method used is static. Future work can explore the use of a totally dynamic 
environment, third-generation technical system techniques, which also includes 
dynamic organizational factor model.  
 Reviewing the approaches in quality assessments hints an interesting 
direction: the idea of using quality measure as a “surrogate” of safety measure. A 
question is, whether we can use the concept of “Excellency” (the criteria in the 
European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) Excellence Model (Zink, 
1995)) of organization as a predictor of safety performance. Future empirical studies 





APPENDIX A: HUMAN RESOURCE FUNCTIONS 
 
The following items are adapted from Ostroff (1995): 
 
Selectivity in Recruiting/Hiring (SE) 
• Examining various recruiting sources (e.g. want ads, employee referrals, 
colleges) to determine which provide the most appropriate employees 
• Provide information to job applicants that realistically describes the job and 
company (positive as well as negative aspects) 
• Regularly conduct validation studies in the tests, predictors or hiring practices 
used 
• Use hiring procedures or tests that are based on job duties and requirements  
• Use hiring procedures or tests to determine who will best fit in with the 
company’s culture and values 
Internal Staffing (ST) 
• Fill non-entry level position from among present employees who desire 
promotion or transfers 
Contingent Workforce (CW) 
• Use nonpermanent workers (e.g. temps, contractors, retirees) in managerial-
related jobs 
• Use nonpermanent workers in professional, non-managerial jobs 
• Use nonpermanent workers in low-level jobs, such as secretarial, custodial, 
etc. 
Training and Employee Development (TR) 
• Conduct formal analyses to determine the training needs throughout the 
company  
• Develop clear specific objectives for what is to be learned in training 
programs 
• Determine the most appropriate method (e.g., lecture, role-playing, hands-on) 
for teaching particular skills in training program 
• Provide training (inside or outside the company) to keep employees’ skills up-
to-date 
• Develop mechanisms to that employees are supported or rewarded for using 
their newly learned skills on the job 
• Provide remedial or basic skills training fir those employees who need it 
• Provide programs (e.g. training, mentoring, job rotation) to develop new skills 
and prepare employee for variety of jobs in the company  
• Develop career plans and paths for employee movements in the company 
• Counsel or meet with employees to discuss their own career goals and realistic 
career options 
• Have formal orientation programs that provide new employees with 





• Regularly (at least once a year) conduct appraisals of employees’ performance 
• Have supervisors/mangers meet with individual employees to give 
developmental performance feedback  
• Develop performance appraisal forms that focus on the relevant duties and 
specific skills requires for successful job performance 
• Train mangers in conducting accurate performance appraisals and giving 
employees feedback 
Compensation and Reward Systems (RE) 
Job Based Pay 
• Determine pay levels for each job category using a formal job evolution 
system to compare and order jobs based on skills levels and/or experience 
• Determine pay levels for each job or jobs category based on information about 
the “going rate” in the market 
• Group jobs into pay classes or pay grades and determine a pay range for each 
class 
• Formally analyze and determine the most appropriate mix of direct pay and 
benefits 
Individual Merit Rewards 
• Link individual employees’ rewards, raised or bonuses to how well they 
perform the job 
Contingent Rewards 
• Link individual employees’ rewards, raises or bonuses to how well the unit or 
team performs 
• Regularly evaluate whether productivity goals and quality standards are being 
met  
• Provide incentives to employees to increase productivity or quality 
Organizational-Based Reward 
• Use reward and compensation programs that link employees’ rewards to how 
well the company performs (e.g. profit sharing, employee stock ownership 
plans) 
Skill-Based Pay 
• Base individual employees’ raises/bonuses on a skill-based pay system 
Pay Leader 
• Adhere to pay policy of being a pay leader (high paying) in the industry or 
area 
Non financial Rewards 
• Encouraging managers/supervisors to use non-financial rewards such as 
recognition, praise, etc. 
Benefit 
• Provide health retirement insurance and other benefits to employees 
• Have procedures to assist employees in understanding their benefits 
Job Analysis (JA) 
• Conduct job analyses that describe the tasks performed, behaviors, abilities, 
knowledge and skills needed, and equipment required to perform the job 




• Use standardized, systematic procedures to collect job analysis information 
Job Enrichment (JE) 
• Design jobs to provide employees with sufficient variety, autonomy and 
feedback 
Team Systems (TS) 
• Establish committees/teams of employees who examine productivity and 
quality problems and provide recommendations for changes 
• Utilize autonomous workgroups or self-managed teams who have 
responsibilities for decisions assigning work, and determining work methods 
• Use a total quality management approach to improve productivity and service  
Employee Assistance (EA) 
• Offer employee assistant programs to help employees deal with personal job 
related issues such as stress, family problems, substance abuse and financial 
counseling 
• Sponsor or provide fitness programs for employees, such as athletic programs 
or fitness clubs 
• Use alternative work schedule, such as flexible hours, job sharing, part time 
work or work at home 
• Use a flexible benefits package that gives employees in allocating their 
benefits “dollars” across health, retirement, insurance, child care, etc. 
• Provide programs or benefits to help employees balance work and family 
concerns such as childcare, elder care, referral networks, childcare sick leave, 
etc. 
• Provide outplacement services, such as counseling and job search skills, for 
employee who are discharged or laid off 
Due Process (DP) 
• Have a formal grievance procedure or formal complaint resolution system for 
employees 
• Adhere to progressive discipline system in which employees are disciplined in 
successive steps ranging an oral warning to eventual dismissal 
• Have mechanism in place for employees to communicate suggestions or 
register complaints 
Employee voice/Empowerment (EM) 
• Have formal procedures for sharing important information with employees 
• Involve employees in deigns and administration of compensation systems, 
performance evaluation systems, methods for enhancing productivity, etc. 
• Regularly survey the opinions pf workers regarding their job conditions and 
satisfaction 
• Involve employees in major decisions that will directly affect their work 
processes 
Diversity (DI) 
• Provide transition or other programs for employees to understand and accept 
members from other culture, ethnic background of gender groups 





• Establish goals, time tables and/or other procedures to increase minority 
representation and diversity in the company  
• Conduct adverse impact analyses or analyses to determine if discrimination 
against members of protected classes exists in hiring or promotion practices 
Legal compliance (LC) 
• Regularly check for compliance with laws pertaining to discriminations and 
disabilities 
• Regularly check for compliance with laws pertaining to employee safety 
• Regularly check for compliance with laws pertaining to employee rights 
• Regularly check for compliance with laws pertaining to pay, compensation 
and benefit 
 Safety (SA) 
• Maintain an accident record system or use committees of workers or causes of 
accident and safety hazards 
• Train employees to emphasis safe practices in the work place  
• Conduct internal safety inspection 
Union Relations (UR) 
• Employees unionized labor  
Of those with unions: 
• Monitor the number of NLRB grievances filed 
• Efficiently settle collective bargaining contracts for unionized employees 
• Share information with union representatives regarding the companies 




APPENDIX B: SAFETY CULTURE /CLIMATE FACTORS 
 
 
Safety culture factors in airline maintenance (Gibbons et al., 2005)  
 
In chapter 5, we argued that these items are the mixture of safety culture and climate. 
 
1. Organizational Commitment :  
 
o Safety Fundamentals (SF) 
 
f) Shift work and day-off scheduling policies at my company greatly contribute 
to stress and fatigue in technicians. 
g) My company has effective shift turn- over procedures. 
h) My company’s maintenance manual and information system are kept up to 
date. 
i) Maintenance checklists and procedures are easy to understand and use. 
j) “Return to service” aircraft documentation and record keeping is taken 
seriously at this company. 
 
o Work Environment (WE) 
 
• Management is committed to updating tools and equipment used in 
aircraft maintenance ( e.g. NDT equipment , diagnostic tools). 
 
• My company ensures that tools and equipment ( e.g. work stands, 
hydraulic power sources , electrical equipment ) are regularly 
inspected , serviced, and are safe to use. 
 
• My company ensures that the environment ( e.g. lighting, air 
conditioning, ventilation) is conductive to effective maintenance work. 
 




o Safety Training (ST) 
 
• Maintenance technicians are given enough training to perform their 
work safely. 
 
• My company provides technicians with adequate safety related 






• Training practices at my company are centered around operational and 
airworthiness safety 
 
o Safety Value (SV) 
 
• Safety is defined as a “core value” in my company 
• Management is more concerned with making money than being safe. 
• People in my company would rather cancel a flight than take a chance 
with whether or not maintenance has been performed safely. 
• Management views regulatory violations very seriously, even when 
don’t result in any apparent damage. 
 
2. Formal Safety System :     
 
o Reporting system (RS) 
 
• Technicians don’t bother reporting mishaps or close calls since these 
events don’t cause any real damage. 
• The safety reporting system is convenient and easy to use. 
• Technicians can report safety discrepancies without the fear of 
negative repercussions. 
• Technicians are willing to report information regarding the marginal 
performance or unsafe actions of other technicians. 
• When technicians report a safety problem, supervisors act quickly to 
correct the safety issues. 
• Technicians are willing to file reports about unsafe situations, even if 
the situation was caused by their own actions. 
• Technicians who raise safety concerns are seen as troublemakers. 
 
o Response and Feedbacks (RF) 
 
• When technicians report a safety problem, it is corrected in a timely 
manner. 
• Safety issues raised by technicians are communicated regularly to all 
other technicians in this airline. 
• Technicians are satisfied with the way this airline deals with safety 
reports. 
• My airline only keeps track of major safety problems and overlooks 
routine ones. 
 
o Safety Personnel (SF) 
 




• Personnel responsible for safety have the power to make changes. 
• Personnel responsible for safety have a clear understanding of the risks 
involved in flying the line. 
• Safety personnel have little or no authority compared to operations 
personnel. 
• Safety personnel demonstrate a consistent commitment to safety. 
 
3. Informal Safety System :    
 
o Accountability (AC)  
 
• Management shows favoritism to certain technicians. 
• When accident or incident happens, management always blames the 
technician. 
• Technicians who perform substandard work are “rewarded” by 
receiving only the easy jobs. 
• The process taken to investigate possible unsafe maintenance behavior 
is fair. 
• Standards of accountability are consistently applied to all technicians 
 
o Professionalism (PR) 
 
• Technicians view the airline’s safety record as their own and take 
pride in it. 
• Technicians who perform substandard work develop a negative 
reputation among other technicians. 
• Technicians with less seniority are willing to speak up regarding 
airworthiness safety issues. 
• Decisions made by senior technicians are difficult to challenge. 
• Technicians never cut corners or compromise safety regardless of the 
operational pressures to do so. 
 
 
o Technicians’ Authority (AU) 
 
• Technicians are actively involved in identifying and resolving safety 
concerns. 
• Supervisors support technicians who stop a job because of a concern 
about safety or airworthiness. 
• Technicians routinely perform operational checks after work is 
completed. 
• Effective communication exists up/ down the chain of command. 
• Technicians are seldom asked for input when procedures are 




• Technicians who call in sick or fatigued are scrutinized by supervisors 
or other management personnel. 
• Technicians have little real authority to make decisions that the safety 
of normal operations. 
 
4. Supervisors :   (SU) 
 
o Supervisory Involvement  
 
• Supervisors distribute the workload evenly among technicians 
• Supervisors shield technicians from outside pressures( e.g. flight 
crews, dispatch) 
• Supervisors provide clear and helpful feedback to technicians about 
their safety compliance. 
• Supervisors keep technicians informed about potential hazards 
associated with maintenance activities. 
• Supervisors are often unhappy when technicians take time off for 
training. 
 
o Marinating Standards 
  
• Supervisors do not permit technicians to cut corners.  
• Supervisors often fail to recognize when maintenance technicians 
engage in unsafe practices. 
• Maintenance supervisors closely monitor proficiency standards to 
ensure technicians are qualified to perform the assigned tasks. 
• Supervisors stop unsafe operations or activities . 
• Supervisors never pressure inspectors to sign-off on borderline work. 





APPENDIX C: MODEL EQUATIONS FOR MODLUES IN 
STELLA 
 
The model is implemented in STELLA, supplied by “i see systems”. The model 
equations are grouped according to each module. 
 
Hiring 
Effect of relative technician commitment on quit = a graphical input 
Gap in number of technicians = Target technician Demand Total technicians 
Hiring time = 0.5 year 
Hiring= IF Gap in Number of technicians>0 then INT ((Gap in Number of 
technicians*Relative management commitment to safety)/Hiring Time) ELSE 0 
Rookie promotion time = 5 years 
Rookie quit = INT (Rookies*Effect of Relative technician Commitment on 
quit*Rookie quit fraction) 
Rookie quit fraction = 0.1 
Senior quit = INT (Effect of Relative technician Commitment on quit*Senior quit 
fraction*seniors) 
Senior quit fraction = 0.1 
Target technician demand = Demand/Technician working hours per year 
Technician working hours per year = 2000 hrs/year 
Total technicians = rookies + seniors 





Average experience of technicians hired = 1000 hours 
Average technicians experience = Total technicians Experience/Total technicians 
Experience gap = Max (Target experience Average technicians experience,0) 
Increase in experience from hiring = Hiring*Average experience of technicians 
hired 
Increase on job experience = Total technicians*Safety experience gained in 
flights*Training 
Loss of experience from attrition = Total Number of Quits*Average technicians 
experience 
Reference Experience = 5000 hours 
Relative experience of technicians = Average technicians experience/Reference 
experience 
Safety experience gained on job = Relative technician commitment 
Target experience = 2000 hours 
Time to provide training = 0.5 year 
Total number of quits = Rookie quit + Senior quit 










Management Commitment to Safety 
Change in management commitment to safety = (Target management commitment 
to safety Management Commitment to safety)/Time to change management 
commitment to safety 
Effect of financial pressure on management commitment to safety = SMTH1 
((Management drive to prioritize financial situation over safety) ^FP exponent, FP 
effect time) 
Effect of relative technician error on management commitment to safety = 
SMTH1 ((Relative technician error Probability) ^exponent, effect time) 
FP effect time = 0.25 year 
FP exponent = 0.1 
Management drive to prioritize financial situation over safety = if Z score<2 then 
Z score else Z score*0.3 
Pressure to change management commitment to safety = MAX (0.020, 
Management Commitment to safety)*Effect of relative tech error on management 
commitment to safety*Effect of financial pressure on management commitment to 
safety 
Reference technician error = 0.2 
Relative technician error probability = technician error Probability/reference 
technician error 
Safety pressure effect time = 0.25 year 




Target management commitment to safety = min (Pressure to change management 
commitment to safety, 1) 
Time to change management commitment to safety = 0.5 year 
 
 
Technician Commitment to Safety 
  
 
Change in technician commitment = (Safety goal - Personal tech Commitment to 
Safety)/Time to change personal commitment to safety 
Effect of relative management commitment on technician commitment = SMTH1 
((Relative management commitment to safety), management commitment effect time 
on personal commitment) 
Effect of relative risk on technician commitment = SMTH1 ((Relative technician 
error Probability) ^Personal incident learning exponent, risk effect time on technician 
commitment) 
Management commitment effect time on technician commitment to safety = 0.25 
year 
Maximum personal commitment to safety = 1 
Normal management commitment to safety = 0.8 
Normal technician commitment to safety = 0.8 
Personal incident learning exponent = 0.4 
Pressure to change personal commitment to safety = MAX (Personal tech 
Commitment to Safety, 0.020)*Effect of relative management commitment on 




Relative management commitment to safety = Management Commitment to 
safety/Normal management commitment to safety 
Relative technician commitment = Personal tech Commitment to Safety/Normal 
technician commitment 
Risk effect time on technician commitment = 1 year 
Safety goal = min (Maximum personal commitment to safety, Pressure to change 
personal commitment to safety) 






APOA experience = graphical function 
APOA moral = graphical function 
APOA time pressure = graphical function 
Demand =280000 hours 
EPC experience = 8 
EPC moral = 2 
EPC time pressure = 11 
GTT = 0.01 
Regulatory allowed working hours = 2000 hours/year 
Technician error probability = GTT*(((EPC time pressure-1)*APOA time 
pressure+1)*((EPC experience-1)*APOA experience+1)*((EPC moral-1)*APOA 
moral+1)) 




Time available = Total technicians*Regulatory allowed working hours 
Time Pressure = demand / Time available 
financial Pressure 
Decrease = if Relative risk>1 then Z score* Z decreasing multiplier else 0 
Decrease in Z = Delay ((smth1 (Decrease, .01)), 0.1) 
Decreasing multiplier = 0.05 
Increase = if Relative risk <1 then Z score*Z increasing multiplier else 0 
Increase in Z = Delay ((SMTH1 (Increase, 0.01)), 0.1) 
Relative risk = Relative technician error Probability 




APPENDIX D: TECHNICAL SYSTEM RISK ANALYSIS 
TECHNIQUES 
 

















Figure  0.1 Accident Scenario Context for Safety Analysis (NASA PRA Procedures Guide, 
Stamatelatos, 2002) 
 
 The figure depicts the change of state of a technical system initially operating 
within the "safe functional/physical zone" (shaded area).  At point "A" an event (e.g., 
equipment failure) occurs, causing deviation from the safe zone, putting the technical 
system in an undesired state (point "B").  Another event (e.g., crew recovery action) 
is initiated at that point, and depending on whether it succeeds or fails, the technical 
system is put back into the safe zone (point "C"), or otherwise an accident occurs 
(point "F").  The sequence of events from A (the initiating event) to the end states (C 
or F) forms two simple scenarios.  These scenarios provide the context within which 




ESD is a visual representation of a set of possible risk scenarios resulting from an 
initiating event. Historically, “Event Sequence Diagram” has been a loosely defined 
term, and ESDs have been used in a variety of industries for different purposes.  They 
have been used in probabilistic risk analyses by the nuclear power and aerospace 
industries to develop and document the basis for risk scenarios, and also to 
communicate risk assessment results and models to designers, operators, analysts, and 
regulators.  ESDs have also been used in the aviation industry as part of safety and 
reliability analysis of aircraft systems.  NASA has used ESDs to help identify 
accident scenarios.  In all three applications mentioned above, ESDs have been used 
both qualitatively for the identification of hazards and risk scenarios, as well as 
quantitatively to find probabilities of risk scenarios (Stamatelatos, et. al, 2001).  
 Other methods, closely related to ESDs and used in risk and safety analysis of 
complex systems, are Event Trees and Decision Trees.  Both are inductive logic 
methods for identifying the various possible outcomes of a given initiating event, but 
differ in how they are applied, depending upon whether human control can influence 
the outcomes (as in decision trees) or whether the outcomes depend only upon the 
laws of science (as in event trees).  The “initiating event” in a decision tree is 
typically a particular business or risk acceptance decision, and the various outcomes 
depend upon subsequent decisions.   In risk analysis applications, the initiating event 
of an event tree is typically a component or subsystem failure, and the subsequent 
events are determined by the system characteristics. As in ESDs, an event tree begins 
with a defined accident-initiating event.  This event could arise from the failure of a 




trees must be constructed and evaluated to analyze a set of accidents.  Once an 
initiating event is defined, all of the safety systems that can be utilized after the 
accident initiation must be defined and identified.  These safety systems are then 
structured in the form of headings for the event tree.  This is illustrated in Figure (0.2) 
for two safety systems that can be involved after the defined initiating event has 
occurred. 
 




















Figure  0.2 Illustration of an Event Tree 
        
 
 Once the systems for a given initiating event have been identified, the set of 
possible failure and success states for each system must be defined and enumerated.  
Careful effort is required in defining success and failure states for the systems to 
ensure that potential failure states are not included in the success definitions; much of 
this analysis is done with the fault tree technique discussed earlier.  If bifurcation 
(two-state) modeling is employed, for example, then one failed state and one success 




number of discrete states is defined for each system (such as would be used when 
including partial failures), then a branch must be included for each state. 
 Once the system failure and success states have been properly defined, the 
states are then combined through the decision-tree branching logic to obtain the 
various accident sequences that are associated with the given initiating event.  As 
illustrated in figure (4.2), the initiating event is depicted by the initial horizontal line, 
and the system states are then connected in a stepwise, branching fashion; system 
success and failure states have been denoted by S and F, respectively.   
 FTs( Figure 0.3)  have been extended to include various types of logic 
relations - Priority AND gates, Sequence Dependency gates, Exclusive OR gates, and 
Inhibitor gates (Dugan et al. 1990) and have been extended to include multi-state 
systems (Veeraraghavan & Trivedi, 1994, Wood 1985, Yu et al. 1994, and Zang et 
al.2003). 
  To conduct the construction of a fault tree for a complicated system, it is 
necessary to first understand how the system functions.  A system function diagram 
(or flow diagram) is used to initially depict the pathways by which signals or 
materials are transmitted between components comprising the system. A second 
diagram, a functional logic diagram, is sometimes needed to depict the logical 



















APPENDIX E: BAYESIAN BELIEF NETWORK (BBN) 
 
Bayes' theorem in the subjective theory of probability is at the core of the inference 
engine of BBNs. Bayes’ theorem was formulated by Rev. Thomas Bayes in 1763 
(published in the Philosophical Transaction of the Royal Society of London) and is 
based on the conditional probability decomposition of the joint probability of events. 
Accordingly, for two events A and B we have: 
)BPr(
)APr()A|BPr()B|APr( =                                   (Equation E.1) 
where: 
Pr(A | B):  Posterior, updated probability of A in light of new evidence or 
condition B,  
Pr(A):        Prior probability of A,  
Pr(B | A):  Likelihood of observing evidence B, given the occurrence of A.  
 
  The theorem states that starting with a prior probability, upon availability of 
new information, one's state of knowledge about the occurrence of an event is 
updated according to Bayes' formula.   
 Bayesian Networks can be viewed as a representation of the joint probability 
distribution, or as an encoding of a collection of conditional independence statements. 




understanding how to construct networks, whereas the second one is helpful in 
designing inference procedures. 
  In BBNs, every entry in the full joint probability distribution can be calculated 
from the information in the network. A generic entry in the joint distribution is the 
probability of a conjunction of particular assignments to each variable, such as 
( )nn11 xXxXPr == L  which is denoted as ( )n1  x..., ,xPr . Then the joint probability is 
the product of all appropriate conditional probability tables in the Bayesian Networks. 
The conditional probability table provides a decomposed representation of the joint 
distribution. 





iin1 Xparents|xPrx , ,xPr K            (Equation E.2)  
 
where parents(Xi) denotes the specific values of the variables in Parents(Xi). 
 BBN have been widely used in intelligent decision aids, data fusion, intelligent 
diagnostic aids, automated free text understanding, and data mining. The application 
of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) has also recently received increased attention in 
the field of reliability engineering and risk assessment. BBNs are applied to increase 
the flexibility of the modeling environment, as well as opening the way to new 
applications such as fault finding.  
 It may be evident that a Bayesian Network can be viewed as a probabilistic 
"expert system" in which the probabilistic knowledge base is represented by the 
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